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A B STRA C T
The cen tra l ques tion  th is  d isse r ta tio n  s e e k s  to  answ er  is: 
W hat does  ho m elessn ess  m ean, and how is th a t  meaning 
rhetorically c o n s tru c te d ?  W hat h o m e le ssn e ss  m ean s  is n o t  fixed 
nor s ta t ic ,  b u t  varies with use. To discover and develop  th e s e  
d ifferen t m eanings, th re e  s e t s  of d a ta  w ere  exam ined: a judicial 
opinion, an a d v o c a te ’s congress ional te s t im o n y , and testim onia l 
narra tives  by th e  hom eless. This d a ta  includes rhe toric  p roduced  
from th re e  d is tinc t poin ts  of view -- one th a t  is sy m p a th e t ic  to  
th e  hom eless, one th a t  is hostile to  th e  hom eless, and one th a t  has 
experienced  ho m elessn ess .
A Burkean m ethodology  w as em ployed, su p p lem en ted ,  w here 
appropria te , with insights from p o s tm o d ern  th e o r is ts .  The goal of 
th is  re sea rch  w as to  a r ticu la te  th e  multiple vo ices  which m ake up 
th e  t e x t  of h o m elessn ess .  This s tu d y  d e p a r ts  from traditional 
rhetorical s tu d ie s  by focusing on th e  hom eless , a marginal group.
It also em bodies  tradition by examining th e  official t e x t  o f  th e  
dom inant group.
Four conclusions can be  drawn from this  research . First, th e  
rhetoric  of th e  hom eless  is unique, for th rough  it, t h e  hom eless
vi
work to  overcom e liminality. The a c t  o f  testify ing  is a m eans  of 
asse rt ing  o n e ’s self. Second, th e  s i te  o f th e  d iscourse  is an 
im portan t co m p o n en t  of a s p e a k e r ’s legitimacy. Hom eless 
individuals speak ing  on Capitol Hill are  cons ide red  leg itim ate ; 
th o se  speaking on th e  s t r e e t  are  no t.  The s ite  confers  legitimacy. 
Third, th e  p re se n c e  and a b se n c e  of th e  hom eless  are rhetorically 
significant. P re se n c e  w as u sed  rhetorically  to  ju s tify  laws making 
th e  hom eless  ab sen t ,  to  urge action on their  behalf, and as proof 
t h a t  action can be effec tive . A b sen ce  was used  rhetorically to  
m ake th e  hom eless  go  aw ay and to  deny responsibility for th e  
problem. By testify ing , th e  hom eless  b ecam e  a p re sen ce  which 
could not be  ignored. Fourth, som eth ing  is undeniably lost when 
o th e rs  speak  for us. Telling o n e ’s  own s to ry  may be th e  u ltim ate 
m eans  of em pow erm ent. The hom eless , however, may never g e t  
a c c e s s  to  th e  political a p p a ra tu s  w ithou t re p re se n ta t io n  by an 
advoca te .  The key to  th e  su c c e ss  of any social action is to  control, 
as much as possible, th e  way th e  audience perceives it. The m eans 
to  this  end  is rhetoric .
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 S ta te m e n t  of th e  Problem
The cen tra l q u es tio n  this d isse r ta t io n  s e e k s  to  answ er is:
W hat does  h o m elessn ess  m ean, and how is th a t  meaning
rhetorically c o n s tru c te d ?  To u n d e rs ta n d  w hat h o m e le ssn e ss  m eans
requires th a t  one consider th e  language people use  to  talk abou t
h o m elessn ess .  Malinowski ( 1 9 2 3 )  o ffe red  a valuable p e rsp ec tiv e
on language and m eaning when he o bserved  th a t  language m eans  as
it is used. Hauser ( 1 9 8 6 )  e labo ra ted  this  position when he n o ted
“meaning lies in an in teraction  of language and c o n te x t” (p. 140 ).
As Lakoff ( 1 9 9 0 )  s ta t e s ,  "Language is politics, politics assigns
power, [and] pow er governs  how people talk and how th e y  are
understood"  (p. 6). Put ano ther  way, com prehending th e  meaning of
h o m e le ssn e ss  n e c e s s i t a te s  s tudy ing  th e  rhetoric  of h o m e lessn ess .
This re sea rch  is b a se d  upon tw o  fundam ental a ssum ptions . I
believe th a t  w hat people  say  a b o u t  h o m e lessn ess  m a t te rs .
Rhetoric re flec ts  o n e 's  understand ing  of a problem. "Through
rhetoric, we s ize  up s i tu a tio n s  and nam e th e ir  s t ru c tu re  and
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o u ts tan d in g  ingredients . How we describe  th e  s itua tion  indicates 
how we are perceiving it and th e  choices we s e e  available to  us" 
(Foss, 1989 , p. 3 3 6 ) .  Humans respond  to  th e  world symbolically, 
th rough language. Language is th e  medium of th e  com m unicative 
exchange, th e  m eans by which com m unication is possible. Language 
allows individuals to  define, ca ta log , c a teg o r ize  and  m anage  social 
problems. Campbell ( 1 9 7 2 )  a rgues  th a t  o n e ’s very in te rp re ta tion  of 
th e  world, b e c a u se  it is symbolic, is rhetorical.
Hauser ( 1 9 8 6 )  defines rhe toric  as “com m unication th a t  
a t t e m p ts  to  coord inate  so m e  social action" (p. 2). Social action is 
goal-driven and purposeful, and  com m unication aim ed a t 
accomplishing social ac tion  is rhetorical. L anguage provides 
im portant clues to  peop le 's  values, to  th e  goals th e y  are trying to  
achieve. Language is th e  m eans  by which t ra d e s  are nego tia ted . 
Trading is n ecessa ry  b ec a u se  so m e  goals can n o t be accom plished 
ex cep t  a t  th e  expense  of o th e r  goals. Econom ists  tell us th e re  is no 
such thing as a free  lunch, th a t  all ac tions  have co n seq u en ces .  In a 
like m anner, social ac tions  have co n se q u e n c e s .  Social action  is 
co nduc ted  symbolically, th rough  language. Thus th e  way people 
talk ab o u t h o m e lessn ess  a f fe c ts  hom eless  people, for “The world
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is articu la ted  in a sp eech  th a t  ques tions  and responds , everyw here  
subordinating and ordering” (Lingis, 19 7 9 , p. 154 ).  Because 
language e x p re sse s  o rder and com m unica tes  values, language can 
e ither bring people to g e th e r  or keep th em  apart. Thus th e  words 
people  use  to  talk a b o u t  h o m e le ssn e ss  carry significant 
consequences .
The se c o n d  assum ption  underlying th is  re sea rch  is th e  belief 
t h a t  th e  person  doing th e  talking m a t te rs .  This observa tion  is 
drawn from th e  con tr ibu tions  of th e  p o s ts t ru c tu ra l is ts .  Michel 
Foucault ( 1 9 7 1 /1 9 7 2 )  o bserved  in The Discourse on Language, th a t  
"...in every so c ie ty  th e  production of d iscourse is a t  once  
controlled, se le c te d ,  organised  and redistr ibuted ..."  (p. 2 1 6 ) .
Speech  is contro lled  for m any reasons , argued  Foucault 
( 1 9 7 1 /1 9 7 2 ) ,  b u t th e  m o s t  significant reason  is " to  av e r t  its 
powers and its dangers, t o  evade  its ponderous, aw esom e 
materiality" (p. 2 1 6 ) .
Paying a t te n t io n  to  th e  sp eak e r  requires a willingness to  
listen to  w hat King ( 1 9 9 2 )  te rm s  " th e  subaltern  voice." The 
subalte rn  voice -- known variously as  " th e  em erging voice" or " the  
m u ted  voice" -- "is th e  voice of th e  periphery, no t of th e  cen te r .  It
is th e  voice of th e  silent ones  who are  struggling to  speak" (p. 2). 
The voice of th e  hom eless  is th e  subalte rn  voice. King (1 9 9 2 )  
c o n te n d s  th a t  th o s e  on th e  margin "have historically lacked a c c e s s  
to  large audiences, political ap p ara tu s ,  and public media" (p. 2); so, 
to o  have th e  hom eless.
Not all sp eech  concerning h o m elessn ess  is m ade by th e  
hom eless, however. A dvoca tes  for th e  hom eless  have a c c e ss  to  th e  
political a p p a ra tu s .  A dversaries  confron ting  th e  hom eless  have 
a c c e s s  to  th e  public media. Discerning th e  meaning of 
h o m e le ssn e ss  requires  a willingness t o  listen to  multiple voices. 
Borrowing again from th e  p o s tm o d e rn is ts ,  s p e e c h  concerning 
h om elessness  can be viewed as a te x t .  “The idea of a t e x t , ” 
explains Klein (1 9 9 2 ) ,  “is no longer confined to  a w ritten  
re p re se n ta t io n  of ‘reality’ or, m ore narrowly, a work of litera tu re . 
Any s t a t e m e n t  of experience  -- any oral or w ritten  record, any 
th eo ry  or m ethod , any natural or human sc ience  — is a discursive 
practice  th a t  can be ‘read ’” (p. 10). A te x t  may exist “as a 
f rag m en t or t r a c e  of a larger d ia logue;” its n a tu re  is "multivoiced 
or polysemous" (King, 19 9 2 , p. 5).
To assem ble  th e  t e x t  one m u st  consider th e  voice of th e  
speaker, th e  voice which p roduces  th e  te x t .  The person  who m akes 
th e  a rg u m en t exerc ises  so m e  d e g ree  of influence. Thus th e  identity  
of th e  sp eak er  is im portan t as it re la tes  to  power. I am 
particularly in te re s te d  in how th e  person  making th e  a rg u m en t 
influences h om eless  people , and w hat kind of influence, if any, th e  
hom eless  th e m se lv e s  have.
The focus  of th is  d isse r ta t io n  is th e  rhe toric  of 
h o m e lessn ess .  More specifically, I wish to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  rhetoric  
of th e  hom eless . I b ec a m e  in te re s te d  in th e  hom eless  as  I 
d iscovered  how rarely the ir  vo ices  w ere  heard. Foucault 
( 1 9 7 1 /1 9 7 2 )  has obse rv ed  th a t  sp e e c h  is regu la ted  b ecau se  sp eech  
is power. "It is as  though  discussion, far from being a t ra n sp a re n t ,  
neutral e lem en t,  allowing us to  disarm sexuality  and to  pacify 
politics, w ere  one of th o s e  privileged a re a s  w here  th e y  [socie ty] 
exercised so m e  of their m ore aw esom e pow ers" (p. 2 1 6 ) .  Speech is 
regu la ted  in a varie ty  of ways. One rule or form of regulation deals 
with who speaks ,  or who is allowed to  speak . Foucault 
( 1 9 7 1 /1 9 7 2 )  obse rv ed  th a t  "no t ju s t  anyone, finally may speak  of 
ju s t  anything" ( p. 2 1 6 ) .  A seco n d  way sp eech  is limited is
topically, by regulating w hat may be  said. "We know perfec tly  well 
t h a t  we are  no t free  to  say  ju s t  anything, t h a t  we can n o t simply 
speak  of anything, when we like or w here  we like..." (Foucault, 
1 9 7 1 /1 9 7 2 ,  p. 2 1 6 ) .  A third limitation is location. "The place 
w here a sp eech  is given d ic ta te s  th e  kinds of th ings t h a t  can be 
said and th e  ways th ey  can be  said" (King, 1992 , p. 5).
As I co n d u c ted  my research  I w as repea ted ly  s tru ck  by th e  
ab se n c e  of th e  hom eless  from m o st  d iscourse  ab o u t hom elessness .  
This ab se n c e  very  powerfully s u g g e s t s  th e  d e g re e  to  which th e  
hom eless  are  marginalized. T here  is a g re a t  deal of sp eech  about 
th e  hom eless , b u t  very little sp e e c h  by th e  hom eless. Speech abou t 
th e  hom eless  te n d s  to  fall into tw o  general ca tego ries :  sp e e c h  
produced  on behalf of th e  hom eless, by adv o ca tes ,  and sp eech  
d irec ted  agains t th e  hom eless , by adversaries. One of th e  only 
places w here one can find sp eech  by th e  hom eless, o th e r  than  th e  
s p e e c h  d irectly  so lic ited  in in terv iew s, is th e  Congressional 
hearing. Here, hom eless  people  sp eak  for th em se lv es ,  publicly 
articulating the ir  own experience  be fo re  an audience. T hese  
sp e e c h e s  are  th e  focus of this  inquiry.
Once I d iscovered  th e s e  sp e e c h e s ,  several q u es tio n s  
su b seq u en tly  followed, th e  answ ers  to  which s u g g e s te d  t h a t  a 
large s to ry  w as waiting to  be d iscovered  and told. T h ese  ques tions  
are: (1 )  Is sp e e c h  by th e  hom eless  d ifferent from sp e e c h  abou t th e  
hom eless?  Are so m e  sp e a k e rs  viewed as  leg itim ate  while o th e rs  
are  denied legitim acy? (2 )  W hat similarities do  t h e s e  sp e e c h e s  
share?  Do th e  sp eakers  begin from th e  sam e prem ises?  Make th e  
sam e kinds of a rg u m en ts?  Reach th e  sam e  conclusions? (3 )  To 
w hat d e g ree  are  th e  hom eless  p re se n t  or a b s e n t  from th e  rhetoric 
surrounding h o m elessn ess?  And (4 )  how significant is their  
p resen ce  or ab se n c e ?  W hat is lost and w hat is gained by letting 
o th e rs  sp eak  for us?
To fully answ er th e s e  q u es tio n s  one m u st  firs t exam ine th e  
rhetoric p roduced  by th e s e  d ifferent ac to rs .  To th is  end, in this 
d isse r ta tion  I examine d iscourse  produced  by th e  adversary , th e  
adv o ca te ,  and th e  hom eless  th em se lv es .  C hapter Two deals  with 
th e  rhetoric  of th e  adversary . The d a ta  u sed  for th is  discussion 
w as th e  Opinion w ritten  by Circuit Ju d g e  Altimari in Young v. New  
York City Transit A uthority  (1 9 9 0 ). This opinion was se le c te d  
b ecau se  it is r e p re se n ta t iv e  of th e  nega tive  a t t i tu d e s  many people
hold tow ard  th e  hom eless. T h ese  a t t i tu d e s  are  e x p ressed  in 
varying ways in th e  p ress , b u t  few are  e x p ressed  as  clearly and 
succ inc tly  as  in Ju d g e  Altimari's  opinion. < The focus of C hapter 
Three  is th e  rhetoric  of th e  ad v o ca te .  Here, I examine a sp eech  
delivered by th e  ad v o ca te  Mitch Snyder. This sp e e c h  was chosen  
b e c a u se  it is re p re se n ta t iv e  of th e  a rg u m en ts  m ade  by a d v o c a te s  in 
general. Snyder is perhaps  th e  b e s t  known ad v o c a te  for th e  
hom eless , and, som e would argue, th e  m o s t  articu la te . In C hapter  
Four, th e  te s t im o n y  of several hom eless  people is exam ined. T h e se  
testim onia l narra tives  w ere  s e le c te d  b e c a u se  th e y  r e p re s e n t  th e  
only published s p e e c h e s  p roduced  by th e  hom eless . Both Snyder’s 
sp eech  and th e  sp e e c h e s  by th e  hom eless  w ere given as  te s t im o n y  
a t  Congressional hearings on h om eless  which occu rred  b e tw e e n  
1 9 8 0  and 1992 .
One m u st  also consider th e  influence of th e  various 
s itu a tio n s  on th e  rhetoric. The place from which d iscourse  
orig inates  confers  legitimacy on th e  speaker. Francesconi ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  
building from th e  writings o f Ju rg en  H aberm as, c o n n e c ts  
legitimacy with th e  s p e a k e r 's  w orth iness  to  be  recognized , arguing 
th a t  legitim acy arises  from th e  nexus o f "political com m unication
and social identity" (p. 2 1 ) .  Identity  is c re a te d  socially, th rough  
in terac tion  in particular s itu a t io n s  (Hewitt, 1 9 8 9 ) .  The s itua tion  
is th e  tim e and th e  place in which com m unication occurs.
Spatiality and tem pora lity ,  a rg u es  Soja ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  co n c re t iz e  social 
re lations and social p rac tice  (p. 1 4 3 ) .  Spatiality -- th e  “p lace” 
e lem en t of th e  s ituation  — confers  (or den ies)  legitim acy to  th e  
e x te n t  th a t  it com m unica tes  identity. Legitimacy is c o n te s ta b le  
b ec a u se  claims of legitimacy re s t  upon "norm ative" ju d g m e n ts ,  and 
b e c a u se  legitimacy is a s s e r te d  th rough  sp eech , it is "capab le  of 
discursive redem ption  or re jection" (Francesconi, 1 9 8 6 ,  p. 16). 
Conceived of in th is  m anner, legitim acy is a fundam entally  
rhetorical c o n s tru c t .
1.2 Purpose of th e  Study
The rh e to rs  and s itu a t io n s  exam ined  in th is  d is se r ta t io n  w ere  
s e le c te d  for several reasons . The th re e  rh e to rs  -- th e  ad v o ca te ,  
th e  adversary  and th e  hom eless  — all have so m eth in g  im portan t to  
say  a b o u t  h o m elessn ess .  Examining their  d iscourse  is im portan t 
b ec a u se  it allows one to  develop  a m ore co m p le te  p ic ture  of th e  
issue, from th e  point of view of th o se  sy m p a th e t ic  to  th e  
hom eless , th o se  hostile to  th e  hom eless , and th o se  who have
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actually experienced  h o m elessn ess .  Studying th e  s ite  in which th e  
discourse is p roduced  enab les  one t o  e labo ra te  th e  c o n c e p t  of 
legitimacy, to  g e t  a t  th e  underpinnings of a s p e a k e r ’s power. The 
adversary , in th is  c a se  th e  judge , is leg itim ated  by v irtue of his 
position. The ju d g e  p o s s e s s e s  institu tional au thority . The 
ad v o ca te ,  Mitch Snyder, derives his legitimacy from personal 
experience. His au thority  is c r e a te d  in par t  by his experiences  
living am ong th e  hom eless, and in part  by th e  a t te n t io n  he has 
received from th e  media. The hom eless  person  on th e  s t r e e t  
p o s se s se s  no authority; th is  sp e e c h  is largely ignored. When 
hom eless  individuals o ffer  public te s t im o n y , how ever, th e y  are 
a s se r t in g  th e ir  iden ti t ies  and  becom ing  leg it im ate  en ti t ie s .  
Comparing th e s e  s itua tions  allows th e  scholar t o  s tu d y  th e  
p resen ce  and a b sen ce  of th e  hom eless  in th e  p ro c e ss  of social 
change. Once this  analysis is com ple te , I will exam ine th e  
meaning of hom elessness .
The s tu d y  of th e  rhe to ric  o f  h o m elessn ess  is justif ied  for 
several reasons . Perhaps th e  m o s t  im portan t con tr ibu tion  this 
s tu d y  can make is to  a r ticu la te  th e  significance o f th e  p re sen ce  or 
a b sen ce  of th e  hom eless  in th e  p ro c e sse s  of policy form ation and
social change . The h o m eless  are  liminal en ti t ie s ,  "be tw ix t and 
b e tw een  th e  positions ass igned  by law, cu s to m  and convention" 
(Turner, 1 9 6 9 ,  p. 9 5 ) ,  who slip th rough  th e  c lassifications which 
loca te  s t a t e s  and positions within th e  com m unity. Having no 
p resence , th e  hom eless  are defined by their a b sen ce .  Possessing  no 
power, th e  hom eless  a re  no t p e rm it te d  to  speak  on the ir  own 
behalf. As King ( 1 9 8 7 )  co m m en ts ,  "All sp eak ers  are n o t  c re a te d  
equal. Som e...are  virtually ignored or m e t  with hostility" (p. 9). As 
a result,  m o s t  d iscourse  a b o u t  h o m e lessn ess  is filtered  by o the rs ,  
by individuals who are  n o t hom eless . In m o s t  social m o v em en ts ,  
th e  v ic tim (s) rarely sp eak  for th em se lv es ,  b u t  ra th e r  allow o th e rs  
to  speak  for them . The m ou thp iece  of a m ovem en t is o ften  
rem oved  from th e  c ircu m stan ces  for which th e  m o v em en t is 
fighting. T h ese  individuals a re  s e le c te d  as leaders  in large part  
b ecau se  th e y  are different; b e c a u se  th e y  have pow er to  induce 
social change. For a m o v em en t t o  be  successfu l, however, it m u st 
em pow er th e  m asses ;  it m u s t  le t th e m  tell the ir  own s to r ie s ,  it 
m ust let th em  speak.
The only people who can fully com m unica te  th e  m eaning of 
h o m elessn ess ,  I will argue, are  th e  people  who have experienced
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h o m elessn ess ,  b e c a u se  language co m m u n ica te s  individual 
experience: "It is o n e 's  whole ex is te n c e  t h a t  a r t icu la te s  and 
speaks...  " (Lingis, 1979 , p. 161 ).  Telling o n e 's  own s to ry  is th e  
u ltim ate  a c t  of liberation and  th e  u ltim ate  m ean s  o f em p o w erm en t.  
The com m unica tion  o f individual, particu larized  ex p er ien ce  
functions as w hat Turner ( 1 9 6 9 )  calls "com m unitas ,"  as  a 
"correc tive  expression  of solidarity which s e e k s  th e  unity of man" 
(Giamo, 19 8 9 , p. 104).
1.3 L ite ra ture  Review
H om elessness  has only recen tly  begun to  be  explored by 
com m unication scholars. The few s tu d ie s  t h a t  have been  co n d u c ted  
to  d a te  fall into th re e  general ca teg o ries :  (1 )  th o s e  which explored 
th e  m eaning of h o m elessn ess ,  (2 )  empirical s tu d ie s  which 
exam ined media portrayals  o f  th e  hom eless , and (3 )  qualitative 
s tu d ie s  which em ployed na tu ra lis tic  m e th o d s  and  partic ipan t 
o b se rv a tio n .
Explorations of th e  m eaning of h o m elessn ess  have been  
produced by Fiske (1 9 9 1 )  and Campbell (1 9 8 8 ) .  Fiske ( 1 9 9 1 )  used  a 
c a se  s tu d y  from which to  develop a discussion o f h o m e lessn ess  as 
a cultural p roduct.  Fiske ( 1 9 9 1 )  concluded th a t  h o m elessn ess  is
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c re a te d  by th e  s t ru c tu re  of American life and policy: "These 
hom eless  men are so m e  of th e  flesh-and-blood m eanings of a policy 
th a t  minimizes th e  role of th e  s t a t e  in social life and maximizes 
th e  roles of capital and m arket"  (p. 4 6 1 ) .  Fiske ( 1 9 9 1 )  was th e  
first th e o r is t  t o  employ a cultural s tu d ie s  p e rsp ec tiv e .  The au th o r  
argued th a t  this  m e th o d  re p re se n te d  an " a t te m p t  to  listen," an 
a t t e m p t  " to  try  to  hear" th e  hom eless . Fiske's goal was to  listen to  
th e  hom eless , t o  a r ticu la te  to  t h e  w ays "their sp eech  w as a c c e n te d  
by them , no t by th e  dominant" (p. 4 6 9 ) .  Campbell ( 1 9 8 8 )  also 
examined sp e e c h  b u t  explored ins tead  th e  "ideological rhetoric" of 
"all men are  c re a te d  equal." He analyzed te x t  from th e  film 
W elfare, which com pared  th e  s ituation  of th e  poor to  th e  s ituation  
of Waiting for Godot. This au th o r  did no t deal specifically with th e  
issue of h o m eiessn ess  bu t ra th e r  exam ined th e  meaning and 
significance of th e  m e ta p h o r  Waiting for Godot. His discussion of 
th e  ideology of equality is b ased  on his understanding  of th e  
m etaphor.
Studies of portrayals  of th e  hom eless  have been  co n d u c ted  by 
Power (1 9 9 1 )  and Campbell and Reeves (1 9 8 9 ) .  Power's  ( 1 9 9 1 )  
d isse r ta tion  exam ined th e  portrayal of th e  hom eless  in netw ork
television news. Pow er’s ( 1 9 9 1 )  s tu d y  is one of th e  m o st 
com prehensive  co n d u c ted  to  da te ;  he examined 9 8  netw ork  news 
se g m e n ts ,  b ro ad cas t  on ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN, b e tw een  1 9 8 2  and 
1 9 8 8 ,  in which h o m e lessn ess  or h om eless  people w ere  th e  main 
th e m e s .  The cen tra l q u es tio n s  for Power ( 1 9 9 1 )  w ere  w h e th e r  and 
how th e  media influenced com m unication ab o u t hom elessness .  Did 
th e  media aid th e  h om eless  in c rea ting  identification or did th e  
media inhibit t h e  c rea tion  o f  identification by com m unicating  
o th e rn e ss?  The resu lts  of th is  s tu d y  w ere  in te re s ting  b ec a u se  th e  
media bo th  aided and inhibited th e  creation  of viewer 
identification. Power ( 1 9 9 1 )  found (1 )  th a t  th e  media did no t m ore 
o f ten  portray  th e  hom eless  as s t ig m a tized  -- he had assu m ed  th a t  
th e  media, as  a cultural p roduc t,  would leg itim ate  th e  dom inant 
o rder and s tig m a tize  th e  hom eless  — and (2 )  t h a t  so m e  portrayals 
o f th e  h o m e less  in c reased  identifica tion . Specifically, po rtrayals  
w here  th e  hom eless  w ere  no t s tig m atized , and w here  th e  life 
c ircu m stan ces  of hom eless  people  w ere  a t t r ib u te d  to  social fo rces  
ra th e r  th a n  th e  individual, in c reased  view er identification. While 
Power ( 1 9 9 1 )  re je c te d  his hypo thesis  “th a t  th e  media sy s te m  
legitim ized existing  econom ic  and political s t r u c tu r e s  by
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marginalizing hom eless  peo p le” (p. 148 ),  he concluded th a t  th e  
m anner in which th e  media a d d re sse d  issues such  as  h o m e lessn ess  
invited “few a lte rn a tiv e  in te rp re ta t io n s  beyond  a focus  on 
p re sen ce  or a b se n c e  of individual e f fo r t” (p. 1 4 9 ) .  The media 
significantly influenced com m unication  ab o u t  h o m e le ssn e ss .
Campbell and  Reeves ( 1 9 8 9 )  also in v es tig a ted  dep ic tions  of 
th e  hom eless  in th e  evening news. They s tud ied  th e  "Joyce Brown 
s to ry ,"  th e  s to ry  of a hom eless  woman in New York City who was 
ins titu tionalized  ag a in s t  her will. The au th o rs  co m p ared  th e  s to ry  
ac ro ss  th e  th re e  major news netw orks, and c o n t r a s te d  th e  netw ork  
s to r ie s  with th e  telling produced  by th e  program  Sixty Minutes. 
Specifically, th e ir  p ro jec t  aim ed to  (1 )  identify th e  p ro c e ss  by 
which th e  netw ork  new s m ade s e n se  of h o m elessn ess ,  (2 )  describe  
how netw ork  new s organ izations  fram ed  and n a r ra te d  social 
problem s, and (3 )  analyze how television news m arked boundaries  
b e tw een  th e  marginal and th e  m ainstream . They found th a t  th e  
netw ork  new s m ade s e n se  of h om elessness  by blaming th e  
individual; people  w ere  hom eless  as a resu lt o f  d ru n k en n ess  or 
m ental illness. The au th o rs  found th a t  th e  netw orks  fram ed th e  
problem  accord ing  to  dom inant social values; s o c ie ty  c e le b ra te s
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econom ic and m aterial s u c c e s s  and views reg ress ion  as  failure.
The netw orks  identified th e  hom eless  as  dev ian t and d is tan ce d  
th em  from th e  audience; Sixty Minutes, however, s u b v e r te d  th e  
traditional order, by pu tt ing  Jo y ce  Brown in th e  cen te r .  S ix ty  
M inutes  let Joyce  Brown tell her own s tory . The agency  of 
narrative, th e  a u th o rs  c o n ten d ,  t ra n s la te d  th e  unfamiliar in to  th e  
familiar. Through narrative, Joyce  Brown w as po r trayed , n o t  as a 
danger  to  soc ie ty , a wom an to o  mentally ill t o  ta k e  care  of herself, 
b u t  ra ther, as  th e  hero in a b a t t le  b e tw een  individual and s ta t e .
The ways t h a t  new s o rgan iza tions  fram e and n a rra te  social 
problem s is d irectly  re la ted  to  th e  w ays new s m arks boundaries  
b e tw een  th e  marginal and th e  m ainstream .
Qualitative s tu d ie s  have b een  co n d u c ted  by Robinson, Seiter  & 
Acharya (1 9 9 2 ) ,  and Lisosky (1 9 9 2 ) .  Robinson e t  al. ( 1 9 9 2 )  
exam ined influence s t r a te g ie s  u sed  by th e  hom eless . Their s tu d y  
ex te n d e d  research  on persuasive  s t r a te g ie s  by applying th e m  to  th e  
hom eless. T hese  au th o rs  exam ined (1 )  th e  num ber and ty p e  of 
persuasive  s t r a te g ie s  em ployed by hom eless  individuals and (2 )  th e  
e x te n t  to  which such  ta c t ic s  w ere a d a p te d  to  ta rg e ts .  The au tho rs  
also ev a lua ted  th e  general e f fe c t iv e n e ss  o f th e s e  s t ra te g ie s .  They
found th a t  hom eless  individuals relied upon five primary 
pe rsuas ive  ta c t ic s :  appea ls  t o  altruism , e f fo r ts  a t  obligation, 
offers of exchange, th e  d irect re q u e s t ,  and th e  promise. In 
addition, h o m eless  individuals o f te n  em ployed  su p p o rtin g  ta c t ic s ,  
which w ere  u sed  in conjunction  with primary ta c t ic s ,  never  by 
th em se lv es .  T h ese  ta c t ic s  w ere  po liteness , p rops  (such  as  signs), 
and so u rce  ch a rac te r is t ic s ,  which th e  a u th o rs  defined  as “any 
a t t e m p t  t o  facilita te  begging  s u c c e s s  th ro u g h  increasing or 
em phasiz ing  spec ific  personal c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  su ch  as  looking 
pitiful, h o n e s t  and clean” (Robinson e t  al., 1 9 9 2 ,  p. 4 ) .  The au thors  
found th a t  individuals who u sed  th e  g r e a te s t  num ber of ta c t ic s  
were th e  m o s t  successfu l a t  obtaining money. As begging  su c c e ss  
increased , th e  u se  of a ltru istic  form s of persuas ion  increased  and 
th e  use  of th e  d irect re q u e s t  d ec rease d .  The au th o rs  n o ted  th a t  
m ore success fu l  b eg g a rs  e la b o ra te d  th e ir  r e q u e s ts  in com parison 
to  th e  less successfu l ,  giving additional and  qualifying re a so n s  to  
explain the ir  n eed s .  The m ore a r t icu la te  th e  h o m eless  individual 
is, th e  m ore  su ccess fu l  t h a t  individual is. Com m unicative 
c o m p e te n c e  is im portan t for th e  hom eless .
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Lisosky ( 1 9 9 2 )  s tud ied  coping s t r a t e g ie s  of hom eless  
children. This s tu d y  ex te n d ed  research  by going beyond documenting  
t h e  occur rence  o f  anxiety and frus tra t ion in hom eless  children to  
exploring how hom eless  children com m unica ted  their  anxiety and 
frustra t ion.  Lisosky ( 1 9 9 2 )  o b se rv ed  homeless  children 
communica t ing  in their  natural  env ironment  before  inviting th e  
children t o  draw and tell s to r ie s  ab o u t  their  exper iences.  From 
t h e s e  exchanges ,  t h e  r e sea rch e r  concluded t h a t  hom eless  children 
ex p re ssed  e m p a th y  more  and were  more selfless than  o the r  
children. Homeless  children t e n d e d  to  be o ther-or ien ted ,  able t o  
focus  on and a t t e n d  to  t h e  n eeds  of o ther  family members .
Homeless  children co p e d  with the ir  situat ion, Lisosky ( 1 9 9 2 )  
argued,  by suppress ing  their  n eeds  and suppressing their anger.
Lawrence & Hocking ( 1 9 9 0 )  s tud ied  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  th e  
hom eless  and t h e  e f f e c t s  of pro-social communication. They found 
t h a t  individuals who in te rac t  with t h e  hom eless  develop  more 
positive a t t i t u d e s  a b o u t  hom eless  people  and h o m elessn ess  in 
general.  S u b je c t s  who in te ra c te d  with hom eless  individuals 
developed  m ore  favorable  a t t i t u d e s  toward  them .  Experimental 
s u b je c t s  r a t e d  hom eless  individuals less b lameworthy  and more
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socially a t t r a c t iv e  than  th e  control  group.  In teract ion with 
hom eless  people  also a l te red  behavioral in tent ions.  Experimental 
s u b je c ts  displayed a g r e a te r  d e g re e  of willingness t o  help t h e  
hom eless  than  control  par t ic ipants .
Five general  conclusions  can be  drawn from this research .
First, for t h e  homeless ,  t h e  ability t o  com m unica te  is essen t ia l  for 
survival. Robinson e t  al. ( 1 9 9 2 )  indicate  t h a t  begging is 
ins trumental  communicat ion  aimed a t  obtaining t h e  n eces s i t i e s  of  
life. The coping skills Lisosky ( 1 9 9 2 )  identifies among hom eless  
children are communicat ive  abilities. Lawrence and Hocking ( 1 9 9 0 )  
go  so  far as to  s u g g e s t  t h a t  one possible solution to  t h e  plight of 
t h e  hom eless  is t o  increase  their  communicat ion with o the rs .  
Second,  t h e  meaning of  h o m e lessn ess  is no t  fixed, bu t  fluid, th e  
product  of t h e  tens ions  b e tw e e n  a dynamic s e t  of  social forces.  
Hom elessness  resul ts  from "a clash of con trad ic tory  meanings  and 
competing values.. ." (Campbell & Reeves, 1989 ,  p. 23) .  Fiske ( 1 9 9 0 )  
bel ieves ho m e lessn ess  is a p roduc t  of culture,  which he defines  as 
bo th  "a whole way of life," and " the  genera t ion  and circulation of 
meanings, pleasures and values" (p. 4 5 5 ) .  To Lawrence and Hocking 
(1 9 9 0 ) ,  w ha t  ho m elessn ess  m eans  is a product  of social a t t i tu d es .
Third, much of w hat  is known abou t  t h e  homeless  is media ted.
Power ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  Fiske (1 9 9 0 ) ,  and Campbell and Reeves ( 1 9 8 8 )  all 
acknowledge th e  role of t h e  media in communicat ing hom elessness .  
Television is s e e n  as  being particularly powerful. Fourth, t h e  
hom eless  are  marginalized b e c a u s e  th e y  are different  from th e  
majority.  Lastly,  and pe rhaps  paradoxically,  communicat ion can 
e i ther  bridge th a t  gap and d ec rea se  t h e  d is tance  b e tw e en  th e  
m ains t ream  and th e  margin or it can increase  separa t ion  and 
difference. Campbell and Reeves ( 1 9 8 9 )  observe  t h a t  "At th e  sam e  
t ime television p eeks  a t  t h e  plight of  t h o s e  without  homes,  it also 
imposes a d is tance" (p. 40 ) .
This s tu d y  ex ten d s  t h e  work of Fiske ( 1 9 9 1 )  and Campbell 
( 1 9 8 8 )  by examining w ha t  h om elessness  m eans  t o  different  rhe tors  
in different  s i tuat ions .  Making such  comparisons  will enable  m e  to  
ar t icula te  t h e  com pe t ing  ideologies a t  work in regard  t o  
homelessness .  Like Power ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  and Campbell and Reeves ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  
I am in te re s te d  in t h e  communicat ion  of “identi fication” and 
“o th e r n e s s . ” Their insights  a b o u t  t h e  role of  t h e  media will help 
inform my ju d g m en ts  abou t  th e  role of t h e  ad voca te  as  mediator.  
This s tudy  enlarges  t h e  s c o p e  of their  discussion to  include
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in te re s ted  social ac tors .  The work of  Robinson e t  al ( 1 9 9 2 )  on 
persuas ive  t a c t i c s  employed by hom eless  individuals provides a 
solid empirical foundat ion  for a philosophical invest iga t ion  of  t h e  
b roader  question: Does soc ie ty  legi t imate  this form of  s p eech  
(begging)?  Lisosky's ( 1 9 9 2 )  discussion of hom eless  children will 
su pp lem en t  t h e  analysis of  t h e  test imonial narra tives .  Lawrence 
and Hocking's ( 1 9 9 0 )  observa t ions  abou t  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  th e  
hom eless  will a u g m e n t  t h e  discussion of adversar ial rhetoric.
This s tu d y  is an a t t e m p t  to  ar t icula te  t h e  multiple voices 
which make up th e  t e x t  of  hom elessness .  This s tu d y  -- by 
focusing on t h e  homeless ,  a marginal group -- d e p a r t s  from 
tradit ional  rhetorical  s tud ies .  It also em bod ies  t rad i t ion  — by 
examining th e  official t e x t  of  t h e  dominant  group.  Combining t h e s e  
perspec t ives ,  bo th  t h e  new and th e  old, will p roduce a much fuller 
and richer unders tand ing  of t h e  rhetoric of  hom elessness .
1.4 Methodology
The approach  used  in this s tu d y  is w ha t  Campbell ( 1 9 7 2 )  
t e r m s  "organic ,” in which t h e  critic applies “critical c a t e g o r i e s  
t h a t  grow out  of  t h e  nature  of  t h e  discourse” (p. 14).  The goal of 
t h e  critic is t o  examine rhetorical a c t s  “as  p a t t e r n s  of  a rg u m en t
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and in terac t ion  t h a t  grow o u t  of  par ticular cond i t ions” (Campbell,
1 9 7 2 ,  p. 14) .  The critical s y s t e m  m o s t  su i ted  for th is  analysis is
Dramatism. Brock, S co t t  and Chesebro ( 1 9 9 0 )  explain t h a t  Kenneth
Burke's " rhetorical  philosophy," initially labelled "d ram a t ism ,"  has
"evolved from literary in to  social criticism, with markedly
sociopsychological over tones"  (p. 1 72) .  Such an approach  is fi tt ing
for a discussion of  h o m e lessn ess .  H om elessness  is a social
problem of  considerable  magni tude .  While an ex ac t  figure is
impossible t o  com e  by, e s t im a te s  of  t h e  num ber  of hom eless  people
range from 3 5 0 , 0 0 0  to  over  3 million.2 H om elessness  is a problem
with "sociopsychological ove r tones ."  H om elessness  d em an d s  a
response  bo th  a t  t h e  "socio" or socie tal level and  a t  t h e  level of th e
individual. Burke's p e rsp ec t iv e  provides th e  critic a way of
discussing b o th  individual and  socie ta l  motives ,  for he offers  a
unique insight into t h e  role of language and action:
The d ram at is t ic  view of  language  m akes  explicit  t h e  idea 
t h a t  our th o u g h t s  and  ideas are never  f ree  from th e  language 
we use  t o  f rame them .  Our words c r e a te  or ienta tions  or 
a t t i tu d e s ,  shaping our views of reality and th u s  genera t ing  
different m ot ives  for our act ions  (Foss, Foss & Trapp, 1991 ,
p. 181).
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Burke ( 1 9 6 8 )  a cc o u n t s  for motives  sys tematically:
"Dramatism is a m e th o d  of  analysis and corresponding crit ique of
terminology des igned  to  show t h a t  t h e  m o s t  direct  rou te  to  th e
s tu d y  of human relations and human mot ives  is via a methodical
inquiry into cycles  or c lu s te r s  of  t e r m s  and their  functions"  (p.
3 4 1 ) .  Bizzell and Herzberg ( 1 9 9 0 )  observe ,  "In this sys tem ,
s t a t e m e n t s  abou t  motives can be  s tudied and compared  by
examining t h e  ways in which t h e y  t r e a t  t h e  d ramatic  e le m e n t s  of
human relations: ac t ,  scene ,  agen t ,  agency and purpose" (p. 9 9 0 ) .
Burke ( 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 )  def ined t h e s e  e lem en ts  as  follows:
In a rounded s t a t e m e n t  a b o u t  motives , you m u s t  have 
som e  word t h a t  nam es  th e  a c t  (nam es  what  took  place, 
in th o u g h t  or deed) ,  and ano the r  t h a t  nam es  th e  scene 
( th e  background of t h e  ac t ,  t h e  si tuation in which it 
occurred) ;  also you m u s t  indicate w hat  kind of person 
(agent) per formed t h e  ac t ,  what  m eans  or in s t rum en ts  
he used (agency), and th e  purpose (p. xv).
The five e le m en ts  of t h e  p e n ta d  enable t h e  critic t o  make
com par isons  ac ro ss  t h e  d i f fe ren t  s i tuat ions .  The analysis begins
with t h e  identification of t h e  e le m e n t s  of t h e  pen tad .  This
identification will be  s u p p le m e n te d ,  w here  appropr ia te ,  with
insights  from p o s tm o d e rn  rhetorical theory .
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The first e lem en t  in th e  p e n tad  is th e  ac t .  "The dramatis t ic  
approach,"  c o n ten d s  Burke ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,  "is implicit in t h e  key te rm  ' a c t . 1 
'Act '  is th u s  a terminis t ic c e n t e r  from which many re la ted  
considera t ions can be shown to  'radiate, '  as  though  it were  a 'god- 
te rm , '  from which a whole universe of  t e rm s  is derived" (p. 4 4 5 ) .
The ac t  refers  t o  w hat  t h e  speaker  does . One might  distinguish th e  
different  a c t s  in th is  s tu d y  in t h e  following manner ,  by claiming 
t h a t  t h e  homeless  individual on t h e  s t r e e t  begs ,  t h e  advoca te  
a dvoca te s ,  t h e  adversary  blames,  and th e  hom eless  individual 
appear ing be fo re  a Congressional c o m m i t t e e  tes t i f ies .
The second  e lem en t  in th e  p en tad  is t h e  scene .  The s cene  is 
t h e  background or se t t ing ,  t h e  place or location in which th e  ac t  
occurs.  The s c e n e  is importan t  b e cau se  it "conta ins  t h e  act"
(Burke, 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 ,  p. 3),  providing t h e  c o n tex t  ou t  of which th e  
a c t  em erges .  The writings of  Michel Foucault  also con t r ibu te  t o  
one ' s  understanding of  th e  scene .  Foucault  ( 1 9 6 9 / 1 9 7 2 )  is 
concerned  with t h e  relationship of t h e  s c e n e  (which he t e rm s  th e  
s i te  of  t h e  speaking)  and legitimacy. "We m ust  also describe  th e  
in s t i tu t iona l  s ite s  from which th e  [speaker]  makes  his discourse, 
and from which this  d iscourse  derives  its leg i timate  so u rce  and
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point of application (its specific  o b je c t s  and in s t ru m en ts  of
verification)" (Foucault,  1 9 6 9 / 1 9 7 2 ,  p. 51) .
Three  different  s c e n e s  will be d iscussed  in this s tudy ,  th e
public s t r e e t s ,  t h e  Congressional hearing site,  and th e  courtroom.
Examined from th e  p e rsp ec t iv e  of Foucault , t h e  different  s c e n e s
provide differing d e g re e s  of  legi timacy t o  different  speakers .  The
public s t r e e t s ,  for example, are  no t  a “leg i t im ate” forum for
expression, th u s  t h e  hom eless  who speak  th e re  are ignored, while
Congressional hearing rooms and cour t room s  are s i te s  of
institutional author ity ,  w here  only cer ta in  ty p e s  of  sp e e c h  by
cer ta in  people  are allowed. “In public t y p e s  of d iscourse ,” remarks
Lakoff ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  “sp eak e rs  a re  careful t o  spell things out,  and of ten
t h e r e  are formulaic ways of speaking to  ensure  full explicitness.
There  is an es tab li shed ,  explicit o rder  of business  t o  e n su re  t h a t
everyone  can follow what  is going on” (p. 43) .
The a g e n t  refers  t o  t h e  person performing th e  act .  Foucault
( 1 9 6 9 / 1 9 7 2 )  also has someth ing  to  say  about  th e  agen t .  His focus,
again, is on th e  what  gives t h e  a g e n t  legitimacy.
First question:  who is speaking? Who, among th e  to ta l i ty  of 
speaking individuals, is acco rded  th e  right t o  u se  this  so r t  of 
language ( langage)?  Who is qualified to  do so?  Who derives
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from it his own special quality,  his p res t ige ,  and from whom, 
in return ,  does  he receive if no t  t h e  assurance ,  a t  leas t  t h e  
presumption  th a t  w hat  he says  is t rue?  What is t h e  s t a t u s  of  
t h e  individual who -- alone -- has  t h e  right,  s an c t io n ed  by 
law or t radit ion,  juridically def ined or s p o n tan e o u s ly  
ac ce p te d ,  t o  proffer such discourse?  (Foucault , 1 9 6 9 / 1 9 7 2 ,  p. 
50).
The a g e n t s  in this inquiry are  t h e  homeless ,  t h e  advoca te ,  and th e  
adve rsa ry .
The agency  refers  t o  th e  m eans  by which th e  a c t  is 
accomplished. The different  a g e n t s  considered here  make use  of 
different agencies .  The adversary  employs  t h e  agency  of  declaring. 
He defines th e  act,  t h en  defines t h e  a g e n t  in te rm s  of th e  act .
Ju d g e  Altimari u ses  his opinion as  a vehicle for as se r t ing  
author ity.  The ad v o ca te  makes  an a rg u m en t  using himself as  th e  
agency.  Snyder  himself is a m eans  t o  an end; in this  case ,  m e ss a g e  
and m e sse n g e r  beco m e  intertwined. The homeless  pe rson 's  agency 
is narrat ive.  T h ese  d ifferent  m eans  of accomplishing th e  ac t  
influence t h e  audience in dif ferent  ways; th u s  t h e  se lect ion  of 
ag e n c y  can significantly influence a s p e a k e r ’s su c ce ss .
The purpose  is t h e  reason  for performing th e  act .  The 
adversary ,  J u d g e  Altimari, os tens ib ly  is act ing in t h e  b e s t  
in te re s t s  of th e  s t a t e  t o  p ro te c t  th e  public good. The advoca te ,
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Mitch Snyder, is ac t ing for t h e  purpose  of aiding t h e  homeless  and 
s timulating a co m p a ss io n a te  r e sp o n se  from t h e  audience.  Snyder, 
in o th e r  words, is trying t o  make people  feel som eth ing  for t h e  
homeless .  When hom eless  people  te s t i fy  before  Congressional 
com m it tee s ,  t h e y  are acting to  g e n e ra te  social change  and are 
a s se r t in g  the i r  own ident i t ies .
Foss ( 1 9 8 9 )  n o te s  t h a t  "The naming of t h e  five e lem en ts  of 
t h e  p en tad  is j u s t  t h e  first s t e p  in t h e  discovery of  motive.  The 
next  s t e p  is to  discover  t h e  relationships am ong th e  five te rm s ,  
using w hat  Burke calls ratios" (p. 3 3 9 ) .  Accordingly, t h e  next  s t e p  
in this analysis will be  t h e  application of t h e  rat ios  and discussion 
of t h e  insights  th is  exercise  produces .  "An examinat ion of all or 
many of t h e  ratios possible from t h e  five t e rm s  should produce one 
te rm  t h a t  has  t h e  m o s t  impact  on t h e  o th e r  t e rm s  or  t h a t  
de te rm ines  th e  na tu re  of all or m o s t  of th e  o th e r  t e r m s  in t h e  
pentad"  (Foss, 19 8 9 ,  p. 3 4 1 ) .  The analysis s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  scene-  
agency  ratio is t h e  m o s t  important ,  for only certa in  t y p e s  of 
s p e ec h  may be leg i t imated  in cer ta in  s i tuat ions .
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1.5 Implications
This s tu d y  has  severa l  significant implications. This 
d isse r ta t ion  of fers  a new way of  looking a t  m ed ia ted  
communication.  Ins tead of  focusing on techno logy  as  mediator,  
this discussion c e n t e r s  on how communicat ion is m ed ia ted  by o th e r  
people.  This research  answ ers  t h e  question,  w ha t  is gained  or lost 
when o th e r s  speak  for you? This is an importan t  ques tion and has  
rece ived  little a t t e n t io n  from scholars .
I bel ieve so m e th ing  fundam enta l  and essen t ia l  is lost when 
o th e r s  speak  for us. Hewit t  ( 1 9 8 9 )  calls this  o n e ’s  self, o n e ’s 
personal ident ity.  “The se lf  is. .. its own p e r sp e c t iv e ” (Hewitt ,
1989 ,  p. 185) .  When o th e r s  ar t icula te  our experience th ey  take  
som eth ing  from us, t h ey  rob us of  t h e  ability to  tell our own s tory.  
Gregg ( 1 9 7 1 )  s t a t e s  t h a t  “rhetoric  has  t o  do with cons t i tu t ing  
self-hood through express ion” (p. 74) .  The ad v o ca te  for t h e  
homeless ,  with t h e  b e s t  of  in tent ions ,  marginal izes t h e  hom eless  
by talking for them .  The hom eless  are p re se n t  -- t h e y  are  being 
taken  care  of, their  n eeds  are being expressed  (by t h e  adv o ca te )  -- 
bu t  th ey  are also absen t ,  for t h ey  are  mute .  When o thers  evaluate  
our experience,  as  t h e  adversary  does ,  t h ey  go fur ther  still. They
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exclude us, negat ing  our voice, and t h a t  which m akes  us human. In 
this s ituation th e  hom eless  are  m o s t  ab sen t .
A traditional reason  for engag ing  in criticism is t o  p roduce  
new knowledge.  According t o  this  perspec t ive ,  considering th e  
sp e e c h  of t h e  homeless ,  a d v o c a te s ,  and adversar ies ,  is valuable 
b e c a u s e  it will lead to  a b e t t e r  unders tand ing  of an importan t  
social issue. One reason  to  listen t o  t h e  hom eless  is t o  learn 
ab o u t  their  exper iences .  Con tem porary  scholars  t a k e  this  a rgum en t  
one s t e p  further ,  enlarging th e  role of  th e  critic considerably.
Brown ( 1 9 9 2 )  u rges  rhetorical scholars  t o  u se  criticism t o  p roduce  
“more a d e q u a te  narra t ives  for our political com m uni ty” (p. 2 1 9 ) .  
According t o  this  perspec t ive ,  t h e  end  of  criticism is no t  t h e  
product ion of  new knowledge bu t  r a ther  t h e  “e m p o w e rm e n t” of th e  
marginalized and disenfranchised.  What Brown ( 1 9 9 2 )  is 
sugges t ing  is t h a t  t h e  critic e n g a g e  in t h e  c rea t ive  cons truc t ion  of  
a s tory .  The dange r  of  this  approach  is t h a t  in so  doing, crit ics-as- 
a d v o c a te s  will marginalize t h e  very groups  th e y  s eek  to  empower.  
This observat ion  places an enorm ous  burden on th e  critic. Great 
care  m u s t  be  t aken  to  amplify t h e  voice of  t h e  hom eless  without  
d is tor t ing  or diminishing t h a t  voice.
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This research  r e p re s e n t s  an a t t e m p t  t o  un d e rs tan d  th e  
meaning of  h o m elessn ess .  Accomplishing this  goal required 
craft ing a d is t inctive critical approach  which b lended  t o g e t h e r  
bo th  new and  traditional e lem en ts .  Tradition d ic ta ted  t h a t  
rhetorical  scho la rs  s tu d y  leg i t imate  sp e ec h ,  w h a t  Aris to t le  t e r m e d  
forensic and deliberative speech ,  t h e  speech  of t h e  cour t room  and 
th e  assembly.  Contemporary  rhetorical theo ry  urges  t h e  scholar  t o  
l isten to  t h e  voice a t  t h e  margin, t h e  subalte rn  voice.
Incorporat ing legit imacy into t h e  analysis b e c a m e  n e c e s sa ry  
b e c a u s e  in th is  case ,  t h e  marginal group -- t h e  hom eless  -- is 
speaking from es tab l ished  or dominant  s i te s  -  t h e  cou r t room  and 
Capitol Hill.
I a t t e m p t  t o  contextua l ize  t h e  voice of t h e  hom eless  within 
t h e  b roader  social t e x t  b e c a u s e  I do believe t h a t  critically 
examining th e  rhetoric  of h o m e le s sn es s  ~  keeping t h e  above  
cau t ions  in mind — will p roduce  a fuller unders tand ing  of 
hom elessness .  As Eagleton ( 1 9 8 3 )  reminds us, rhetoric  tak e s  th e  
m o s t  com prehens ive  view of  t h e  opera t ions  of discourse,  seeking 
meaning in in teract ion,  in culture ,  and in ideology. This
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disser ta t ion  a t t e m p t s  t o  bring to  light t h e  meaning hidden in t h e
marg ins .
CHAPTER 2 
THE RHETORIC OF THE ADVERSARY
The centra l  ques t ion  this  d isse r ta t ion  s e e k s  t o  answ er  is: 
w ha t  does  ho m elessn ess  mean,  and how is t h a t  meaning 
rhetorically c o n s t r u c t e d ?  To u n d e r s ta n d  what  h o m e le s sn e s s  m ean s  
requires one to  consider  t h e  language people use  to  talk abou t  
hom elessness .  Humans respond  t o  t h e  world symbolically,  th rough  
rhetoric .  Rhetoric helps individuals define, ca ta log ,  c a teg o r ize  and 
m a n ag e  the ir  affairs.  Social ac t ion  is c o n d u c te d  symbolically,  
th rough  rhetoric.  Because  rhetoric  ex p re s se s  order  and 
com m unica tes  values, it can bring people to g e th e r ,  th rough  what  
Burke ( 1 9 6 6 )  calls identification, or it can keep  th e m  apar t ,  
disassocia ting them ,  th rough  w ha t  Burke ( 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 6 9 )  t e rm s  
divis ion.
To discern t h e  meaning of  h om elessness  one m u s t  listen to  
multiple voices  and de te rm ine  who is producing th e  rhetoric.  
Foucault  ( 1 9 7 1 / 1 9 7 2 )  has  obse rved  t h a t  in every soc ie ty  s p eech  is 
regulated.  T h e se  regulat ions can be  bo th  explicit and taci t ;  they  
r ep re sen t  an a t t e m p t  by soc ie ty  t o  control w hat  Foucault
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( 1 9 7 1 / 1 9 7 2 )  calls t h e  “a w e s o m e ” (p. 2 1 6 )  power of rhetoric.  
Because t h e  ident ity of t h e  person  (or persons)  producing th e  
rhetoric  is im por tan t  as  it re la te s  t o  power, t h r e e  different  
rhetorics  by th r e e  different  rh e to rs  will be  examined. The focus  of 
this chap te r  is on t h e  rhetoric  of  t h e  adversary.
The te rm  adversary  is s u g g e s t e d  by t h e  na tu re  of t h e  legal 
sy s tem ,  from which t h e  da ta  is drawn. The case  c e n te r s  on th e  
issue of w he the r  t h e  New York City Transit  Author i ty ’s  ban on 
begging and panhandling in t h e  subway violates  t h e  First 
A m en d m en t  rights  of  hom eless  individuals. The ques t ion  before  t h e  
Circuit Court is w h e th e r  begging  is a form of sp e ec h  ent i t led  to  
Const itutional  p ro tec t ion .  At t h e  level of t h e  dist r ic t  court ,  Judge  
Leonard Sand who wro te  t h e  opinion in Young v. New York City 
Transit A u th o rity  72 9  F.Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ,  concluded th a t  it 
was, and observed :  “While o f ten  disturbing and so m e t im e s  
alarmingly graphic,  begging  is unmistakably  informative and 
persuasive s p e e c h ” (p. 3 5 2 ) .  Ju d g e  Altimari r eversed  and v a ca te d  
th e  dist rict  c o u r t ’s ruling when t h e  c ase  was appea led  t o  th e  
Circuit Court,  in Young v. New York City Transit A uthority  9 0 3  F.2d 
146  (2nd Cir. 1 9 9 0 ) .  This opinion is analyzed here.
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A judicial opinion was  s e l e c t e d  for several  reasons .  The 
legal arena is t h e  s i te  of a s t rugg le  t o  a s s e r t  and es tab l ish  t h e  
rights of hom eless  people. Blasi and Preis ( 1 9 9 2 )  co n ten d  t h a t  
“t h e  legal s y s t e m  has  occupied  a peculiarly central  place in public 
d e b a t e  and decision making abou t  h o m e le s sn es s” (p. 3 1 0 ) .  Not until 
1 9 6 2  did t h e  Suprem e Court hold t h a t  s t a t e s  could no t  “criminalize 
t h e  s t a t u s  of  being ill or p oo r” (Blasi & Preis, 199 2 ,  p. 3 1 0 ) .  Today 
th e  e n a c tm e n t  of  new laws has p ro m p ted  vigorous legal action. As 
Alexander  Wohl explains in t h e  Am erican Bar Association Journal, 
“In t h e  last decade ,  legal a d v o c a te s  for t h e  hom eless  have begun to  
chal lenge t h e  m o s t  visible m an i fe s ta t ions  of  h o m e le s s n e s s . . . ”
(1 9 9 0 ,  p. 58).
Second,  “cour ts  provide a ready so u rce  of  social details from 
which to  c o n s t ru c t  popular narra t ives  of social ch an g e  and t e n s io n ” 
(Denton & Woodward, 199 0 ,  p. 260 ) .  The bus iness  of  t h e  cour ts  is 
t o  wrest le  with values. In t h e  c a se  a t  hand, Judge  Altimari 
cons iders  which is more  im portant :  an individual’s  f reedom  of 
sp e e c h  or th e  g o v e rn m e n t ’s obligations t o  t h e  public. The ruling is 
a vehicle for resolving t h e  conflict.  The opinion is an e labora te  
narra t ive  just ifying t h e  decis ion and ar t icula ting t h e  social values
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on which it is based .  Goss ( 1 9 7 4 )  a rgues  t h a t  communicat ion 
schola rs  “should  b e c o m e  m ore  immediately involved in legal 
decision making” (p. 47 ) .  She calls t h e  role of  t h e  cour ts  as  
in s t ru m en ts  of social change  “crucial” (p. 47 ) .
The legal s y s t e m  is known for resolving d i sp u te s  object ively. 
LeDuc ( 1 9 7 6 )  descr ibes  law as “a unique communicat ion p rocess  
th rough  which cer ta in  public or private  con t rovers ie s  can be 
ca tego r ized  and th e re b y  resolved by refe rence  t o  appropria te  
preexisting general ized and objec t ive  s ta n d a rd s ” (p. 2 7 9 ) .  Legal 
d iscourse  is generally perce ived  as  dry and impersonal,  c o m p o sed  
mainly of r e fe r e n ce s  to  p r e c e d e n t  and judicial philosophies ,  and 
deve loped  with painstaking logic. A judicial opinion is a formal 
express ion of t h e  law; it also e x p re s se s  social norms.  The cour t  
rules on t h e  c ase  according to  s tanda rds ,  bu t  it develops  and 
d e fe n d s  its position rhetorically.  References  t o  t e s t im o n y  and 
p re c e d e n t  are j u s t  tw o  examples  of t h e  many available m eans  by 
which ju d g e s  s u p p o r t  and e labo ra te  thei r  positions.
While rhetorical scholars  have  been  e a g e r  to  s tu d y  th e  
behavior of  jurors  (Buchanan,  Pryor, Taylor, & Stawn,  1 978 ;  Arnold, 
1 9 7 6 ;  Reinard & Reynolds, 1 9 7 8 ;  Miller, Fontes ,  Boster,  &
Sunnafrank, 1 983 ;  Parkinson, 1981 ;  Wright & Hosman, 1982 ;
Bracac, Hemphill, & Tardy, 1981 ;  Friend, & Vinson, 1 9 7 4 ;  Tate ,  
Hawrish, & Clark, 1 9 7 4 ) ,  and lawyers (Beach, 1985 ;  Wasby,
D’Amato  & Metrailer, 1 9 76 ;  Benne tt ,  1 9 79 ;  Mills, 1 976 ;  Abbot t ,  
1974 ;  Quel, 1 9 5 4 ;  Parkinson, Geisier & Pelias, 1 9 8 3 ) ,  t h ey  have 
b een  slower  t o  examine t h e  force  of  judicial opinion (Bosmajian, 
1992 ;  Newell & Rieke, 1986 ;  Makau, 1984;  Rabin, 1978 ;
Bar tanen ,1987 ;  Hagan, 1976 ;  Goss, 1974 ;  Crable, 1 976 ;  Jones,
1976;  LeDuc, 1 9 7 6 ) .  The review of t h e  l i terature reveals t h a t  
r e sea rchers  a re  using a var ie ty  of  m e th o d s  of  analysis. Rarely is 
th e  sam e  m ethod  used twice. This s u g g e s t s  t h a t  one reason  
scholars  have b een  slower t o  examine judicial opinions is t h e  
difficulty in finding a su i tab le  m e th o d  of  analysis.
Newell and Rieke ( 1 9 8 6 )  employ a practical reasoning 
approach. They focus on th e  underlying value within an argument ,  
viewing legal doctr ine  as  a “web of  warran ts  for dec is ions” (p. 
21 3 ) .  Their analysis of  First A m endm ent  ca ses  c e n t e r s  on th re e  
issues :  jurisdict ion,  in te rp re ta t io n ,  and priori tizat ion and  
negotia t ion.  Each issue is t h e n  divided into warrants .  Jurisdiction, 
for example, is divided into principles concerning “t h e  function of
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t h e  Supreme Court,  t h e  role of various levels of  governm ent ,  and 
charac te r is t ics  of  t h e  specific  c a s e ” (p. 2 1 5 ) .  Issues  of 
in te rp re ta t io n  fall into c a te g o r i e s  of  definition, special  privilege, 
and rights t o  p ro tec t ion .  The third area co n s is t s  of  “prioritization 
of conflicting rights,  negot ia t ion b e tw e e n  th e  perce ived  needs  of 
socie ty  and t h e  rights of f ree  speech ,  and t r a n sc e n d e n c e  above  th e  
conflicting is sues” (p. 2 1 6 ) .  This approach,  c o n te n d  Newell and 
Rieke ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  “helps display t h e  complexity  of  legal jus t i f ica t ion” 
(p. 217) .
Rabin ( 1 9 7 8 )  applies  Gott l ieb’s  model of  rule-guided 
reasoning to  Griswold v. Connecticut, a c a se  in which th e  Supreme 
Court over tu rned  a Connecticu t  s t a t e  law making t h e  use  of 
con t racep t ives  illegal. The s t r e n g th  of t h e  Gottlieb model, 
according to  Rabin ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  is t h a t  it provides  a s y s te m a t ic  and 
ru le -based  m e th o d  for evaluat ing judicial dec is ions.  Rational 
decisions co rrespond  t o  t h e  fac ts  a n d /o r  rules, s t a t e  t h e  law 
correctly,  are no t  b roader  than  t h e  s ituat ion requires ,  are not  
arbitrary, employ principled choice,  and a re  c o n s i s t e n t  with 
presupposi tions ,  co n se q u en ce s  and o th e r  “unavoidable” fea tures .  
Rabin ( 1 9 7 8 )  concludes  t h a t  Gott l ieb’s th eo ry  “s u c c e e d s  quite
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well” a t  “a s se s s in g  t h e  ra tionali ty  of  rule-guided decis ion making” 
(p. 90 ) ,  bu t  t h a t  it is poorly su i ted  for analyses  aimed a t  producing 
understanding.
Jones  ( 1 9 7 6 )  so u g h t  t o  gain a d e ep e r  understanding of 
justi f icat ion in legal opinions th rough  a c a te g o ry  sy s te m .  He 
explains t h a t  “A ca teg o ry  s y s t e m  is a tool  t h a t  organizes  
information into dis t inct  c la s se s  for t h e  purpose  of  comparing and 
analyzing” ( 1 9 7 6 ,  p. 121) .  Using an “operational hybrid” of 
ca tegor ies ,  Jo n es  ( 1 9 7 6 )  analyzed two Supreme Court cases ,  one  of 
which effect ively overrules  t h e  o ther ,  and com pared  t h e s e  
jus t i f ica t ions  with t h e  ju s t i f ica t ions  o f fe red  by t h e  a t t o r n e y s  in 
their  briefs for t h e  s eco n d  case .  Contrary t o  legal theory,  Jones  
( 1 9 7 6 )  found t h a t  ju s t ices  rely m ore  heavily on forms of 
a rgum enta t ion  o th e r  than  p rec e d en t .  His in ten t  was t o  descr ibe  th e  
just if icat ions he found, n o t  t o  eva lua te  th e m  or de te rm ine  which 
were  th e  m o s t  im por tan t  or influential.
This discussion highlights t h e  wide range of m ethodo log ies  
em ployed by scholars.  This resea rch  also m akes  it clear t h a t  
forensic  rhe to r ic  differs cons ide rab ly  from deliberat ive .  
(Deliberative rhetoric  will b e  d i scu ssed  in t h e  next  chap te r . )
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Researchers  t ied  t o  t h e  a rg u m en ta t iv e  tradit ion find t h a t  legal 
a rg u m en ts  m u s t  adhere  t o  a s e t  of  prescribed and detailed  rules. 
Th e se  rules make t h e  accompanying  rhetorical ana lyses  equally 
detai led. Not all research ,  however ,  is ru le-based.
Other  schola rs  have analyzed Supreme Court opinions without  
tying their  conclus ions t o  a particular m ethod .  Michael R. Hagan 
( 1 9 7 6 )  concluded t h a t  ju s t i c e s  simply choose  legal c o n c e p t s  and 
p re c e d e n t s  t h a t  s u p p o r t  their  decis ions and downplay “m a t t e r s  
which would suppor t  an opposing view” (p. 199) .  Hagan ( 1 9 7 6 )  
examined t h e  rhetoric  of Roe v. Wade. Bartanen ( 1 9 8 7 )  examined 
th e  rhetoric  of d issen t .  She found t h a t  d issent ing  opinions, like 
majority opinions, were  m ot iva ted  by “a need  t o  d e f e n d ” a 
part icular in te rp re ta t ion ,  a desire  t o  “bo ls te r  t h e  C our t ’s im age ,” 
and as  a potentia l  rem edy  t o  b e  used  in future  del iberat ions  (p.
2 4 4 ) .  She o b se rv ed  t h a t  appeals  t o  values, particularly t h e  values 
o f  ju s t ice ,  dem ocracy ,  and logic, cha rac te r ize  judicial rhetoric .  
Bartanen ( 1 9 8 7 )  concludes  t h a t  her  analysis “reveals  how 
effect ively  t h e  value appea ls  identified as  ch a ra c te r i s t i c  of 
judicial rhetoric  s e rv e  th e  motives  of. . .” ju s t i ce s  (p. 2 6 1 ) .
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Several conclus ions  may be  drawn from t h e  review of th e  
l i tera ture .  Perhaps  t h e  m o s t  signif icant  conclus ion is t h a t  judicial 
rhe tor ic  p r e s e n t s  t h e  schola r  with methodologica l  difficulties.  
Rule-based or rule-guided a p p ro a c h e s  (Newell & Rieke, 1 986 ;  Rabin, 
1 9 7 8 ;  Jones ,  1 9 7 6 )  p roduce  deta i led  descr ip t ions  of  judicial 
rhetoric t h a t  “can be  overwhelming” (Newell & Rieke, 1 9 8 6 ,  p.
2 1 7 ) .  Scholars who e m b ra c e  no particular m ethodology,  preferring 
ins tead  t o  draw their  conclusions directly from the ir  d a ta  (Hagan, 
1976 ;  Bartanen, 1 9 8 7 ) ,  p roduce  b e t t e r  descript ions  of th e  
part iculars  surrounding ea ch  opinion, b u t  with limited 
generalizability.  Bearing in mind t h e  limitations of  any m ethod ,  I 
hope,  in performing a pen tad ic  analysis of  J u d g e  Altimari’s opinion, 
t o  offer  a discuss ion of t h e  par t iculars  suff ic ient t o  w arran t  
drawing m ore  general  conclusions.  As Burke ( 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 6 9 )  writes,  
ideally th e  p e n ta d  “should provide us with a kind of simplicity t h a t  
can be developed into considerable  complexity and y e t  can be 
discovered b e n e a th  its e labora t ions” (p. xvi).
There  are  tw o  im p o r tan t  r e a so n s  for se lec t ing  this  particular 
opinion. Judicial opinions a re  significant b e c a u s e  cou r ts  have th e  
capaci ty  in th e m  to  speak  n o t  j u s t  t o  t h e  li t igants bu t  also t o  a
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larger audience (LeDuc, 19 7 6 ,  p. 2 7 9 ) .  Opinions are des igned to  
influence severa l  audiences .  J u d g e  Altimari d i rec ts  his views to  
d if fe rent  people  a t  d if ferent  t im es ,  communica t ing  cer ta in  
information to  t h e  dist r ic t  cour t ,  t h e  Transi t  Authority ,  t h e  
hom eless  and their  advoca te s ,  and to  soc ie ty  a t  large.
The s eco n d  reason  for se lect ing  this  opinion is s u g g e s t e d  by 
t h e  t e rm  adversary .  Ju d g e  Altimari views begging  with hostil ity 
and considers  b eg g a rs  a m enace  t o  socie ty .  He writes: “Begging in 
t h e  subway o f ten  am o u n ts  t o  nothing less th an  assault ,  c reat ing in 
p a s sen g e rs  t h e  apprehension of  imminent dange r” (p. 1 58) .
Although this  belief is arguably  w idespread  in American soc ie ty ,  it 
is no t  o f te n  explicitly a r t icu la ted .  The majori ty of t h e  l i tera ture  
on ho m elessn ess  is produced by ad v o ca te s  who portray th e  
hom eless  sympathet ical ly .  One reason  t h a t  Pres ident  Reagan’s 
a sse r t ion  t h a t  m o s t  of t h e  hom eless  “lived on th e  s t r e e t s  by 
choice” s o  o u t ra g ed  a d v o c a te s  and is so  of ten  c ited  by th e m  is t h a t  
it is one of  t h e  few express ly  an t i -hom eless  m e s s a g e s  a t t r ib u tab le  
to  a powerful political figure. It may be  more  exped ien t  for 
political au thor i t ie s  t o  pay “lip s e rv ice ” to  t h e  issue of 
h o m e le ssn e s s  — t o  listen sympathet ica l ly  by holding hearings  and
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invest igat ing t h e  problem, for example — than  t o  openly show 
disdain or co n te m p t .  Hence t h e  dea r th  of an t i -homeless  rhetoric  in 
t h e  political arena.  Judge  Altimari’s opinion is a more  detai led  
express ion of  t h e  ant i -homeless  position. In th is  s e n se ,  it perhaps  
r e f lec ts  explicitly w h a t  many o th e r  powerful officials s u g g e s t  
only implicitly.
The suit  was brought  by th e  Legal Action Center  for th e  
Homeless ( “LACH”) on behalf of tw o  hom eless  men. The plaintiffs 
c o n te n d  t h a t  a regulation es tab l ished  by t h e  New York City Transit  
Authority  ( “TA”) prohibiting begging in t h e  subw ay  s y s t e m  violates  
thei r  rights under  t h e  First A m endm ent .  Under t h e  regulation, 
individuals can solicit for organized  chari ties,  b u t  n o t  for 
themselves .  The de fendan ts  co n te n d  th a t  begging is no t  p ro te c ted  
s p e e c h  and t h a t  leg i t imate  s t a t e  in te re s t s  justi fy  t h e  regulation. 
The dis tr ic t  cour t  ruled in favor of  th e  plaintiffs. Ju d g e  Sand, 
speaking for t h e  court ,  concluded t h a t  “a meaningful distinction 
cannot  be drawn for First A m endm en t  purposes  b e tw e en  
solicitation for charity and begg ing” (p. 3 5 2 ) .  The circuit cour t  
m u s t  de te rm ine  if th e  lower cou r t  in te rp re ted  t h e  law correctly.
My analysis of t h e  opinion follows.
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The opinion con ta ins  suff icient  mater ia l t h a t  several  a s p e c t s  
of th e  p en tad  may be considered.  Begging is t h e  central  act.
Begging is ment ioned  in t h e  opinion 75  times.  What begging means  
is re la ted t o  t h e  scene ,  t h e  New York City subway. Burke ( 1 9 5 4 )  
s t a t e s  t h a t  an e v e n t  t a k e s  on “character ,  meaning, [and] 
significance in acc o rd a n c e  with t h e  c o n te x t s  in which we 
exper ience it” (p. 7).  What  t h e  ac t  m eans  is also related t o  th e  
agen t :  begging m eans  different  th ings  t o  different people. Several 
a g e n t s  are identified in t h e  opinion: t h e  circuit or appeals  court,  
w hose  views are  e x p re s s e d  by Ju d g e  Altimari; t h e  d is tr ic t  or lower 
court ;  t h e  D efen dan t /A ppe l lan ts ,  primarily t h e  Transi t  Author ity ,  
and th e  Plaintiff/Appellee, t h e  LACH, which b rough t  t h e  suit  on 
behalf  of tw o  hom eless  individuals, William B. Young and Joseph  
Walley. “Both th e  a c t  and t h e  a g e n t  require s c e n e s  t h a t  ‘con ta in ’ 
th e m ,” con tends  Burke ( 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 ,  p. 15).  Not all th e  a g en t s  are 
accorded  t h e  s a m e  significance, however .  The dis tr ic t  court ,  
ment ioned 77  t imes,  receives  t h e  bulk of th e  a t ten t ion .  Next in 
importance are t h e  Transi t  Authority,  ment ioned  5 4  t imes,  t h e  
circuit court ,  m en t ioned  4 3  t im es ,  and lastly t h e  plaintiffs, who 
are ment ioned  merely 1 5 t im es .  “Ideas are th e  proper ty  of  a g e n t s , ”
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observes  Burke ( 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 ,  p. 12).  Ideas co n n ec t  a g e n t s  with 
agency, t h e  ins trument  or m eans  t o  an end. The end  or goal may 
illuminate t h e  a g e n t ’s purpose .  The p re sen c e  of  several a g en t s  
makes  this  c a se  complex.
Because  Judge  Altimari sp e n d s  so  much of his t ime 
discussing t h e  various a g e n t s  involved in t h e  c a s e  it s e e m e d  
logical t o  begin this  analysis in a similar manner.  One could argue 
t h a t  four s e p a ra t e  p e n tad s  exist  in relation t o  each  agen t .  In 
Pentad  #1 t h e  ac t  is begging,  t h e  s c e n e  is t h e  subway, th e  a g en t  is 
t h e  circuit court ,  t h e  agency  is t h e  opinion and th e  purpose  is 
reprimanding th e  lower court.  In Pen tad  # 2  th e  a c t  is begging, th e  
s c en e  is t h e  subway, th e  a g e n t  is t h e  circuit court ,  t h e  agency  is 
th e  opinion declaring t h a t  begging is not  free speech ,  and th e  
purpose  is t o  a s s e r t  institutional authority .  In Pen tad  # 3  th e  ac t  
is begging, t h e  s cene  is t h e  subway, th e  a g e n t  is t h e  TA, t h e  agency 
is t h e  regulation prohibiting begging in t h e  subway and th e  purpose  
is t o  p ro te c t  t h e  common good.  In Pen tad  # 4  th e  ac t  is begging, th e  
s cen e  is th e  subway, t h e  a g e n t  is a beggar ,  t h e  agency  is 
ha rassm ent  and th e  purpose  is t o  gain money. Each of t h e s e  
p e n ta d s  will be  d iscussed  in turn.
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2.1 Pentad #1:  “No good deed  goes  unpunished.. .”
The em phas is  in t h e  first p en tad  is on th e  dis tr ic t  court.
Judge  Altimari’s remarks  c a s t  t h e  dist r ic t  cour t  in a nega t ive  
light. The a g e n t  is t h e  circuit  court ,  which identifies, examines , 
and evalua tes  t h e  co n d u c t  of  t h e  lower court.  The appellate  c o u r t ’s 
evaluat ions  are  harsh. T h e se  evaluat ions  fall into th re e  general  
c a te g o r ie s .
Criticism of  t h e  lower c o u r t ’s ac t ions  is t h e  first  ca tego ry .  
Altimari cr it icizes t h e  d is t r ic t  c o u r t ’s use  of p r e c e d e n t ,  observing 
th a t  “th e  dist r ic t  cour t  m iscons t rued  th e  line of reasoning” (p.
155)  used by th e  Supreme Court in an earlier case .  He d isparages  
t h e  dis tr ic t  c o u r t ’s ability t o  resolve  t h e  issues , noting t h a t  
“Despite  t h e  d is tr ic t  c o u r t ’s inability t o  draw a dist inct ion 
b e tw e e n  begging and solicitation by organized charities ,  t h e  
am ended  regulation ref lec ts  t h e  TA’s ability to  do s o ” (pp. 1 5 5 -5 6 ) .  
He also s u g g e s t s  t h a t  “The dist r ic t  cour t  a t t e m p t e d  t o  discredit  
this d if ference” (p. 156 ) .  Altimari d enounces  t h e  lower c o u r t ’s 
ac tions,  s t a t in g  t h a t  t h e  “d is t r ic t  c o u r t ’s analysis r e f lec ts  an 
ex ace rb a ted  de fe ren ce  to  t h e  alleged individual r ights  of  b eg g a rs
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and panhandlers . . .” (p. 1 58) .  Indeed, he con tends ,  t h e  district  cour t  
“misapprehends  t h e  TA’s in ten t  in revising t h e  regula t ion” (p. 161) .
Almost  all of  t h e  cr it icisms falling into th is  first  c a te g o ry  
ju x ta p o se  t h e  inep t i tude  of  t h e  dist r ic t  cou r t  with t h e  propit ious 
in ten t  of  t h e  Transit  Authority .  The “distr ic t  cou r t  improperly 
decided to  replace t h e  TA as  m anager  of th e  subway s y s te m  and 
falsely a s su m ed  th e  c o m p e te n c e  t o  judge  how much pro tec t ion  of 
th e  s y s t e m  and its p a s se n g e r s  is wise and how t h a t  level of  sa fe  
public t r a n sp o r ta t io n  will be  a t t a i n e d ” (p. 161) .  The circuit  cour t 
clearly cons iders  t h e  Transi t  Authority  t o  have  t h e  b e t t e r  ju d g m en t  
and exper ience in this  m a t t e r .  This conclusion also s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  Transit  Authority  was m ot iva ted  to  act ion by its concern  for 
p a s se n g e r  sa fe ty .  Altimari maligns t h e  lower cour t  by concluding 
t h a t  i ts m ot ives  were  impure: “Confronted  with t h e  d is tr ic t  c o u r t ’s 
holding, a cynic might remind th e  TA t h a t  ‘no good deed  goes  
unpunished’” (p. 162) .  In fact ,  a rgues  Altimari, t h e s e  act ions  
“c o n t ra v e n e  t h e  fundam enta l  principle of  judicial d e fe re n c e  owed 
t o  officials in carrying o u t  the i r  responsibili t ies  b a s e d  on 
exper t ise  and exper ience” (p. 161) .
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Criticisms falling in t h e  s eco n d  c a teg o ry  deal with errors  of 
omission. The dis tr ic t  cou r t  failed t o  inquire “as  t o  which level of 
judicial scrut iny [wa]s  ap p ro p r ia te” (p. 1 57) .  This “omission and 
presumption w[as]  fatal t o  t h e  distr ict  c o u r t ’s reasoning” (p. 157) .
In fact ,  t h e  dis t r ic t  cou r t  “lacked su b je c t  m a t t e r  jurisdiction over  
this i s sue” (p. 163) ,  and was  “ill-disposed t o  under take  such a 
t a s k ” (p. 1 64) .  In addition, t h e  dis tr ic t  cour t  em phas ized  certa in  
a s p e c t s  of t h e  case ,  such as  “t h e  to ta l  prohibition of begging in t h e  
subway ,” bu t  neg lec ted  to  consider  o th e r  a s p e c t s  of  t h e  case  as it 
was legally required to .  The d is tr ic t  cou r t  “failed t o  ad d re s s  t h e  
fac t  t h a t  th e re  has  been  no showing in this  case  t h a t  t h e  remaining 
avenues  of communicat ion are in ad eq u a te” (p. 1 60) .  Furthermore,  
t h e  dis tr ic t  cour t  ignored its own circuit c o u r t ’s p re ce d en ts .  
“Previously, we held .. . that  t h e  subway is neither  a d es ig n a te d  nor a 
tradit ional  public forum. However,  t h e  dis tr ic t  cou r t  proffered 
tha t . . .ou r  decision was of ‘limited precedent ia l  value’” (p. 1 52) .
Lastly,  t h e  circuit  co u r t  a t t a c k s  t h e  judicial activism of  t h e  
lower court .  The dist rict  cour t ,  Altimari argues ,  took  t h e  law into 
its own hands.  “The distr ict  cour t  d irec ted  th a t  t h e  complaint be 
am ended  on numerous  occasions; it sua sponte  c o n ta c te d  th e
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A tto rney  General, and when he declined to  intervene,  d i rec ted  t h a t  
he be made  a par ty  so  t h a t  New York Penal Law sect ion  2 4 0 .3 4 ( 1 )  
be a t  issue; it ins t ruc ted  t h a t  over  a dozen d e fendan ts  be added, 
and t h a t  t h e  class be  enlarged t o  include all needy  pe rsons  in New 
York S t a t e ” (p. 151) .  In s o  doing, “th e  district  cour t des igned  a 
much different  c a s e  than  t h e  con t roversy  t h a t  originally cam e 
before  t h e  c o u r t ” (p. 1 62) .  Citing Supreme Court rulings, th e  
circuit cou r t  reprimands  t h e  lower cour t ,  a s se r t ing  t h a t  “A 
district  cour t  o ugh t  no t  ‘reach ou t  for. . . issues, t h e reb y  depriving 
s t a t e  cour ts  of opportuni t ies  t o  develop and apply s t a t e  law’” (p. 
164).
The lower cour t  e r red  in several  ways. It m is in te rp re ted  and 
misapplied p reced en t .  It upheld individual rights  a t  t h e  ex p en se  of 
th e  common good. It took  control away from th e  proper  author ities .  
It lacked jurisdiction. Its analysis was incomplete .  In shor t ,  th e  
dist r ic t  cour t  simply w en t  t o o  far.
The circuit  cour t  def ines  itself in c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  dis tr ic t  
court .  The circuit cour t  is th e  higher cour t  w hose  t a sk  is t o  
de te rm ine  if t h e  lower cour t  a c t e d  appropriately.  Since t h e  ruling 
is reversed  and vaca ted ,  th e  audience has  bu t  one conclusion: the
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distr ic t  cour t  was  wrong. The circuit cour t  t h e re fo re  is right.
This division c a s t s  t h e  circuit  c ou r t  in a favorable  light. Its 
in te rp re ta t ion  is a cc u ra te  and appropria te .  Its analysis is tho rough  
and com ple te .  In shor t ,  t h e  circuit cour t  is everyth ing t h e  district  
is not.
Ju d g e  Altimari adds  t o  t h e  higher co u r t ’s  e th o s  by cas t ing th e  
circuit cou r t  and his own ac t ions  in a positive manner.  The circuit 
cour t ,  for example, g o e s  beyond  t h e  requ irements  of t h e  situation: 
“Although no t  n e cessa ry  t o  our  holding in this case ,  we briefly turn  
t o  t h e  dis tr ic t  c o u r t ’s conclusion t h a t  t h e  subway is a public forum 
in which begging and panhandling m u s t  be  p e rm i t te d ” (p. 161) .  This 
observat ion  s u g g e s t s  good  will. It d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h e  appellate  
cour t  in tends  to  s e t  th ings  right. This desire  is so  s t rong ,  in fact,  
t h a t  t h e  cour t  does  more  it has  to ,  so  t h a t  it may clarify t h e  legal 
issues. A g r e a t  deal of  clarification is called for, s ince  th e  lower 
cour t  m ade  so  many mistakes .  The dis tr ic t  cour t  is lower and 
inferior; t h e  circuit court ,  above  it and  superior.  The situat ion,  
n o te s  Burke ( 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 ) ,  is a “synonym for s c e n e ” (pp. 12-13) .
Here Judge  Altimari u ses  scenic  proper t ies  t o  e leva te  one a g e n t
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and to  den igra te  ano ther .  The circuit cour t  remains  t h e  focus in 
th e  second  pentad.
2.2 Pentad  #2 :  “Here, w ha t  com m on s e n se  beckons t h e  law 
o r d a in s . ”
Here, t h e  circuit cour t  m u s t  make a decision. It m u s t  decide 
if begging is p r o te c t e d  speech .  The plaintiffs chal lenged th e  
regulation on cons t i tu t iona l  grounds,  contending  t h a t  “begging is 
pure speech  fully p r o te c t e d  by th e  First A m en d m en t” (p. 152) ,  and 
arguing th a t  “w henever  a hom eless  and needy  person is extending 
his hand, he is com m unica t ing” (p. 153) .  The regulation permits  
individuals t o  solicit on behalf  of organized  chari t ies  bu t  prohibits 
individuals from begging in t h e  subway sy s te m .  The d e fendan ts  
con tend  th e  regulation did no t  deny anyone f reedom of speech  and 
t h a t  t h e  Transi t  Authority  was act ing b o th  within its legal rights 
and in th e  b e s t  in te res t  of t h e  s t a t e .
Judge  Altimari begins  t h e  opinion with an observat ion:  “We 
initiate our discussion by express ing  grave d o u b t  as  t o  w he the r  
begging c o n s t i tu t e s  th e  kind of ‘express ive c o n d u c t ’ p r o te c te d  to  
so m e  e x te n t  by th e  First A m e n d m e n t” (p. 1 53) .  This observat ion
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s e t s  t h e  s t a g e  for w hat  is t o  follow. The cour t  is t h e  ul t imate 
arbi ter  of  w ha t  is and is no t  p r o te c te d  speech .
The cour t  e s tab l ishes  t h e  s tan d a rd s  t o  b e  u sed  in judging this 
case .  The first  s tan d a rd  is “Common s e n s e , ” which “tells us  t h a t  
begging is much more ‘c o n d u c t ’ than  it is ‘s p e e c h ’” (p. 1 53).
Defining t h e  s t a n d a rd  in th is  way allows t h e  c ou r t  t o  simply a s s e r t  
its claim b e c a u s e  w ha t  com m on s e n s e  tells us is t ru e  on its face. 
This m o v e m e n t  eliminates any requ irem ent  for proof. Next,  t h e  
cour t  links this  s tan d a rd  t o  legal s tanda rds .  “Here,” o b se rv es  t h e  
court,  “w ha t  com m on s e n se  beckons  t h e  law ordains” (p. 1 53) .  A 
discussion of  t h e  specific  legal s t a n d a r d s  follows: “In de termin ing  
‘w h e th e r  par t icular  c o n d u c t  p o s s e s s e s  suff ic ient  com m unica t ive  
e lem en ts  to  bring th e  First A m en d m en t  into play,’ t h e  Supreme 
Court asks  ‘w h e th e r  [a]n in ten t  t o  convey  a particularized m e ss a g e  
was  p r e se n t  and [whether]  t h e  likelihood was  g re a t  t h a t  t h e  
m e ss a g e  would be unders tood  by th o s e  who viewed i t ’” (p. 1 53).
Once specific legal s ta n d a rd s  have been  identified it is a 
simple m a t t e r  for t h e  cour t  to  show how t h e s e  s ta n d a rd s  have not  
been  m e t  in t h e  p re sen t  case ,  th u s  justifying t h e  reversal.  The 
cour t  simply a s s e r t s  t h a t  “. . .begging is n o t  inseparably inter twined
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with a ‘part icular ized m e s s a g e ’” (p. 153 ) .  Fur thermore ,  wri tes  
Altimari, even  if begging  w ere  in te r tw ined  with a part icularized 
m essag e ,  “th e r e  hardly s e e m s  to  be  a ‘g r e a t  likelihood’ t h a t  th e  
subw ay  p a s se n g e r s  who w i tn ess  t h e  c onduc t  are able t o  discern 
w ha t  t h e  particularized m e s s a g e  might  b e ” (pp. 1 5 3 -5 4 ) .  in fact,  
t h e  cour t  s u g g e s t s ,  p a s se n g e r s  would no t  likely even  pay a t ten t ion  
t o  t h e  m essag e ,  if indeed th ey  un d e rs to o d  it: “Given t h e  p a s s e n g e r s ’ 
apprehens ive  s t a t e  of mind, it s e e m s  ra the r  unlikely t h a t  they  
would be d isposed  t o  focus  a t t e n t io n  on any m essage ,  let  alone a 
t a c i t  and particularized o n e ” (p. 1 54) .
Ultimately, a rgues  t h e  court ,  begging is no t  fundamental ly  
a b o u t  sp e e ch  bu t  ra ther  is a b o u t  money: “W hether  with or without  
words, t h e  o b jec t  of  begging and panhandling is th e  t ra ns fe r  of 
money. Speech  is simply no t  inherent  t o  t h e  act;  it is no t  th e  
e s se n c e  of th e  co n d u c t” (p. 1 54).
Appeals  for organized charit ies ,  on t h e  o th e r  hand, “involve a 
var ie ty  of s p e e c h  in te re s t s ,  including ‘communica t ion  of  
information,  t h e  disseminat ion and p ropagat ion  of views and ideas, 
and th e  advocacy of c a u s e s ’” (p. 1 55) .  These  varied speech
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in t e re s t s  are  sufficient ,  wri te s  t h e  court ,  “t o  invoke p ro tec t ion  
under  t h e  First A m e n d m e n t” (p. 155) .
The opinion funct ions  as  a rebu t ta l  in which t h e  circuit cour t  
r e fu tes  and over tu rns  t h e  a rg u m en ts  of th e  lower court.  The fact  
t h a t  t h e  ac t ions  of  t h e  circuit cour t  are always r epo r ted  in th e  
plural — “We do no t  think, however ,  t h a t  t h e  regulation is d irec ted  
a t  s p eech  itself.. .” (p. 1 4 8 )  -- adds  weight  and au thor ity  to  th e  
opinion.
The opinion is largely c o n s t r u c t e d  of a s se r t ions ,  ques t ions ,  
observa t ions  and sugges t ions .  Asser t ions  are used  to  com m unica te  
certainty .  When th e  court  claims to  “have no d o u b t , ” t h a t  “based  
on th e  fac ts  it s e e m s  fair t o  say ,” or t h a t  “common s e n s e  tells u s , ” 
it p r e e m p t s  a rgum en t .  Observat ions  com m unica te  t h e  impression 
t h a t  t h e  cour t  simply had no o the r  choice, as  when th e  circuit cour t  
no tes ,  “We can only conclude in t h e  ins tant  c a se  t h a t  t h e  district  
court  improperly decided to  replace t h e  TA as  m anager  of th e  
subway sy s te m . . . ” (p. 161) .  Questions  allow th e  cour t  t o  c a s t  doubt  
on th e  merits  of th e  ca se  or th e  soundness  of  t h e  reasoning of the  
lower court .  Sugges t ions  enable  t h e  cour t  t o  frame th e  issue in a 
favorable way, as  when it t a k e s  t h e  opportuni ty  t o  show how
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limited its own powers  are.  The language th e  cour t  u ses  allows it 
t o  d is tance  itself from th e  issue a t  hand and t o  appear  above  th e  
fray. For ins tance ,  careful no t  t o  appear  t o  dislike t h e  homeless ,  
Altimari s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  cour t  is sym pa the t ic ,  b u t  t h a t  i ts power 
is limited. He writes: “We tak e  this  opportunity ,  the re fo re ,  t o  
su g g e s t  t h a t  it is no t  t h e  role of  this cour t  t o  resolve all t h e  
problems of t h e  homeless ,  as sy m p a th e t ic  as  we may be. We m ust  
fulfill t h e  more  m o d e s t  t a sk  of determining w h e th e r  t h e  TA may 
properly ban conduc t  t h a t  it finds t o  be inherently harmful in th e  
subway s y s t e m ” (p. 1 56) .  Tha t  conduc t  is t h e  focus  of t h e  third 
pentad.
2.3 Pen tad  #3 :  “In t h e  subway,  begging is inherently agg ress ive .”
The funct ion of t h e  circuit cour t  in this appeal is t o  make a 
ruling b ased  on t h e  law. Reexamining t h e  evidence in t h e  c a se  is 
optional; a rg u m en ts  in appeal are m ade  on t h e  basis of application 
or misapplication of  th e  law, no t  on th e  basis of  earlier t e s t im o n y  
or evidence.  Nonetheless ,  t h e  cour t  found certa in  te s t im o n y  
compelling enough  to  include it in i ts opinion.
Judge  Altimari begins by noting th a t  “In 1 9 8 8  th e  TA 
init iated a leng thy  s tu d y -p ro c e s s  concerning ‘quality of  life
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prob lem s’ exper ienced by riders in their  use  of  t h e  subway s y s t e m ” 
(p. 149) .  This re fe rence  is a del ibera te  one  des igned to  remind th e  
audience t h a t  t h e  Transi t  Authority  is concerned  a b o u t  i ts riders. 
Information for t h e  s tudy ,  t h e  cou r t  cont inues ,  c am e  from “A 
research  survey co n d u c ted  by Pe te r  Harris” (p. 149) ,  and an 
“ou ts ide  consult ing co m p an y ,” w hose  pres iden t ,  “Professor  George 
Kelling” is “an e x p e r t  with ex tens ive  national and international  
exper ience in social p ro b le m s” (p. 149) .  information was  also 
provided by “D etec t ive  Bernard Jacobs ,  a tw en ty - fou r  year  ve te ran  
of  t h e  Transi t  Authori ty  Police and initiator of  t h e  Transi t  Crime 
Prevention Unit,” who “m e t  with numerous  groups  of  ci tizens and 
passen g e r s” (p. 149) .
Ju d g e  Altimari p r e s e n t s  t h e  credent ia ls  of each  exper t  
w i tness  t o  c r e a t e  favorable  e t h o s  for t h e s e  individuals and their  
tes t imony.  The e th o s  is n ee d ed  b e ca u se  t h e  resul ts  of th e  s tudy  
later  b e co m e  th e  justi ficat ion for banning begging in t h e  subway. 
The s tudy  revealed t h a t  “subway pa s se n g e r s  exper ience begging as  
intimidating, harassing and th re a te n in g ” (p. 1 56) .  It is in fac t  th e  
begging and no t  t h e  communicat ing,  Altimari argues ,  which is t h e  
problem. “In t h e  subway, it is t h e  conduc t  of begging and
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panhandling, to tally  in d ep en d en t  of  any part icularized m ess a g e ,  
t h a t  p a s sen g e r s  exper ience  as  th rea ten ing ,  harass ing and 
intimidating” (p. 1 54) .  This  is t h e  conduct  t h a t  t h e  TA is 
regu la t ing .
Altimari c o n s t r u c t s  t h e  a rg u m e n t  carefully.  First, he p roves  
th a t  th e  TA has regulatory power. “The TA, in fact ,  has  a broad 
s ta tu to ry  m a n d a te  t o  p romulgate  rules governing th e  conduc t  and 
sa fe ty  of t h e  public as  it may d e e m  necessary ,  convenien t  or 
desirable. . .” (p. 158) .  This s t a t u t o r y  m an d a te  gives  t h e  t ransit  
authority  legitimacy. Second,  t h e  cou r t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  far from 
being new, t h e  regulation prohibiting begging and panhandling in t h e  
subway is “long-s tanding” (p. 149 ) .  To s t r e n g th e n  this claim, th e  
phrase  “long-s tanding prohibit ion” is r e p e a t e d  th ro u g h o u t  t h e  
opinion. By identifying t h e  prohibition as  a long-s tanding one, 
Altimari s u g g e s t s  t h a t  only a minor policy shift  has  occurred.  He 
implies t h a t  t h e  regulation has been  on th e  books for a long time, 
bu t  up to  now it was not  rigorously enforced. The only change  in 
policy, then,  is t h e  s t r e n g th  of en fo rcem en t .  This re fe rence  also 
co u n te r s  t h e  p la in t i f fs  claim t h a t  t h e  Transit  Authority  c r e a t e d  a 
new policy aimed specifically a t  t h e  homeless .  The TA’s action is
cons is ten t ly  refer red  t o  by t h e  cour t  as  a “prohibition” (1 7  
r e fe rences )  or “regula t ion” ( 3 6  re fe rences ) ,  rarely as  a “b a n ” (8 
re fe rences ) .  Regulat ions and prohibitions are  less intrusive and 
more  innocuous than  outr ight  bans. Again, t h e  language s u g g e s t s  a 
minor, not  a major change  in policy. Language nam es  t h e  act .  Burke 
( 1 9 5 4 )  o b se rv es  t h a t  “A g re a t  deal of ch a rac te r  is imparted  to  
e v e n t s  by purely verbal m eans ,  as  when we label a bo t t l e  poison. . .” 
(P- 7).
The policy is necessary ,  t h e  cour t  reasons ,  b e c a u s e  th e  
mission of t h e  TA is t o  p ro m o te  public s a fe ty  in t h e  t rans i t  
sy s tem .  “The TA is em p o w ered  to  es tablish  regulat ions  governing 
p a s se n g e r  conduc t ,  in order  t o  faci li tate an effect ive ,  s a fe  and 
reliable m eans  of public t r a n s p o r t a t io n ” (p. 148) .  In fact ,  t h e  TA’s 
concern  for t h e  public is w ha t  p ro m p ted  it t o  enforce  t h e  
regulation in t h e  first place. Here, language just if ies  t h e  act .
Burke ( 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 )  writes  t h a t  “policy, s t r a t e g y ,  [and] t ac t i c s  are 
all c o n c e p t s  of ac t ion” (p. 14) .
Next,  Altimari c o n te n d s  t h a t  t h e  dis tr ic t  co u r t  simply 
m isunders tood  th e  mot ives  of  t h e  t rans i t  authority .  “The dis tr ic t  
c o u r t ’s conclusion m isapprehends  t h e  TA’s in ten t  in revising th e
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regulat ion” (p. 161) .  The TA’s goals were for th e  common good, 
wr i tes  t h e  court.  “The a m e n d e d  regulation d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h e  TA’s 
concern  t o  sa feguard  th e  s y s te m  and honor t h e  First A m e n d m e n t”
(p. 160) .  It is because  of TA’s concern  for th e  public good th a t  “the  
regulation. J e a v e [ s ]  open  ample a l te rna t ive  channels  of 
communicat ion” (p. 1 60) .  Indeed, t h e  court  observes ,  “th e re  has 
been  no showing in this c a s e  t h a t  t h e  remaining avenues  of 
communication are  inad eq u a te” (p. 160) .  Thus t h e  Transit  
Authority did no t  intend t o  deprive anyone of their  f reedom  of 
speech .  “To th e  contrary ,  t h e  TA regulation is simply no t  d irected  
a t  any express ive a s p e c t  of  t h e  proscribed conduct .  In fac t  under  
t h e  am en d ed  TA rules, t h e  m e ss a g e  may be expressly  delivered” (p. 
159) .  Exactly w ha t  m e ss a g e  may be  delivered is unclear, bu t  it is 
presumably  c o m m unica ted  th rough  t h e  a l te rna t ive  channels  
remaining ou ts ide  t h e  author i ty  of  t h e  TA. Having a ssu red  th e  
audience t h a t  communicat ion pe rs i s ts  and having d isposed  of t h e  
harm, t h e  cour t  p roceeds  t o  just ify t h e  TA’s action.
Altimari wr i tes  t h a t  t h e  Trans i t  Author i ty  e s ta b l i sh e d  th e  
regulation for t h e  express  purpose  of p ro tec t ing  th e  public safe ty .  
The regulation specifically bans  begging b e ca u s e  “Quite ap a r t  from
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any par ticularized idea or m e ss a g e  it might arguably p o s se s s ,  
begging p o s e s  significant dangers  t o  t h e  subway s y s t e m ”
(emphasis  added)  (p. 1 59) .  Begging, by definition, is dangerous,  and 
it is “These  dangers ,  independent  of  t h e  alleged communicat ive  
cha rac te r  of begging,  [which] give rise t o  th e  regulat ion” (p. 1 59) .  
Soliciting for char i ty  was  p e rm i t ted  b ec a u s e  this  ac t ivi ty  is not  
dangerous:  “Nowhere in t h e  record is th e re  any indication t h a t  
p a s se n g e r s  felt int imidated by organized char i t ies” (p. 1 56) .  This 
explanation s u g g e s t s  t h a t  intimidation is th e  b e g g a r ’s agency.  This 
topic  will be deve loped  in t h e  fourth pentad .
The leg i t imate  and  compelling in te re s t s  of  t h e  s t a t e  just ify  
t h e  TA’s ac tions.  Behavior such as  begging “g e n e r a te s  high levels 
of fear  in t h e  pas senge rs ,  th e reb y  discouraging use  of  t h e  s y s t e m ” 
(p. 149) .  According t o  t h e  t ransi t  authority,  som e  th r e e  million 
people ride th e  New York City subway daily (p. 158) .  The court  
offers  a de ta i led  descr ipt ion of th e  ridership, noting th a t :  “The 
subway is no t  t h e  domain of t h e  privileged and powerful.  Rather, it 
is t h e  primary m e an s  of  t r a n sp o r t a t io n  for literally millions of 
people of m o d e s t  means ,  including hard-working men and women, 
s t u d e n t s  and elderly pensioners  who live in and around New York
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City and who are d ep e n d e n t  on th e  subway for th e  conduc t  of their 
affairs” (p. 1 58) .  This e l ab o ra te  por tra i t  of t h e  ridership is an 
a t t e m p t  t o  c r e a t e  identification. Burke ( 1 9 6 6 )  a rgues  t h a t  
“Basically th e re  are  tw o  kinds of  te rm s :  t e r m s  t h a t  pu t  th ings  
to g e th e r ,  and t e rm s  t h a t  t a k e  things apar t.  Otherwise put,  A can 
feel himself identified with B, or he can think of  himself as  
d isassoc ia ted  from B” (p. 4 9 ) .  By describing th e  subway ridership 
as  hard-working people of  m o d e s t  m eans ,  Ju d g e  Altimari increases  
t h e  likelihood t h a t  people  who read th e  opinion will find so m eo n e  
like t h e m se lv e s  or s o m e o n e  p o sses s in g  similar a t t r i b u t e s  in t h e  
descr iption of  t h e  subway  pa t rons .  Altimari is encouraging th e  
audience to  identify with t h e  majority whom th e  s t a t e  and TA 
p ro te c t .
In c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  hom eless  are m ent ioned  rarely. The homeless  
a re  d i s c u s se d  specifically in “The Kelling af f idavi t ,” which 
“earmarks  re sea rch  indicating t h a t  t h e  hom eless  in t h e  subway are 
general ly  males  affl ic ted with se r ious  mental  illness and suffer ing 
from alcohol a n d /o r  drug a b u s e ” (p. 1 50) .  This specific re ference  
is an a t t e m p t  t o  c r e a te  w ha t  Burke ( 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 6 9 )  t e rm s  “division”
(p. 28) ,  t h e  oppos i te  of identification. Its aim is t o  por tray  th e
homeless  as  t h e  other ,  as alien, and as deviant.  The hom eless  who 
beg  in th e  subway are derelict  old men who can ’t  even  t ak e  care  of 
th em se lv es ;  th e y  are  d ifferent  from t h e  responsib le  ci t izens  who 
pay t o  ride t h e  subway. The cour t  n o te s  t h a t  “th e  sad  s ta t i s t ic s  
reveal t h a t  during a ten  m onth  period in 1989 ,  an average  of  six 
hom eless  pe rsons  per  m onth  died in t h e  subway, including fifteen 
p e rsons  who were  s t ruck  by trains.  As a result  Kelling counsel led 
t h a t  this ‘s u b s e t  of  th e  hom eless ’ should not  be encouraged  to  beg 
and panhandle  in t h e  s y s t e m  ‘for their  own well-being’” (p. 1 50) .
Here t h e  opinion is a vehicle for asser t ing  authority .  The TA 
is a rep re sen ta t iv e  of t h e  s t a t e .  It is em pow ered  by t h e  s t a t e  to  
es tab li sh  rules and regula t ions  governing co n d u c t  within th e  
sys tem .  The s ce n e  empowers  t h e  agen t .  The TA can a c t  within t h e  
sys tem .  It can c r e a te  rules governing behavior the re .  The “conduct  
of begging in t h e  subway,” (emphasis  added)  ob se rv es  t h e  court,  
“am ounts  t o  nothing less than  a m enace  to  t h e  public g o o d ” (p.
156) .  The a c t  is dangerous  b ecause  of t h e  scene: t h e  danger  
just if ies  t h e  act ion.  The t rans i t  authority,  b ased  on its experience,  
“obviously reached  a ju d g m e n t  t h a t  th e  only ef fec t ive  w ay” to
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eliminate this danger was “through th e  en fo rce m e n t  of  a to ta l  ban"
(p. 160).
To t h e  court,  t h e  act ion sp ea k s  for itself. It is “obvious” t o  
th e  court  (and presumably t o  everyone  else) t h a t  t h e  t ransi t  
au thor ity  p o s s e s s e d  th e  acum en  and exper t ise  t o  make th e  
appropria te  ju dgm en t .  This s u g g e s t s ,  in Burke’s ( 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 )  
parlance, t h a t  ju s t ice  is a p roper ty  o f  t h e  agen t .  The TA’s 
exper ience  jus t i f ies  i ts decision. It is also clear  t h a t  t h e  Transi t  
Authority had no o th e r  choice: “Further,  t h e  TA obviously made a 
ju d g m e n t  t h a t  while so lic i ta t ions  by organ ized  chari t ies  could be 
conta ined t o  certa in  areas  of t h e  sy s te m ,  t h e  problems posed  by 
begging and panhandling could b e  add ressed  by nothing less than  th e  
enfo rcem ent  of a to tal  b a n ” (p. 156) .  Burke ( 1 9 4 5 / 1 9 6 9 )  obse rves  
t h a t  t h e  s c e n e - a c t  ra tio  “can be applied determinis tically in 
s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  a particular  policy had  t o  be ad o p te d  in a certain 
s ituat ion. . .” (p. 13). This language c r e a te s  t h e  percept ion of 
urgency. Begging is so  s e v e re  a problem t h a t  nothing will contain 
it but  a to ta l  ban.
63
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The em phas is  in p e n ta d  four is t h e  ac t .  Begging is referred to  
75  t im es  in t h e  opinion. Begging is dangerous .  It is “inherently 
agg re ss ive” t o  t h e  “cap t ive” p a s se n g e r s  in t h e  subway s y s te m  (p. 
158) .  It “p o ses  significant dangers  t o  t h e  subway sy s te m .  The 
co n d u c t  t h r e a t e n s  p a s s e n g e r  well-being and s a f e ty  as  well as  
d isrupts  t h e  s y s t e m ’s sm o o th  opera t ion” (p. 1 59) .  Begging has no 
redeeming  social value: “It s e e m s  fair t o  say  t h a t  m o s t  individuals 
who beg are  not  doing so  t o  convey any social or political m essage .  
Rather,  they  beg t o  collect m oney” (p. 1 53).
The a g e n t s  or persons  commit t ing t h e  ac t  -- “b e g g a r s ” (1 0  
re fe rences )  or “panhandlers” (5 re fe rences )  or “th e  h o m e le ss ” (11 
re fe rences )  -- are identified infrequently. The reason?  The a g e n t  
is defined by th e  act .  B eggars beg . Society s ilences and n e g a t e s  
a g e n t s  by avoiding any re fe rences  to  them.  The a b se n c e  of th e  
a g e n t  in many r e fe rences  is a way of  making t h e  a g e n t  go away; it 
is used  to  silence t h e  agen t .  The gener ic  t e rm s  “b e g g a r ” and 
“panhandler” are  used  t o  d is tance  “t h o s e  people” from th e  r e s t  of 
socie ty .  Often, t h e s e  labels are  jo ined with negatively c o n n o ta te d  
words, creating a negat ive  image of  beggars  and panhandlers.  The
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cour t  observes ,  for instance ,  t h a t  “The only m e ssa g e  we are able to  
espy  as common to  all a c t s  of begging is t h a t  beggars  want  t o  
ex t r a c t  m oney  from th o s e  whom th e y  a c c o s t” (emphasis  added) (p. 
154).
Rhetoric c r e a t e s  t h e  percep t ion  t h a t  begging is hazardous.
The c o u r t ’s observat ion  t h a t  “Begging.. .has t h e  serious potential  of 
creating an acc iden t  and injuring many people” (p. 1 50 )  can be 
reconfigured as  follows: “Reacting t o  b eg g a r s  in t h e  subway, 
passengers  could c r e a te  an acc iden t ,” or, “Passenger reactions  to  
beggars  begging in t h e  subway have th e  potential  t o  c rea te  an 
acc iden t .” This language masks  t h e  ju d g m e n ts  and percep t ions  of 
t h e  passengers ,  creat ing t h e  impression t h a t  begging cau ses  th e  
p a s se n g e r s  t o  feel int imidated.  Rhetoric p roduces  ideologies or 
ways of  thinking (Farrell, 1 9 9 3 ,  p. 153 ) .  The observat ion t h a t  
“. . .begging c o n t r ibu te s  t o  a public percept ion  t h a t  t h e  subway is 
f raught with hazard and d a n g e r” (p. 149) ,  can be rewri tten to  read:
“ The public perceives  t h e  subway as  a dangerous  place because  
th ey  s e e  beggars  t h e r e . ” In each  case ,  begging is not  th e  cause  of 
t h e  perception,  t h e  p a s se n g e r  is. The public bel ieves t h e  subway is 
th rea ten ing  b ec a u se  of w hat  they  s e e  the re .  In o the r  words, th e
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v e ry  s ig h t o f  begg ars  is th rea ten in g . When one changes  the  
s e n te n c e  “t h e  s ight  of beggars is th r e a t e n in g ” t o  identify a 
different group so  t h a t  it might  ins tead  read, “th e  s ight  of blacks  
is t h re a te n in g ,” or, “t h e  s ight  of  women is t h re a te n in g ,” t h e  
normative force of  th e  j u d g m en t  b eco m es  more clear. As a basis 
for law this  ruling is frightening. If o n e ’s m ere  p re se n c e  is 
th rea ten ing ,  asking th e  t ime could be  cons idered  ha rassm en t ,  s ince  
it could cause  people t o  feel intimidated. Such a p r e c ed en t  could 
also be used  as  a just if icat ion for removal.  If t h e  s ight  of beggars  
is th rea ten ing ,  t h e  answer  is removing th em .  If t h e  s ight  of blacks 
is th rea ten ing ,  is t h e  solut ion e rasu re?
In t ru th ,  what  is th rea ten in g  s t e m s  not  so much from what  
t h e  homeless  bring t o  t h e  s ituat ion bu t  ra ther  w hat  pas senge rs  
p roject  on them.  Golden ( 1 9 9 2 )  obse rves  t h a t  homeless  people 
se rve  as  a reposi tory for t h e  m yths  and fears  of th e  larger socie ty. 
“Homeless  [people]  can s e rv e  this  function b ec a u s e  their  separat ion  
from soc ie ty  d is tan ce s  th e m  psychologically and tu rns  th e m  into 
blank shapes  on which we can project  various images. . .” (p. 6).  The 
public t rans fo rm s  its vision t o  ref lect  i ts beliefs.  The public s e e s
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t h e  homeless  as alien, as  t h e  other .  Burke ( 1 9 5 4 )  a rgues  t h a t  of ten
language conveys  th e  a t t i t u d e s  of  t h o s e  making judgm en ts .
The s c e n e  also influences percept ion.  Perhaps w hat  is m o s t
th rea ten ing  abou t  begging in t h e  subway is not  t h e  beggar  or th e
ac t ,  bu t  t h e  subway itself. Ju d g e  Altimari wri tes  th a t :
Open city s t r e e t s  allow p ed e s t r i an s  w h a t  soc io logis ts  te rm  
“fa te -co n t ro l ,” or t h e  ability t o  avoid and move away from an 
intimidating person.  To t h e  contrary ,  subw ay  riders enjoy 
considerably  less  fluidity of m o v e m e n t  and ability t o  control 
w ha t  happens  t o  th em . . . th e  rider feels “cap t ive .” As a result ,  
Kelling concluded, in t h e  subway environment,  begging is 
inherently aggress ive  even  if no t  pa ten t ly  so  (pp. 1 4 9 -5 0 ) .
Altimari and Kelling s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  rider is t h e  cap t ive  of t h e
beggar; in actuality,  however,  t h e  rider is a capt ive  of t h e  subway.
Begging is aggress ive  b ec a u s e  in t h e  subway p asse n g e r s  c a n ’t  avoid
it.
2.5 Discussion
Ju d g e  Altimari’s  opinion is a rich so u rce  of  information a b o u t  
ho m elessn ess  and th e  role of t h e  courts .  His opinion aptly 
il lustrates t h e  rhetoric of  t h e  adversary.  Rabin ( 1 9 7 8 )  o b se rv es  
t h a t  “Ju d g es  do no t  like t o  be  accused  of being subjective;  th ey  
prefer  t o  maintain a t  leas t  an appearance of objec t iv i ty . . .” (italics 
in original) (p. 8 5 ) .  In th is  opinion Judge  Altimari co m m unica tes
67
disdain for t h e  hom eless  while a t  t h e  s a m e  t ime couching his 
j u d g m e n ts  in th e  “ob jec t ive” language of th e  law. Such a m aneuver  
allows t h e  J u d g e  t o  appear  rem oved  from th e  s ituation and masks  
his personal involvement in t h e  opinion. His language,  like his 
bench, is above  it ail, above  th e  fray. The specialized vocabulary of 
t h e  court,  r ep le te  with r e fe r e n c e s  t o  judicial p r e c e d e n t  and legal 
con cep ts ,  in which all par t ies  are re fer red  t o  in t h e  third person,  
d is tances  and depersona l izes  t h e  homeless .
Jones  ( 1 9 7 6 )  ob se rv es  t h a t  “ju s t i ce s  need  only a few 
just if icat ions in order  t o  e s tab l ish  the i r  dec is ions” (p. 127 ) .  For 
Ju d g e  Altimari t h e  centra l  jus t i f ica t ion  for t h e  regulat ion is t h e  
ac t  itself: begging.  The opinion is an e labo ra te  narrative  which 
justi f ies  t h e  decis ion and a r t ic u la te s  social values . In th e  
ju d g m en t  of t h e  court ,  begging is a dangerous  activity t h a t  
t h r e a t e n s  th e  public sa fe ty .  Beggars  harass  and intimidate th e  
public for t h e  purposes  of ex trac t ing  money from them .  The entire  
exchange  is carried out th rough  t h e  agency  of ha rassm en t ;  b eggars  
do no t  make simple r e q u e s t s  — th e y  th re a ten ,  a cc o s t  and coerce  
th e  public into action. The Transi t  Authority ,  in c o n t ra s t ,  is a 
benevolent  rep resen ta t ive  of t h e  s t a t e .  The TA is c a s t  as  hero, t h e
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public as  victim, and th e  b eg g a r  as  villain. Socie ty  m a n d a te s  t h a t  
th e  villains be  dea l t  with; t h e  fo rces  of  good  m u s t  t riumph over  th e  
fo rces  of  evil. Thus t h e  s to ry  ends,  t h e  regulation s tan d s ,  and 
beg g a rs  are e j e c te d  from th e  s c e n e  b e ca u s e  their  behavior  is 
defined as  criminal.
Several conclusions can b e  drawn abou t  t h e  meaning of 
ho m e le s sn es s  b a sed  upon an analysis of J u d g e  Altimari’s opinion. 
First, h o m e le s sn es s  is a problem. Ju d g e  Altimari sp e n d s  
considerable  t ime arguing t h a t  t h e  p re sen ce  of  b eg g a rs  in t h e  
subway is harmful t o  soc ie ty .  Second, h o m e le s sn es s  is a deviant  
condition. The homeless  are m em b ers  of a marginal group whose 
rights  are subord ina te  t o  t h e  majority.  They perform deviant  a c t s  
(begging)  in t h e  subway and pose  a t h re a t  t o  socie ty .  The purpose  
of t h e  regulation is t o  p reven t  t h e  a c t  from occurring. Because th e  
a g e n t  and th e  a c t  are inter twined -- beggars  beg  -- t h e  Judge  
implies in t h e  opinion t h a t  t h e  b e s t  way of  dealing with 
hom elessness  is t o  banish t h e  agen t .
The meaning of h o m e lessn ess  is co n s t ru c te d  th rough  a 
var ie ty  of  rhetorical devices .  The tw o  m o s t  s ignif icant rhetorical 
devices  are also t h e  m o s t  powerful.  Judge  Altimari def ines  t h e  ac t
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-- begging — as  dangerous ,  th en  defines t h e  a g e n t  by t h e  act .  This 
c r e a t e s  division and por trays  t h e  hom eless  as  alien and dangerous,  
allowing t h e  Judge  t o  rhetorically make th e  a g e n t  go away. The 
a g en t  is a villain who m u s t  be vanquished. The a g e n t  m u s t  be 
removed,  and t h e  s c e n e  or s ituation justi fies  this  ac t.  The public 
does  not  wish t o  be  t roubled  by beggars;  not  only is t h e  a c t  of 
begging th rea ten ing ,  bu t  m ore  significantly, th e  s ight  of  th e  a g e n t  
is also. The adage  “ou t  of  sight,  ou t  of mind” might be used to  sum 
up th e  percept ions  of socie ty .  The p resence  and ab se n c e  of the  
hom eless  in te ra c t  in a particularly p o s tm o d e rn  way. It is t h e  very 
p re se n c e  of  t h e  hom eless  t h a t  p rec ip i ta te s  t h e  act ion legally 
requiring their  ab sen ce .  P re se n c e  is t h e  just if icat ion for absence .
It is this s a m e  troubling p r e se n c e  of  t h e  hom eless  in t h e  subway 
t h a t  produces  an ab sen ce  of  t h e  homeless  in language. Defining th e  
ag en t  by t h e  ac t  is a way of  making th e  a g e n t  go away, a way of 
rhetorically changing t h e  a g e n t ’s p r e se n c e  t o  absence .
P resence  and a b s e n c e  c r e a t e  a formidable rhetorical 
difficulty for t h e  hom eless  and their  advoca tes .  How can p resence  
and absence  be t ransfo rm ed?  How does  one confront socie ty,  to  
make it s e e  w ha t  is invisible, t o  e ra se  w hat  is under  i ts nose?
How do o th e r  rhe tors  speak,  and w hat  does  h om elessness  mean in 
t h e s e  c o n te x t s ?  T h ese  q ues t ions  will form t h e  focus  of  t h e  next 
tw o  chap te rs .  Chapter  Four is an analysis of t h e  rhetoric  of the  
homeless ,  while Chapter  Three  examines  t h e  rhetoric  of  t h e  
ad v o ca te .  Hom elessness  m ean s  different th ings  t o  d ifferent  
people.  The different  a g e n t s  employ different s t r a t e g i e s  and use 
d if ferent  rhetorical dev ices  t o  com m unica te  t h e  meaning of 
h om elessness .  Homeless  ad v o c a te  Mitch Snyder’s t e s t im o n y  before  
a Congressional c o m m i t t e e  i l lus tra tes  one  way t h a t  a rhetoric ian 
can deal with t h e  difficulty of  p re se n c e  and ab sen ce .  Snyder ’s 
sp e e c h  is an example  of  o n e  way t h a t  a rhetorical t ransfo rm at ion  
can occur.  Snyder’s t e s t im o n y  will be  examined next.
CHAPTER 3 
THE RHETORIC OF THE ADVOCATE
In Chapter  Two, th e  rhetoric  of t h e  adversary was examined.
In Ju d g e  Altimari’s opinion, rhetor ic  o p e r a t e d  divisively, 
separat ing  one group of people  from another .  Rhetoric can also 
function communally, bringing different  groups  of people to g e th e r .  
Bringing people t o g e th e r  is one of t h e  goals of  t h e  advoca te .  The 
focus of this ch ap te r  is t h e  rhetoric  of  th e  advoca te .
The te rm  ad v o ca te  refers  bo th  t o  a person who pleads th e  
cause  of ano the r  or who a rgues  in place of  another ,  and t o  an 
action, arguing in favor of or in su p p o r t  of  a position. Both s e n se s  
of th e  te rm  are s u g g e s t e d  in Mitch Snyder’s te s t im o n y  before  t h e  
House S ubcom m it tee  on Housing and Community Development .  
Snyder, a well-known a d v o c a te  for th e  homeless  and m em b e r  th e  
Community for Creative Non-Violence ( “CCNV”), spoke  ab o u t  
h o m elessn ess  in America. His t e s t im o n y  will be  analyzed here.
As a resul t  of  this analysis,  I hope t o  ar t icu la te  a n o th e r  view 
of  homelessness .  I believe t h a t  t h e  ad v oca te  and th e  adversary  
define ho m e le s sn e s s  differently and t h a t  h o m e le s sn es s  has
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different  meanings for th em .  This s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  ad v o ca te  and 
th e  adversary  will also make use  of different  rhetorical  dev ices  to  
c o n s t ru c t  t h e s e  meanings.  In this  chap te r ,  I will identify t h e s e  
devices  and a t t e m p t  t o  explain their  functions.
Before turning to  Snyder ’s te s t im ony ,  however ,  it will be  
useful t o  examine th e  influence of  t h e  s ituat ion on th o s e  
test ifying.  The Congressional hearing is an unusual co n te x t ,  a 
place w here  talk equals  action, a s e t t in g  where  rhetoric  is t h e  
currency of public policy and  social change.  Asbell ( 1 9 8 9 / 1 9 9 0 )  
( 1 9 8 9 )  claims t h a t  “hearings  appear  t o  be a unique rhetorical 
s ituat ion for t h e  production of  a rg um en ta t ive  d iscourse” (p. 38) .
“On Capitol Hill,” o b se rv es  Davidson ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  “t h e  c e n te r  
s t a g e  is held by c o m m it te e s  and su b co m m it tee s .  They are t h e  
political nerve  ends ,  t h e  g a th e re r s  of  information, t h e  s i f te rs  of  
a l te rna t ives ,  t h e  refiners  of legislative detai l” (p. 9 9 ) .
Com m it tees  perform much of t h e  work of th e  legislature.  Keefe 
and Ogul ( 1 9 6 8 )  call t h e  c o m m it te e  “th e  principal ag e n c y ” for 
gather ing  information and “th e  principal ins t rum ent  by which th e  
legis la ture  can de fend  and  maintain itself in s t ru g g le s  with t h e  
chief execut ive  and th e  bureaucracy” (p. 2 0 6 ) .  Com m it tees  ga th e r
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information by conduct ing  hear ings.  Information is provided by 
w i tnesses  who appear  before  t h e  com m it tee .  Van Der Slik and 
S tenger  ( 1 9 7 7 )  s t a t e  t h a t  c o m m it te e  hearings are an 
inst itutionalized o p p or tun i ty  for ci t izen w i tn e s s e s  t o  ad d re s s  t h e  
legislature.  Hearings are organized  for par ticular r easons  and are a 
t y p e  of purposeful action (Halkowski, 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 1 ) .
The Congressional  hear ing is also a formal sp e e ch  situat ion. 
Formal s p e e c h  s i tu a t io n s  cha rac te r is t ica l ly  inf luence par t ic ipa t ion  
(Lakoff, 1 9 9 2 ) .  Par tic ipants  in hearings  m u s t  follow a prescr ibed 
s e t  of  rules.  Hearings usually begin with Opening Remarks. “A 
c o m m i t t e e  w i tness  begins his p r e sen ta t io n  by reading or 
summarizing a s t a t e m e n t  of  his v iews” (Keefe & Ogul, 1 9 6 8 ,  p.
2 0 9 ) .  These  remarks  are normally followed by tes t im ony .
Test imony is generally p repared  befo rehand  and read  t o  t h e  
com m it tee .  The m o s t  common s t r a t e g y  for preparing to  address  a 
c o m m it te e  is t o  use  position p ap e rs  and oral t e s t im o n y  in 
conjunct ion with each  o th e r  (Kleinkauf, 1 9 8 1 ) .  Tes t im ony m ust  
fall within p resc r ibed  t im e  limits. Oral t e s t im o n y  is t ransc r ibed ,  
and wri tten copies  of t h e  t e s t im o n y  and accompanying docu m en ts  
are su b m i t ted  for t h e  record.  Davis ( 1 9 8 1 )  concluded t h a t  “record
building is th e  p redom inant func tion” of c o m m it te e s  (p. 103 ).  
Partic ipan ts  give th e ir  te s t im o n y  according to  th e  d es ig n a te d  
order, although “Coalitions deve loped  to  su p p o rt  or o p p o se  a bill 
o f te n  carefully co o rd in a te  th e ir  c o m m e n ts  and p o s it io n s” 
(Kleinkauf, 1 9 8 1 ,  p. 3 0 0 ) .  A period of ques tions  and answ ers  
usually follows th e  te s t im o n y . Only c o m m it te e  m em b ers  are 
p e rm it ted  to  ask  questions; non -m em bers  are  n o t  allowed to  make 
inquiries or to  in te rrup t th e  p roceed ings. Norms of po li teness  are 
o b se rv ed  and parliam entary  p rocedure  is followed. W itn esses  use  
formal te rm s  of ad d ress ,  d irecting  th e ir  rem arks  t o  T he Chair, The 
Chairman, The Senator, The R epresen ta tive , and so  on. T hese  te rm s  
s e t  th e  hearing ap a r t  from o th e r  form s o f social in te rac tion  and 
“signal th a t  som eth ing  special is going o n ” (Lakoff, 1 9 9 0 ,  p. 93 ) .
An individual’s p re se n c e  a t  a hearing co m m u n ica tes  so m eth in g  
ab o u t  th a t  p e rso n ’s s ta tu s  and im portance , for, “Entering th e  
congress iona l a rena  as  a w itn e ss  clearly is atypical c itizen  
behavior” (Van Der Slik & S tenger ,  1 9 7 7 ,  p. 4 6 8 ) .  W itnesses  
typically include people  who have a s ta k e  in th e  o u tco m e  (D enton & 
Woodward, 1 9 9 0 ) ,  and people who have been  invited to  appear
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before  th e  co m m ittee ,  b u t “anyone can ask to  appear  before  a 
c o m m it te e ” (Keefe & Ogul, 1 9 68 , p. 2 1 2 ) .
“D espite  th e  ubiquity of congressional hear ings” as a par t  of 
t h e  legislative p ro c e ss ,  “very  little s y s te m a t ic  re sea rch  from any 
discipline has b een  done  on congress ional h ea r in g s” (Halkowski, 
1 9 9 0 /1 9 9 1 ,  p. 2). Studying th e  te s t im o n y  produced a t  
congressional hearings is im p o rtan t  for severa l reaso n s . Rives 
(1 9 7 6 )  s t a t e s  t h a t  “th e  purpose  o f inquiry is ac t io n ” (p. 4 5 ) .  
Congressional hearings a re  formal inquiries c o n d u c te d  by th e  
leg isla ture  t h a t  provide r e se a rc h e r s  with valuable d a ta  a b o u t  
social problem s and political ac tions .  P e te rso n  ( 1 9 8 8 )  o b se rv e s  
th a t  “Political p e rfo rm an ces  reaffirm  h ierarchy” (p. 2 6 1 ) .
Examining te s t im o n y  em erg ing  from a political p ro c e ss  like th e  
legislative hearing could provide one  with inform ation ab o u t  social 
values and hierarchy. Asbell ( 1 9 8 9 / 1 9 9 0 )  s u g g e s ts  th a t  “much is 
revealed  a b o u t  th e  relationship b e tw e e n  th e  disabled and our laws 
th rough  an examination of th e  Congressional hearings” (p. 5). A 
similar claim can be  m ade  in th is  case: An analysis of th e  
te s t im o n y  of th e  a d v o ca te  for th e  hom eless  can reveal much abou t 
th e  relationships am ong th e  hom eless , th e  ad v o ca te ,  and socie ty .
76
Investigating  th e  role of th e  a d v o c a te  is particularly im portan t.  As 
P e te rso n  ( 1 9 8 8 )  n o te s ,  “a hearing provides an opportun ity  for 
groups to  fram e a s ituation  around their  own in te re s t s ” (p. 2 6 1 ) .  
Comparing th e  te s t im o n y  p roduced  by th e  ad v o ca te  and by th e  
hom eless  gives m e th e  opportun ity  to  identify and explore their 
particular in te re s ts .  Their te s t im o n y  provides a glim pse of how 
each  rh e to r  perce ives  and responds  to  th e  world of h om elessness .
Rhetorical s tu d ie s  of c o m m it te e  d iscourse  have been  
co n d u c ted  by Asbell ( 1 9 8 9 /1 9 9 0 ) ,  P e te rson  (1 9 8 8 ) ,  Davis (1 9 8 1 ) ,  
Rives (1 9 7 6 ) ,  and Schuetz  (1 9 8 6 ) .  Asbeli ( 1 9 8 9 /1 9 9 0 )  examined 
hearings concerning th e  Rehabilitation A ct of 1 9 7 3  befo re  th e  
House S u b co m m ittee  on Education. Her d isse rta tion  em ployed a 
N eo-A risto telian  analysis to  g e n e ra te  an a rg u m e n ta t iv e  profile of 
th e  te x t .  The profile show ed  which c o n te n t  and s truc tu ra l  
e lem en ts  w ere  p re se n t  in th e  a rgum en ts .  Her goal was to  shed  
so m e  light on th e  w ays th e  legislative p ro cess  a f fe c te d  so c ie ty  in 
general and th e  disabled minority in particular. Asbell 
( 1 9 8 9 / 1 9 9 0 )  concluded th a t  all of th e  te s t im o n y  was highly 
con trived  and very formally com m unica ted , th a t  m o s t  a rg u m en ts  
w ere b a se d  on factual claims and w ere  su p p o r te d  by s ta t is t ic s ,  and
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t h a t  rarely w ere  bo th  s ides  of any issue explicitly d iscussed . 
Working from an organizational p e rsp ec tiv e ,  P e te rso n  ( 1 9 8 8 )  
exam ined th e  rhetorical s t r a te g ie s  p art ic ipan ts  used  to  c o n s tru c t  
institu tional au tho rity  in S e n a te  s u b c o m m it te e  hearings on 
w ilderness legislation. She found th a t  par t ic ipan ts  in th e  hearings 
u sed  th re e  s t r a te g ie s  to  com m unica te  au thority : position markers, 
p se u d o -re q u e s ts ,  and im ages of order. P e te rso n ’s ( 1 9 8 8 )  analysis 
of th e  com m unication of au tho rity  included b o th  w itn e sse s  and 
legislators. Davis ( 1 9 8 1 )  c o n te n t  analyzed  fo rty -e igh t c o m m itte e  
hearing sess io n s  from th e  1971 delibera tions  on national health  
insurance. She developed  a seven  ca te g o ry  sy s te m  which identified 
various a s p e c ts  of com m unicative  u t te ra n c e s  in th e  co m m ittee  
sess ions. T hese  c a teg o r ie s  included th e  ty p e  of u t te ra n c e ,  purpose 
of u t te ra n c e ,  th e  tim e focus of th e  u t te ra n c e ,  th e  orien ta tion  of th e  
u t te ra n c e ,  th e  top ics  d iscussed  in th e  u t te ra n c e ,  and th e  ap p aren t 
audience of th e  u t te ra n ce .  Davis ( 1 9 8 1 )  concluded th a t  legislators 
carefully contro lled  com m unication  in hearings. Her re sea rch  is 
among th e  m ost thorough co n d u c ted  to  da te .  Rives (1 9 7 6 )  
perform ed  one of th e  first s tu d ie s  of congressional hearings. He 
in vestiga ted  hearings on th e  Taft-H artley  A ct befo re  th e  House
Com m ittee on Education and Labor, and th e  S en a te  C om m ittee  on 
Labor and Public Welfare. He concluded th a t  hearings “can b e s t  be 
described  as a modern adaption  of dialectic” (p. 4 4 ) .  He found five 
e le m e n ts  of classical d ialectic  p r e s e n t  in c o m m it te e  hearings. 
Hearings em ployed  logical inquiry, s t im u la te d  inform ation- 
gathering, p e rm it ted  th e  express ion  of opposition in th o u g h t ,  used  
th e  techn ique  of ques tion  and answ er, and en couraged  speculation 
ab o u t cou rses  of fu tu re  action. Additional work has been  done by 
S chuetz  (1 9 8 6 ) .  Her work differs so m ew h a t from th e  research  
d iscussed  previously in t h a t  s h e  did n o t s tu d y  specific  hearings; 
instead , she  w ro te  a b o u t  th e  legislative p ro cess  itself. S chue tz  
(1 9 8 6 )  exam ined overlays o f a rg u m en t p re se n t  in th e  legislative 
process . She distinguished b e tw e e n  th e  overt and cov er t  functions 
of political d iscourse . The o v e r t  function d e te rm in e s  th e  public 
n a tu re  of a rg u m e n ts ,  while th e  c o v e r t  function is p ro te c t iv e ,  
co n c e rn e d  with achieving con fo rm ity  with policy, limiting 
criticism of an action, or justify ing  th e  adoption  of a flawed 
policy. The o v e r t  function  is policy-driven, while t h e  c o v e r t  is 
concerned  with th e  p e rp e tu a t io n  of power.
79
The review of th e  l i te ra tu re  revea ls  t h a t  scho lars  are  using a 
variety  of m e th o d s  to  in v es t ig a te  congressional hearings. The 
review of th e  l i te ra tu re  in th e  previous c h a p te r  also revealed  t h a t  
scholars can ch o o se  from a num ber of m e th o d s  to  s tu d y  judicial 
opinions. There  are  severa l re a so n s  for th is  similarity. First, 
congressional hearings  and legal ac tio n s  are b o th  form s o f  political 
com m unication. D enton and W oodward ( 1 9 9 0 )  define political 
com m unication  as  “public d iscuss ion  a b o u t  th e  allocation of public 
re so u rces  ( rev en u es ) ,  official au th o r ity  (who is given th e  pow er to  
m ake legal, leg isla tive and  ex e c u tiv e  decis ions),  and official 
sanc tions  (w hat th e  s t a t e  rew ards or pun ishes)” (p. 14). Judge 
Altimari’s opinion d e a l t  with q u e s t io n s  o f official au th o r ity  and 
official sanc tions .  He ruled t h a t  th e  Transit A uthority  had th e  
official a u th o r ity  to  d e te rm in e  w h a t  behaviors  w ere  perm issible  
and impermissible in th e  subw ay  sy s te m . Thus b eg g ars  could be 
rem oved  from th e  s y s te m  for violating th e  official sanc tions .  The 
te s t im o n y  in t h e  p re s e n t  c h a p te r  falls within th e  rubric of public 
d iscussion a b o u t  th e  allocation o f public re so u rces .  The w itn e sse s  
appearing befo re  th e  co m m itte e  a t t e m p t  to  p ersuade  th e
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legislature to  a llocate  public re so u rc e s  for th e  b en ef it  of th e  
hom eless .
The seco n d  similarity b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  s e t s  o f  d a ta  is th e  
com plexity  o f th e  rules governing th is  sp e e c h .  Political 
com m unication  is public, occurring in a c o n te x t  t h a t  influences 
bo th  w hat is said and  th e  way th a t  it is said. Ju stif ica tions  m ust 
be grounded in law; th e  reaso n s  for th e  action m ust be co n n ec ted  to  
s t a t u t e  a n d /o r  p reced en t.  Testim ony m u st be g rounded in 
experience; th e  reaso n s  for th e  action  m u st be  c o n n e c te d  t o  th e  
person  befo re  th e  c o m m ittee .  The judicial opinion, in Burkean 
te rm s ,  e m p h as iz es  th e  a c t / s c e n e  ratio, while te s t im o n y  highlights 
th e  a c t / a g e n t  ratio.
The third  reason  t h a t  scholars  use  so  many d ifferen t m e th o d s  
t o  in v e s t ig a te  forensic  and  de libera tive  rhe toric  is t h a t  scho lars  
may choose  to  exam ine d ifferen t a s p e c ts  of any political ac t.  
T estim ony  and opinions are  rich so u rc e s  of da ta ; many ques tions  
can be asked ab o u t them . Some m eth o d s  of inquiry are b e t te r  
su ited  to  so m e  ques tions  th an  o thers .  Research m e th o d s  are  like 
lenses; th ey  help people  s e e  th ings  in d ifferen t ways. Some 
m e th o d s  are wide angle lenses, offering a broad p ic ture  of e v e n ts
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(Asbell, 1 9 8 9 /1 9 9 0 ;  P e te rson , 1 9 8 8 ;  Rives, 1 9 7 6 ) ,  while o th e r  
m e th o d s  are m ore narrow, focusing on th e  details (Davis, 1 9 8 1 ) .
An ad v a n ta g e  of employing a Burkean p e rsp ec t iv e  is t h a t  th e  
p e n ta d  is b road  enough to  e n c o m p a ss  th e  com plexity  of political 
com m unication; th e  e lem en ts  of th e  p e n ta d  are p re se n t  in all of th e  
d a ta  exam ined here. The p e n ta d  is n o t so  broad, however, t h a t  it 
limits a d iscussion of th e  particulars. Indeed, th ro u g h  th e  ratios, 
various a s p e c ts  of any e lem en t of th e  p e n tad  can be  exam ined in 
considerable  detail. Last, and perh ap s  m o s t  im portantly , th e  
application of th e  sam e  m e th o d  to  th re e  d ifferen t s o r t s  of sp eech  
will allow me, in C hapter  Five, t o  com pare  and c o n t ra s t  th em . Out 
of th a t  discussion I hope to  produce a m ore com ple te  and m ore 
useful unders tand ing  of w hat h o m e le ssn e ss  m eans.
W hat follows nex t is a d iscussion  and analysis of hom eless  
a d v o c a te  Mitch Snyder’s te s t im o n y  befo re  th e  House S ub co m m ittee  
on Housing and Community Development. Each e lem en t of th e  
p e n ta d  -- ac t ,  scen e , a g e n t ,  agency , and purpose  -- will be 
d is c u s s e d  individually.
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3.1 Act
The a c t  is tes t ify ing  befo re  a Congressional c o m m ittee .  
T estim ony can be  cons ide red  narrative; when Snyder te s t i f ie s  he 
tells  a s to ry ,  sharing his exper iences  and his p e rsp e c t iv e  with th e  
com m ittee .  One might e x p ec t  t h a t  b ecau se  it is a narrative, th e  
m o s t  compelling fe a tu re  of Snyder’s te s t im o n y  would b e  e th o s  or 
pa thos .  To th e  contrary , one of th e  m o st striking fe a tu re s  of th e  
n arra tive  is its logos, its  logical fram ew ork and s t ru c tu re .
Snyder begins by acknowledging th e  s itua tion  with a few 
in troductory  remarks: “Thank you for th e  opportun ity  to  bring 
to g e th e r  people from across  th e  coun try  who obviously have a s to ry  
t o  tell and w hose  s to ry  is of in te re s t  to  growing num bers  of 
peop le” (p. 16). He th en  immediately launches into his testim ony , 
s ta t in g  th a t:  “Four people are dead . They died in 3 d ay s” (p. 16).
This s ta t e m e n t  s ta n d s  o u t  b e c a u se  th e re  is no transition  preceding 
it, nothing p rep ares  th e  aud ience for th is  reve la tion .3
The rep o rt  th a t  “Four people are  d e a d ” is b o th  observation  
and assertion . The observa tion  is a factual report: in th e  last th re e  
days  four people  have died. The assertion  is com m unica ted  in w hat 
follows, th e  explanation of th e  c a u se  of dea th . “They died of
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h om elessness  and exposure  and lack of she lte r .  They died becau se  
local officials are  b o th  unable  to  and unwilling to  deal with th e  
problem ” (p. 16). Snyder u ses  th e  assertion  to  accomplish several 
ends. First, th e  a sse r t io n  e s ta b lish e s  th e  significance of th e  
problem. H om elessness  is serious b e c a u se  it leads to  d ea th .  Four 
people died of hom elessness. Second, Snyder uses  th e  assertion  to  
place blame for th e  problem on th e  governm en t.  T hese  individuals 
died, th e  audience is told, b e c a u se  local officials could no t and 
would no t help. Snyder rem arks t h a t  “...local officials are 
incapable of dealing with th e  p rob lem ” (p. 17). According to  
S chuetz  (1 9 8 6 ) ,  placing blam e is a cov er t  function.
Next, Snyder declares  th a t  “We have a twofold dilemma on 
our h an d s” (p. 1 6). He sp e n d s  considerable  tim e explaining w hat 
this  dilemma is. He begins by observing th a t  th e re  are  m ore people 
hom eless  now than th e re  have ever been  before, even m ore than  
w ere  hom eless  during th e  Great Depression. He n o te s  t h a t  winter 
is coming and pred ic ts  t h a t  people will die. People have already 
died. Here Snyder p re se n ts  visual ev idence to  sup p o rt  his claim. “I 
have here a friend. His nam e is John Doe. Those are th e  c rem ated  
remains of a human being who died 2 years  ago, hom eless  and alone
84
in this  c i ty ” (p. 17). The visual p re se n ta t io n  is so m ew h a t m acabre , 
b u t Snyder believes th a t  “ ...it’s only when th e  em otions  are  a roused  
th a t  people begin to  th ink” (in Rader, 1 9 8 6 ,  p. 4 ) .  This hom eless  
m an’s d e a th  apparen tly  a ro u sed  Snyder’s em otions; Rader ( 1 9 8 6 )  
rep o rts  t h a t  Snyder “carries th e  c re m a te d  a sh es  of a hom eless  
friend” (p. 5) around with him. Bringing th e  a sh es  with him to  th e  
hearing room is an e ffo r t  on S nyder’s par t  to  elicit a similar 
emotional re sp o n se  on th e  part of th e  audience in th e  hearing room.
The visual ev idence su p p o rts  Snyder’s claim th a t  people are 
suffering. The p re sen ce  o f a suffering minority o u g h t t o  be  enough 
to  m ove th e  majority to  action. However, Snyder co n ten d s ,  nothing 
is being done to  alleviate th a t  suffering. “The Presiden t has been  
incredibly adro it a t  c rea ting  th re e  ring c ircuses  and focusing 
a t te n t io n  everyw here e x cep t  w here it n eed s  to  g o ” (p. 1 7). He tells 
th e  co m m ittee ,  “So while we deeply app rec ia te  th e  sy m p a th y  and 
sensitiv ity  th a t  has  gone  into th e s e  hearings, and while we 
un d ers tan d  th a t  if you didn’t  care  you wouldn’t  be  here  and we 
wouldn’t  be here; th a t  ain’t  en o u g h ” (p. 17).
The a rgum en t con tinues  to  build. Snyder tu rns  th e  tab le s  to  
m ake th e  problem  and its solution m ore clear, effec tively  pu tt ing
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pressu re  on Congress. “If you w ere on th e  s t r e e t s ,  let m e tell you 
right now, bills would fly, legislation would p ass  hands  so  fa s t  our 
eyes  would not be  able to  keep  up with th e  speed . If you had to  face 
th e  nex t th re e  m o n th s  with cold hands and fe e t ,  fingers falling off 
b ecau se  of f ro s tb ite  and gangrene, if you had to  figure ou t how to  
live th rough  th e  nex t 3 m o n th s  with your families with no place to  
go b u t  m aybe  your car if you w ere lucky, you would do more than  
you are doing now” (p. 17).
Finally, Snyder n am es  th e  ac t .  The problem facing th e  
Congress is how to  g e t  hom eless  people off th e  s t r e e t s  now before  
th e y  die. “W hat we have to  concern  ourselves with now is g e t t in g  
folks in off th e  s t r e e t s ,  particularly in th o s e  p a r ts  o f  th e  coun try  
w here  th e y  may well die as  a resu lt of their  h o m e le ssn e ss” (p. 18). 
Rhetorically, t h e  m agn itude  of th e  defined problem d e te rm in e s  th e  
s t r e n g th  of th e  desired  response . Snyder a rgues  “record  n u m b ers” 
of people are dying and suffering, su g g es tin g  t h a t  th e  problem is 
enorm ous. Next he s t a t e s  th a t  “This is a national em ergency .
T reat it as  such. Do everything th a t  you have to  do, everything th a t  
you can do, to  make sp ace  for th o se  people” (p. 1 8). Calling th e  
problem an “e m e rg e n c y ” com m unica tes  urgency to  th e  audience.
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Snyder’s language is a su b tle  way o f pressuring th e  c o m m it te e  to  
a c t  im m ediately .
“Ideas,” o b se rv e s  Burke ( 1 9 4 5 /1 9 6 9 ) ,  “are  th e  p roperty  of 
a g e n ts ” (p. 12). Several ideas are  com m unica ted  in Mitch Snyder’s 
te s t im o n y , th e  m o s t  significant o f  which is th e  notion th a t  people  
are  dying b e c a u se  g o v e rn m en t officials will n o t help th em . T hese  
d e a th s  are  terrib le n o t  b e c a u s e  d e a th  itself  is terrible, b u t b e c a u se  
th e s e  d e a th s  w ere  p reven tab le . Snyder appears  to  believe th a t  if 
he can g e t  th e  c o m m ittee  m em b ers  to  u n ders tand  th e  s ituation, to  
s e e  how n eed less  th e s e  d e a th s  are, th a t  this  knowledge alone 
should be suffic ien t to  call t h e  c o m m it te e  to  action. The s ituation  
dem ands  action. “The s c e n e / a c t  ra t io ,” w rites  Burke ( 1 9 4 5 /1 9 6 9 ) ,  
“...may be applied in h o r ta to ry  s t a t e m e n t s  to  th e  e f fe c t  t h a t  a 
ce r ta in  policy should be  a d o p te d  in conform ity  with th e  s i tu a t io n ” 
(p. 13).
3.2 Scene
To u n d ers tan d  th e  s c e n e  requires  one also u n ders tand  th e  role 
o f  th e  agen t,  as  a d ifferent s c e n e  is m en tioned  in relation to  th e  
d ifferen t a g e n ts  identified in S n y d e r’s te s t im o n y . Each a g e n t  — 
Snyder himself, th e  Congress, and th e  hom eless  — is loca ted
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differently. The hom eless  are loca ted  on th e  s t r e e t s ,  ou tside , 
anyw here. Snyder o b se rv e s  th a t  hom eless  people are  living on th e  
s t r e e t s ,  so m e  “with no place to  go  e x c e p t  m aybe their  cars  if th ey  
are  lucky” (p. 17). They are  living w herever  th e y  can -- in their 
cars, in t e n t s ,  in aban d o n ed  buildings, making do -- doing w h a tev e r  
is n ecessa ry  t o  survive. The hom eless  are anyw here. The hom eless  
are also here. Snyder repea ted ly  m akes t h a t  point t h a t  th e  
hom eless  and d e s t i tu te  a re  here, in our nation, in America, this  
fabled land of opportun ity . T here  a re  “millions of people  in this 
coun try  right now who a re  living in u t t e r  d es ti tu t io n ,  in ab so lu te  
poverty, and are  crying out, moaning from one end  of th e  country  to  
a n o th e r” (p. 1 7). H om elessness  is pervasive, it is p re se n t  all 
ac ro ss  th e  United S ta te s .  The hom eless  are  here, th e re  and 
everyw here. Paradoxically, th e  hom eless , who in one s e n se  are  so  
p re se n t ,  are also undeniably a b se n t .  The hom eless  are placeless, 
a b s e n t  b ec a u se  th e y  are  u n co n n ec ted  to  th e  com m unity and barely 
acknow ledged by it. The hom eless  are everyw here  and nowhere.
Snyder lo ca te s  himself in th e  world of th e  hom eless . He 
alludes to  his own experience  on th e  s t r e e t s  in his te s t im o n y , 
explaining th a t  he sp e n t  2 m on ths  on th e  s t r e e t s  in 1 9 8 0 ,  and
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telling th e  c o m m it te e  he plans to  re tu rn  to  th e  s t r e e t s  la ter this 
m onth. Snyder acknow ledges t h a t  he d o e sn ’t  like living on th e  
s t r e e t s ,  adm itting  th a t :  “It isn’t  p leasan t.  It isn’t  co m fo rtab le” (p.
18). Snyder explains th a t  he m u st m ove to  th e  s t r e e t s  “becau se  my 
b ro th e rs  and s is te rs  are  t h e r e ” (p. 18). By locating himself on th e  
s t r e e t s  with th e  hom eless  Snyder d e m o n s t r a te s  his ability to  
rep re sen t  them . Snyder can speak  for th e  hom eless  b ecau se  he 
himself has b een  hom eless . Thus he is a credible w itness . It is in 
te rm s  of his own experience and no t th e  experiences of o th e rs  th a t  
Snyder acknow ledges t h a t  being on th e  s t r e e t s  m akes  you invisible. 
He sp e n t  4  m on ths  on a s t r e e t s  and millions of people passed  by 
him, bu t few of th em  saw him. “They looked right th rough  me. I 
didn’t  exist. They kept m e a t  a rm ’s length and I was no t a human 
being” (p. 2 1 ) .  In o th e r  words, Snyder is th e re  bu t no t there ,  
p re se n t  b u t  a b se n t .  Snyder explains this  response . The people “are 
seeing  som eth ing  a t  a d is tance . They are  seeing  w hat their minds 
allow th em  to  se e . . .” (p. 21 ) .
It is so m e w h a t  ironic for Snyder to  talk a b o u t  invisibility. 
Snyder’s activ ism  on behalf of th e  hom eless  is notorious; it is hard 
to  imagine anyone less invisible. Victoria Rader ( 1 9 8 6 )  describes
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Snyder’s ac tions  as political t h e a t e r  in her “social h is to ry ” of th e  
CCNV. She w rites  of Snyder: “He d re s se s  and lives like a s t r e e t  
person. He b eg s  and yells,...he pours blood on ca thedra l altars  and 
prays in th e  middle of th e  s t r e e t  and g e t s  a rre s ted .  If th e  audience 
still does  no t respond , he s t a r t s  s tarv ing  himself t o  d e a th ,  always, 
always, in front of th e  c a m e ra s ” (p. 5).
Perhaps it is his anger  a t  th e  experience o f being invisible 
t h a t  Snyder tran sfo rm s  into action. He channels his anger  into his 
te s t im o n y , making specific  ju d g m e n ts  a b o u t  particular players in 
th e  political p rocess .  S om etim es  th e  t a r g e t  of t h a t  anger  is th e  
President, as w as m en tioned  earlier. At o th e r  t im es, Snyder 
fo cu ses  his a t te n t io n  on Congress. Congress is loca ted  in a 
particular tim e and place, in th e  hearing room and in W ashington, 
D.C. Their im m ediate  location, “This hearing room ,” Snyder 
obse rves ,  “is a fine location for people to  lie down and s leep  and 
m aybe avoid freezing to  d e a th ” (p. 17). There is historical 
p re c e d e n t  for such action, a rgues  Snyder. “The U.S. Capitol during 
th e  Civil War w as p re ssed  into serv ice  as a hospital b e c a u se  
American lives d ep en d ed  on it. If we w ere a t  war right now and 
so m eo n e  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  th e  Capitol, or t h a t  g re a t  new s tru c tu re ,
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th e  Hart Building, might be  an appropria te  place to  seek  sa fe  refuge 
during a t tack ,  th e re  isn’t  one  person  in Congress  who would argue 
agains t th a t  u s e ” (p. 1 7). However, when “a similar su g g e s t io n ” 
w as pu t forth  to  th em  it w as ignored. It was asked  th a t  “Congress 
open its doors to  th e  hom eless  and an invitation, as  an a c t  of 
leadership and exam ple as a way of helping people  in this  country  
given th e  se r io u sn ess  of th e  t im es. And we are  still waiting for 
som ebody  to  make th a t  su g g es t io n ” (p. 17).
The th re e  s c e n e -a g e n t  ra tios  each  highlight a d ifferen t 
purpose. The hom eless  are loca ted  on th e  s t r e e t s ,  sim ultaneously  
anyw here, everyw here , and now here. This descrip tion  highlights 
t h e  no tions  t h a t  h o m e le ssn e ss  is pervasive, existing a t  all levels 
and all ac ross  th e  country , and th a t  th e  hom eless  are  alienated  
from socie ty . Snyder himself is loca ted  on th e  s t r e e t s ,  w here he is 
p re se n t  y e t  a b se n t .  This re fe ren ce  calls a t te n t io n  to  Snyder’s 
s ta tu s  as an insider, one who knows w hat th e  problem is b ecau se  
he has experienced  it f irs t-hand. Snyder is also a political insider, 
familiar with th e  ins and o u ts  of pow er in W ashington, D.C. T hese  
re fe ren ces  remind th e  audience th a t  Snyder is b o th  accessib le  and 
inaccessible, here  th e n  gone, always in motion, w here  th e  action  is.
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Congress  is loca ted  in th e  here  and now, in a hearing room a t  th e  
n a t io n ’s capitol. This re fe re n c e  highlights th e  c o m m it te e ’s locale 
as  a s e a t  of power. Burke ( 1 9 6 6 )  w rites  th a t  “Our p re sen ce  in a 
room is im m ediate, b u t th e  room ’s relation to  our coun try  as a 
nation and beyond...is  a function of th e  symbol s y s te m s  th a t  rep o rt  
on th e m ” (p. 4 8 ) .  The function of th e  co m m ittee  is to  produce 
legislative action; th e  function o f S nyder’s rhe to ric  is to  p e rsu a d e  
th e  co m m ittee  to  act.
3.3 Agent
The a g e n ts  — Snyder, Congress, and th e  h om eless  -- can also 
be  considered  independently  of th e  scen e . The re fe ren ces  to  th e  
hom eless  se rv e  severa l functions. The hom eless  are always 
identified as  “p e o p le ” or “A m ericans,” n o t  as  “b e g g a r s ” or 
“panhand lers .” T h e se  labels have m ore positive c o n n o ta t io n s  and 
are  designed  to  p ro m o te  identification. Burke ( 1 9 6 6 )  o b se rv e s  t h a t  
“All te rm ino log ies  m u s t  implicitly or explicitly e m b o d y  cho ices  
b e tw e e n  th e  principle of continuity  and th e  principle of 
d iscon tinu ity” (p. 50). Som e re fe re n c e s  are  numeric, which 
con tr ibu te  to  th e  s e n se  of m agnitude and s u g g e s t  th a t  
h o m e lessn ess  is a significant problem . Snyder re p e a te d ly  m en tions
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th a t  “millions o f  p eo p le” are  h om eless  and th a t  “large num bers  of 
people are  su ffering” (p. 1 7). Early on in his te s t im o n y  Snyder 
o b se rv e s  t h a t  b e tw e e n  2 and 3 million Am ericans are  hom eless , and 
th a t  th is  num ber is larger than  a t  any o th e r  t im e in American 
history; larger even  th an  th e  num ber during th e  Great Depression. 
This re fe re n c e  implies t h a t  h o m e le s sn e s s  is an even  bigger 
problem to d ay  th an  it was in th e  1 9 2 0 s .  This re fe ren ce  se rv es  a 
tem pora l function as well. When Snyder s u g g e s ts  t h a t  “m aybe we 
can begin to  find new ways of dealing with old and growing 
prob lem s” (p. 18), he ch a ra c te r iz e s  h o m e lessn ess  a s  an old 
problem, one which has been  around a t  leas t since th e  Depression. 
O ther tem pora l re fe ren ces  c o n tr ib u te  to  a s e n se  of urgency, as 
when Snyder n o te s  t h a t  “millions o f people  in th is  coun try  right 
now are living in u t t e r  d e s ti tu t io n ,  in ab so lu te  p o v e r ty ” (p. 17).
The hom eless  are c a s t  in a positive light. They are “innocent 
A m ericans ,” v ic tim s of c i rc u m sta n c e ,  w ho are  “c r iss -c ross ing  th e  
country  looking for work, begging  for j o b s ” (p. 16). They are 
“scram bling and  scraping  as  b e s t  th e y  can to  hold their  families 
and th em se lv es  to g e th e r . . .” (pp. 1 6 -1 7 ) .  The hom eless  are 
deserving people  who are doing th e  b e s t  th a t  th e y  can, trying to  g e t
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work and keep  th e ir  families in tac t.  They are  n o t lazy individuals 
who seek  a public handout. The hom eless  are no t responsible for 
their plight, th e y  are  simply “down and o u t” (p. 1 7).
Curiously, C ongress  is re ferred  to  as  “y o u ” th ro u g h o u t 
Snyder’s te s t im o n y . In so m e  s e n s e s  th is  deictic  form s e p a ra te s  
Snyder from Congress. Deixis “is th e  a s p e c t  of language th a t  
indicates, m en tions  or m akes  explicit use  o f . . . the  connection  
b e tw een  speak er  and h ea re r” (Lakoff, 1 99 0 , p. 2 4 4 ) .  Deictic form s 
can point to  co n n ec tio n s  of a spatial, tem poral, social or em otional 
nature . “Deictic form s include tim e  and sp a c e  ad v erb s  (now, then; 
here, th e re ) ;  and first- and seco n d -p e rso n  pronouns (I, y o u )”
(Lakoff, 1990 , p. 2 4 4 ) .  The people who are concerned  about 
h o m e le ssn e ss  are  identified by inclusive deictic  re fe re n c e s ,  us 
and we. B ecause th e s e  re fe re n c e s  “explicitly invoke th e  
p art ic ipan ts  and th e ir  re lationships to  one a n o th e r ,” th e y  “o f te n  
acquire  symbolic em otional function . Their original spacial or 
tem pora l co n nec tion  is realized as  em otional c lo se n e ss  or 
d is ta n c e ” (Lakoff, 1 9 9 0 ,  p. 2 4 4 ) .
Snyder u ses  th e  pronoun you  to  identify Congress. Congress 
is d is tanced  when Snyder tu rn s  th e  tab les . When Snyder says  th a t
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“if you w ere on th e  s t r e e t s ” som eth ing  would be  done, he is 
focusing his a t te n t io n  on Congress, blaming th e m  for the ir  lack of 
action. When Snyder calls Congress to  action, he again u ses  th e  
pronoun you. “Do everything you  have to  do, everything you  can 
d o ” (italics ad ded)  (p. 18). In co n tra s t ,  Snyder’s  re fe ren ces  to  
himself and to  th e  people who do pay a t te n t io n  to  th e  hom eless  are 
expressed  by th e  pronoun we. “We know” abou t th e  problem, he 
says, b ecau se  w e  work with th e  hom eless , “we s e e . . .w h a t  is going 
on in this co u n try ” (italics added) (p. 1 7). In fac t,  we  are th e  ones 
who are  bringing th is  problem to  your  a t ten tio n : “And so  w e  bring 
you  a s e n se  of urgency, a s e n se  of m agn itude” (italics added) (p.
18). The use  of th e s e  deictic form s implies th a t  w e  a re  d is tinct 
from you. The c o n tra s t  b e tw een  th e  informed ad v o ca te  and 
uninform ed leg is la tu re  also gives th e  a d v o c a te  g r e a te r  credibility 
b ec a u se  Snyder, unlike th e  legislature, knows a b o u t  th e  problem.
Snyder’s  re fe ren ces  t o  himself and his experience  are  
designed to  legitim ate him as an a d v o c a te  for th e  hom eless . His 
experience e n ti t le s  him to  speak . Snyder’s allusion to  th e  length  of 
tim e he has s p e n t  with th e  hom eless: “And we s p e n t  th e  last 11 
years  of our lives ea ting  with, living with, s leeping  with, feeding
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th e  hom eless , sheltering  th e m ” (p. 2 1 ) ,  gives him considerable  
e th o s .  Snyder’s experience m akes  him an ex p er t  on hom elessness .
In o th e r  words, he is one of them .
3.4  Agency
The agency  is th e  in s tru m en t or m eans  by which th e  a c t  is 
accomplished. In many s e n se s  th e  ad v o ca te  is th e  agency. The 
p en tad ic  analysis is com plicated  by th e  fac t  t h a t  th e  te rm  ad v o c a te  
is bo th  a noun and a verb. The noun identifies a person  who pleads 
th e  cau se  of ano ther  or who a rgues  in place of ano ther; th e  noun 
form of ad v o c a te  refers  t o  th e  ag en t.  The verb  refers  to  th e  action 
of arguing in favor of or in su p p o rt  of a position; th e  verb  form of 
ad v o ca te  describes  th e  ac t.  The a c t  is com m unica ted  by m eans of 
tes tim ony .
Coady ( 1 9 9 2 )  defines te s t im o n y  as  “a certa in  sp e e c h  a c t ” (p. 
2 5 )  t h a t  “involves a speaker. . . te s tify ing  to  th e  t ru th  of som e 
proposition which is e i th e r  in d isp u te  or in so m e  way in n eed  of 
de te rm ina tion ...” (p. 38 ) . Snyder’s te s t im o n y  p re se n ts  th e  tru th  
ab o u t ho m elessn ess .  H om elessness  is in so m e  way in n eed  of 
d e te rm ina tion  in t h e s e  hearings. Snyder is qualified to  te s t i fy  
b ecau se  he has had “so m e kind of d irect acqua in tance  or
observ a tio n ” with th e  problem (Coady, 19 9 2 , p. 35 ) . Snyder s ta n d s  
for th e  hom eless  a t  th e  hearing; his p re sen ce  reminds th e  audience 
of th e  hom eless , who are  generally a b s e n t  from th e  political 
p roceed ings  t h a t  concern  th em . Snyder himself can b e  considered  
th e  agency, for he is th e  instrum ent, he is th e  m outhp iece  of th e  
m o v em en t.  Such an o bse rva tion  i l lu s tra tes  t h e  difficulty in 
separa ting  th e  ac t,  th e  ag en t,  and th e  agency. It is Snyder’s 
te s t im o n y , however, which will be  th e  focus here .
As th e  m eans, testify ing  accom plishes several ends . One use  
of te s t im o n y  is to  e d u c a te  o the rs .  Denton and Woodward (1 9 9 0 )  
w rite  t h a t  te s t im o n y  “freq u en tly  s e rv e s  an educational fu n c t io n ” 
(p. 2 7 9 ) .  Keefe and Ogul (1 9 6 8 )  e laborate , explaining th a t  
“H earings...p resen t an opportun ity  to  ‘g e t  a t  all th e  f a c ts , ’ to  ‘hear 
all s id e s ,’ (and ‘in te re s te d  p a r t ie s ’), [and] t o  ed u c a te . . .a n d  inform 
th e  re p re se n ta t iv e . . .” (p. 2 0 7 ) .  Information is com m unica ted  
th rough  te s tim ony . A seco n d  function of te s t im o n y  is “to  a t t r a c t  
a t te n t io n ” to  a problem or to  a proposal (Denton & Woodward, 1990 , 
p. 3 0 3 ) .  When Snyder p re se n ts  th e  tru th  of h om elessness  in th e s e  
legislative p roceed ings, he is a t t ra c t in g  a t te n t io n  to  his point of 
view. Policy-making is a n o th e r  function of te s t im o n y . Van Der
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Slik ( 1 9 7 7 )  explains th a t  “A c o m m it te e  is a s u b s e t  of legislative 
body, and its  m em b ers  specialize in considering, preparing, 
evaluating and recom m ending a specific s u b s e t  of th e  policy 
proposal p laced  before  th e  legislative body for policy ad o p tio n ” (p. 
177 ).  The co m m ittee  considers  and ev a lu a tes  legislation b ased  on 
th e  te s t im o n y  it hears.
Testim ony  accom plishes a varie ty  of goals. T estim ony  is a 
m ean s  of com m unicating  im portan t  inform ation, making policy 
reco m m en d a tio n s ,  and es tab lish ing  credibility and  g o o d  will. 
Snyder’s p re se n c e  a t  th e  hearing, his te s t im o n y , is a willful and 
s ign if ican t rh e to rica l  a c t .
3.5 Purpose
The pu rpose  of th e  d iscourse  is re la ted  to  its  audience.
S ch u e tz  ( 1 9 8 6 )  claims th a t  th re e  aud iences  “are  likely t a r g e t s  for 
political a rg u e rs” (p. 2 2 7 ) .  The official audience is c o m p o se d  of 
th o se  e lec ted  or appoin ted  to  m ake decisions. In th e  p re se n t  case , 
th e  official audience is th e  c o m m ittee .  Snyder appea ls  to  th e  
official aud ience in several ways. He a t t e m p ts  to  a ro u se  their 
em otions  by reminding th e  c o m m it te e  t h a t  th e  w in ter  is coming 
and th a t  people are dying. Perhaps th e  m o s t  m em orable  emotional
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appeal is th e  p re se n ta t io n  of th e  c re m a te d  rem ains of a hom eless  
man; th is  p re se n ta t io n  c o n c re t iz e s  an o therw ise  a b s t r a c t  and 
d is ta n t  experience .
The bulk of Snyder’s  te s t im o n y  is aimed a t  producing action. 
He particularly u rges  C ongress  to  ta k e  im m ediate  action  to  
alleviate th e  suffering. He rem inds th e m  th a t  “people  are  waiting 
for a signal. They are waiting for an example. They are  waiting for 
leadership. And th ey  h aven ’t  g o t te n  it” (p. 18).
The seco n d  ta r g e t  audience is com posed  of c o n s ti tu e n ts .  
C o n s ti tu en ts  are people who have a s ta k e  in th e  o u tcom e, who have 
an in te re s t  in th e  policy. Snyder includes th e  c o n s t i tu e n ts  in much 
of his te s t im o n y . In his opening rem arks he than k s  th e  co m m ittee  
for “th e  opportun ity  to  bring to g e th e r  people from acro ss  th e  
coun try  who obviously have a s to ry  to  tell and w hose  s to ry  is of 
in te re s t  to  growing num bers  of peop le” (p. 1 8). Most of th e  
te s t im o n y  in th e  hearings, in fac t ,  is given by c o n s t i tu e n ts .  All 
people  who provide se rv ices  for th e  hom eless  would fall into th is  
ca teg o ry .  C o n s t i tu e n ts  would include sh e lte r  o p e ra to rs ,  
vo lun teers ,  a d v o c a te s ,  social workers, and g o v e rn m en t agenc ies  
who are  serv ice  providers.
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Snyder never refers  to  c o n s t i tu e n ts  directly or by name. 
S om etim es th e  re fe ren ces  are  vague, “So you have th o se  who are 
struggling to  feed , c lo the , and sh e lte r  th e  millions o f people in this  
country  who are  virtually d e s t i tu te ,  down and o u t ” (p. 17). At o ther  
t im es  c o n s t i tu e n ts  are included in his p ro n o u n cem en ts ,  as part  of 
us or we. When Snyder u rges  action he invokes th e  we, so  th a t  he 
speaks  no t ju s t  with his own au thority , b u t with th e  au tho rity  of 
th e  c o n s t i tu e n t  audience. “But w e  need  space. We need  it now. We 
don’t  need  equivocation. We d o n ’t  n eed  slow moving p roposals” 
(italics added) (p. 18).
The third t a r g e t  aud ience is th e  media, who m ay repo rt  on th e  
hearing. The media share  ch arac te r is t ic s  with w hat Furay ( 1 9 7 7 )  
te rm s  th e  “g rass  roo ts  mind” (pp. 4 -5 ) .  According to  Furay (1 9 7 7 ) ,  
g ra ss  ro o ts  decision making is influenced by th e  im age of th e  
source , and th e  d eg ree  to  which th e  s to ry  is in te res ting  and 
involving. Snyder tells a good  s to ry .  The s t ru c tu re  of his narrative 
is intriguing. Snyder begins by acknowledging th e  s ituation . Fie 
thanks  th e  c o m m ittee  for t h e  opportun ity  to  ad d re ss  them ; he 
follows social cus tom . Then he abruptly  tells th e  aud ience th a t  
four people are  dead. Fie describes  suffering. He p re se n ts  th e
1 0 0
remains o f a single human being who died on th e  s t r e e t s ,  who died 
b ecau se  no one cared. He affixes blame for this problem on th e  
President and th e  Congress. He angrily s u g g e s ts  t h a t  if th e  
s ituation  w ere  rev ersed  th a t  m ore action would be taken . He again 
tells th e  c o m m it te e  t h a t  people  are suffering and dying. He re tu rns  
t o  th e  d e a th s  of th e  four individuals and invites th e  c o m m itte e  to  
a t te n d  a memorial service being co n d u c ted  for th e s e  people th a t  
a f te rnoon . Snyder tells th e  c o m m it te e  he knows w hat this  
suffering is like b ec a u se  he has experienced  it. And, he su g g e s ts ,  
th e  c o m m ittee  should experience  it too . Then he calls for a 
solution, re i te ra tin g  his earlier poin ts , t h a t  m any are  suffering, 
th a t  th e  s ituation  is a national em ergency . Snyder’s s to ry  sounds 
like a serm on.
Indeed, a religious in te rp re ta t io n  of Snyder’s te s t im o n y  is 
plausible. Victoria Rader ( 1 9 8 6 )  in te rp re ts  Snyder’s life and his 
ac tions as a “radical” re sp o n se  to  th e  Gospel. He is a man who 
abides by moral abso lu tes :  “M itch...speaks with to ta l  
ce r ta in ty .. .an d  his s ty le  is s tunningly  abrasive. Snyder tells it like 
he s e e s  it...no holding b ack ” (pp. 3 8 -3 9 ) .  She describes  him as 
“More of a blistering p ro p h e t  th an  a saint, Snyder is a man with
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‘fire in his belly’” (p. 35 ) .  The Community for Creative Non- 
Violence ( “CCNV”), in fac t,  has a religious history. It w as founded 
under th e  ausp ices  of th e  Catholic Church by Paulist Priest Ed 
Guinan in 1 9 7 0 .  Snyder himself, th o u g h  “culturally Jew ish ” (Rader, 
19 8 6 ,  p. 4 1 ) ,  b ecam e Catholic before  joining CCNV. CCNV’s ties  to  
th e  church have always b een  loose, however, and CCNV is b e s t  
described  as an ecum enical organization.
3 .6  Discussion
The focus of this  c h a p te r  has been  th e  te s t im o n y  of hom eless  
advo ca te ,  Mitch Snyder. Studying th e  te s t im o n y  p roduced  a t  
congress ional hearings is im portan t for severa l reaso n s .  
C ongressional hearings  provide r e se a rc h e rs  with valuable 
information ab o u t  social p rob lem s and th e  political p ro cess .  The 
hearing is a conduit to  bring th e  people  and their re p re se n ta t iv e s  
to g e th e r ,  which le ts  c itizens  inform th e ir  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  of the ir  
w ishes. Hearings are  a m eans  of com m unicating  information; 
Denton and Woodward ( 1 9 9 0 )  obse rv e  th a t  hearings o ften  serve  an 
educational function. One way to  view Snyder’s te s t im o n y  is as an 
a c t  of information-giving. Davis ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  however, found th e  
hearing p ro c e ss  w as of limited inform ation value, noting t h a t  “in
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general, m em b ers  do n o t com e to  th e  hearings to  gain new 
information” (p. 1 0 0 ) .  Rather, th ey  appear  to  use  th e  hearings to  
confirm their  own unders tan d in g  and to  verify information. This 
observation  may acco u n t for so m e  of th e  anger  in Snyder’s 
te s t im o n y . Rader ( 1 9 8 6 )  d esc rib es  Snyder’s s ty le  as  “ab ras iv e” 
and s t a t e s  t h a t  “he is deliberately  inflam m atory” (p. 4 ) .  She n o te s  
t h a t  “Many o b se rv e rs  find th is  s ty le  polarizing, unnecessarily  
con fron ta tiona l” (p. 3 9 ) .  Snyder himself, however, “believes th e  
collisions are  n ec e ssa ry  — to  bring o u t th e  t r u t h ” (Rader, 1 9 8 6 ,  p. 
4 0 ) .  Snyder may have to  go  to  such lengths to  overcom e th e  
barriers he perce ives  on Capitol Hill. Snyder is a complex and 
co n trad ic to ry  figure. His narra tive  is confron ta tional;  his s ty le  is 
abrasive. Yet he also co m m u n ica tes  sincerity. He is deeply, 
pe rhaps  obsessively , co n ce rn ed  with th e  plight of th e  hom eless .
W hat d o es  h o m elessn ess  m ean to  Snyder? Snyder, like Judge  
Altimari, defines  h o m e le s sn e s s  a s  a problem . Unlike Altimari, 
however, Snyder d o es  no t focus  on th e  harms of h om elessness  to  
soc ie ty . If anything, he a rg u e s  t h a t  th e  condition of h o m elessn ess  
is harmful to  th e  h om eless  th em se lv es ,  by equa ting  h o m elessn ess  
with dea th .  N eedless  d e a th s  a re  harmful to  soc ie ty  b e c a u se  th e y
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are  morally wrong. The ta c i t  m e ssa g e  here  is t h a t  life is sac red  
and m ust be p ro te c ted .  Snyder may concede  th a t  th e  hom eless  are 
m em bers  of a marginal group, b u t  in no way does  he s u g g e s t  th a t  
th e  rights o f  th e  hom eless  are  su b se rv ien t to  th e  majority. To him, 
th e  hom eless  are  no t deviant, b u t  ra th e r  victims of c ircum stance . 
Snyder u ses  their  very hum anity  to  a s s e r t  the ir  right to  e x p e c t  help 
from socie ty .
Snyder’s a rg u m en t is a moral one. H om elessness  is a social 
ill which d e m a n d s  app ro p ria te  action . Snyder him self is o u tra g e d  
th a t  th e  m ere  p re se n c e  o f suffering  people  is insufficient to  
s tim u la te  t h a t  action. Thus Snyder has a ssu m ed  th e  role of 
bringing th a t  suffering to  light. While Snyder d o e s  n o t  use  
religious im agery  in his te s t im o n y ,  his m e ss a g e  is m essianic: he is 
spreading  th e  word to  th e  m a ss e s  in th e  hopes  th a t  th ey  will 
b ecom e enlightened. Once people recognize and u n d ers tan d  th e  
human suffering  th a t  is h o m e le ssn e ss  th e y  will begin to  ta k e  s te p s  
to  alleviate it. Snyder’s  te s t im o n y  is an a t t e m p t  to  co n v e r t  th e  
non-believer.
I s u s p e c t  th a t  it m ay be  easy  to  dismiss Snyder’s w ords th e  
first tim e one hears  th em . His s ty le  may sp eak  louder th an  his
words. The first t im e I read  his te s t im o n y  I w as s tru ck  m o st  by 
Snyder’s anger. Rader ( 1 9 8 6 )  o b se rv es  th a t  “CCNV m em bers ...a re  
driven to  ex trem es . W hat brings th em  to  behave so  
outrageously ...[is]  the ir  proximity to  th e  poo r” (p. 9). A fter 
examining th is  sp e e c h  severa l t im es  in th e  co u rse  of th is  analysis, 
I find m uch in it t o  adm ire. Ultimately, however, Snyder perp lexes 
me. I am left w ondering how useful Snyder’s anger  is for this 
social m o v em en t.  Are congress ional r e p re se n ta t iv e s  able to  g e t  
beyond th a t  anger?  Are th e y  pe rsu ad ed  by it? Is th e  public? Or 
does  Snyder’s  ab ras iv en ess  polarize th e  d e b a te ?  Some might argue 
th a t  Snyder a lienates  th e  very audience he se ek s  to  persuade . I 
will wait t o  c o m m en t on th e s e  concerns  until C hap ter  Five.
The analyses co n d u c ted  in C hapter  Two and C hapter Three 
illustrate  tw o  very d ifferen t m ean ings of h o m e lessn ess .  
In terestingly , t h e s e  m ean ings  are  c o n s t r u c te d  similarly, from 
several of th e  sam e  rhetorical dev ices . Reconciling th e s e  
d ivergen t m eanings a p p ea rs  to  be  difficult. Before discussing th e  
ways in which th e  various m ean ings  of h o m e le ssn e ss  fit to g e th e r  
(if th e y  fit t o g e th e r  a t  all) to  m ake up a “t e x t ” on h om elessness ,  I 
shall exam ine one last ty p e  of rhetoric . This is th e  rhetoric  of th e
hom eless  th e m se lv e s .  I believe t h a t  h o m e lessn ess  m eans 
so m eth in g  entire ly  d ifferen t to  th e  hom eless  th an  it does  to  e i ther  
th e  adversary  or th e  adv o ca te .  I s u sp e c t  th a t  th e  devices th e  
hom eless  u se  t o  rhetorically  c o n s t ru c t  the ir  p e rsp e c t iv e  will also 
differ from th o s e  used  by Ju d g e  Altimari or Mitch Snyder. The 
rhe toric  o f th e  hom eless  will b e  d iscu ssed  in C h ap te r  Four.
CHAPTER 4 
THE RHETORIC OF THE HOMELESS
In C hapter Three, th e  rhetoric  of th e  a d v o c a te  w as examined. 
Snyder pa in ted  a p ic ture  o f h o m e le ssn e ss  quite  d ifferen t from th e  
one c o n s tru c te d  by Ju d g e  Altimari in C hapter Two. Altimari 
defined h o m e le ssn e ss  as  a dev ian t condition which potentia lly  
th re a te n s  soc ie ty . Snyder defined h o m elessn ess  as a condition of 
suffering. Both of th e s e  rh e to rs  ad d re sse d  a problem and o ffered  a 
solution. Ju d g e  Altimari, th e  leg itim ate  r e p re se n ta t iv e  of th e  
s ta t e ,  p rescribed  a legal rem edy. Mitch Snyder, a re p re se n ta t iv e  of 
a marginalized group, uged  th e  legislature to  ta k e  action  on this 
g ro u p ’s behalf. The focus of th is  c h a p te r  is on th e  marginalized 
group itself. In this  c h a p te r  I in v es tig a te  th e  rhetoric  of th e  
h o m eless .
I b ecam e  in te re s te d  in th e  hom eless  as I d iscovered  how 
seldom  the ir  voices  w ere heard  in th e  political p rocess .  The 
h om eless  a re  liminal en t i t ie s ,  "be tw ix t and b e tw e e n  th e  positions 
assigned  by law, custom  and convention" (Turner, 19 6 9 , p. 95 ); they  
slip th ro u g h  th e  c lassif ica tions which lo ca te  s t a t e s  and positions
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within th e  community. Like o th e rs  on th e  margin, th e  hom eless  
“have  historically lacked a c c e s s  to  large aud iences ,  political 
appara tus, and public m edia” (King, 19 9 2 , p. 2). In fac t,  m o s t  of th e  
rhetoric  on h o m elessn ess  has b een  p roduced  by adversaries  and 
ad v o c a te s  -- people who are no t hom eless  them se lves .
The rhetoric of th e  hom eless  is unique. The voice of th e  
hom eless  is th e  subalte rn  voice, “th e  voice of th e  periphery, no t of 
th e  c e n te r ” (King, 1 9 9 2 ,  p. 2). This voice “is th e  voice of th e  silent 
ones  who are struggling to  sp e a k ” (King, 19 9 2 , p. 2). The hom eless  
a re  struggling to  speak  b e c a u se  o f the ir  position: th e y  are  
powerless. The hom eless  are o f te n  no t p e rm it ted  to  sp eak  on their  
own behalf. “The poor a re  politically invisible. It is one of th e  
c ru e le s t  ironies of social life in advan ced  coun tr ie s  t h a t  th e  
d isp o sse ssed  a t  th e  b o t to m  of soc ie ty  are unable to  sp eak  for 
them se lves .  The people of th e  o th e r  America...are a tom ized . They 
have no voice” (Harrington, 1963 , p. 21). As King ( 1 9 8 7 )  observes , 
“All sp eak e rs  are no t c re a te d  equal. Som e...are  virtually ignored or 
m e t with hostility” (p. 9).
Consider th e  case  of hom eless  people begging on th e  s t r e e t .  
The hom eless  are p re sen t  in th e  s e n se  th a t  th e y  are  ac tive  ag e n ts ,
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asse r t in g  a limited ty p e  o f contro l over  their  im m edia te  s ituation . 
They are  a b s e n t  in th e  s e n se  th a t  th e y  have limited pow er to  
compel or produce a response ; th e y  have little control over th e  
resp o n ses  of o th e rs  and c ed e  th a t  control to  th e  o ther. The other, 
b e c a u se  th e  in teraction  ta k e s  place in public sp ace ,  is given th e  
choice to  a c t  or no t to  ac t ,  t o  no tice  or ignore th e  hom eless . As 
LaRusso ( 1 9 7 7 )  explains, “ ...in public sp ace  [people are] exposed  to  
many m ore stimuli than  in [their] personal sp a c e  -- b u t in such 
impersonal fashion as  to  allow [ th e m ] g re a te r  choice in deciding 
which of th o se  will a ffec t  [ th e m ]” (p. 126).
It is only recen tly  t h a t  scholars  have begun  to  examine th e  
subalte rn  voice. The voice of th e  margin or th e  voice of th e  fringe 
has  historically b een  ignored while th e  voice of th e  m ajority  was 
analyzed. There  are several im portan t reaso n s  for s tudying  th e  
m ajority  voice. Presidential rhetoric , for exam ple, influences n o t  
ju s t  our nation b u t  potentially  th e  en tire  world. Policy d e b a te s  on 
to p ics  like health  care  have  significant e f fe c ts  on th e  p rac tice  of 
medicine in th e  real world. Why then , s tu d y  th e  voice of th e  
margin, th e  voice of th e  pow erless?
Perhaps th e  b e s t  place to  begin articulating an answ er to  th is  
question  is by examining th e  idea of th e  subalte rn  voice as “th e  
voice of th e  silent ones  who are  struggling  t o  s p e a k ” (em phasis  
added) (King, 19 9 2 , p. 2). Rhetoric is fundam entally  a b o u t  struggle . 
Humans use  language to  m ake s e n s e  of th e  world. Individuals rely 
on language to  conquer uncerta in ty , it is a m eans o f producing a 
sh a red  vision, and it o ffers  a m e th o d  for handling or solving 
problem s. Articulating th e  s tru g g le  to  sp eak  is an exciting 
challenge for th e  rhetorical scholar. This marks a th eo re tica l  move 
forward, beyond  docum en ting  th e  e f fe c ts  of rhetoric  on a particular 
s i tu a tio n  or explicating how a particu lar s itu a tio n  called fo rth  a 
particular rhetoric . Studying th e  suba lte rn  voice is a way of 
s tudying  th e  s tru g g le s  t h a t  unite people. By examining th e  rhetoric 
of th e  hom eless , one gains an insight into th e  fundam ental 
s tru g g le s  for self  and au tonom y  th a t  all hum ans face.
The s tru g g le  to  sp eak  is s im ultaneously  a s tru g g le  aga ins t 
oppression . The hom eless  are  rhetorically o p p re sse d  th rough  
language. Identifying individuals as  homeless  is a way of defining 
th e m  by the ir  d ifference or deviance. Labeling a person  or action 
dev ian t co m m u n ica te s  sep a ra t io n ,  marginalizing th a t  perso n  or
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action. Campbell and Reeves ( 1 9 8 9 )  observe  th a t  “Being w ithout a 
hom e t r a n s p o r ts  a person , o f te n  violently and  unwillingly, from 
m ainstream  to  m argin” (p. 2 1 ) .  Defining th e  hom eless  by their 
d ifference effec tive ly  exc ludes  th e m  from th e  com m unity.
Belonging to  a com m unity  is a privilege, for “com m unity  is a moral 
ideal t h a t  e x p re s s e s  one valued m ode  of social partic ipa tion” 
(Hewitt, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 1 2 9 ) .  Community m em bership  is desirable 
b e c a u se  it g e n e ra te s  a s e n se  of belonging. The hom eless  are 
symbolically rem oved  from “th e  c e n tr is t  values ‘h o m e ’ c o n n o te s ,” 
con tend  Campbell and Reeves (1 9 8 9 ,  p. 21); th e y  are  denied “safe ty ,  
stability , family, w arm th , neighborhood , [and] com m unity .”
Thus th e  s tru g g le  t o  sp e a k  is finally a s tru g g le  to  a s s e r t  
o n e ’s self. H om eless individuals offering te s t im o n y  are  a s se r t in g  
their iden tit ies  — th e y  a re  in t h e  p ro c e ss  of becom ing leg itim ate  
en tit ies .  The a c t  of te s tify ing  is a way of making th e  invisible 
visible. This is b e c a u se  language  co m m u n ica te s  individual 
experience. Telling o n e ’s own s to ry  is th e  u ltim ate  a c t  of 
liberation and th e  u ltim ate  m ean s  of em pow erm en t.  The 
com m unica tion  o f individual, particu la rized  e x p e r ien ce  func tions  
as w hat Turner ( 1 9 6 9 )  calls “co m m u n ita s” and as  a “correc tive
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expression  of solidarity which s e e k s  th e  unity of m an” (Giamo, 
1 9 8 9 , p. 104). It is a m eans of giving th e  hom eless  presence .
The d a ta  of analysis for th is  c h a p te r  are  testim onial 
narratives by th e  hom eless . One of th e  few places w here  one can 
find sp e e c h  by th e  hom eless  is th e  Congressional hearing. I 
exam ine th e  te s t im o n y  of s ix teen  hom eless  individuals. The 
te s t im o n y  co m es  from four Congressional hearings on 
h o m elessn ess  spanning th e  tim e period from 1 9 8 2  to  1 9 89 .
Through th is  analysis I hope t o  explain th e  un iqueness of th e  
rhetoric of th e  hom eless , and to  show  how th e  hom eless  use  
rhetoric  to  overcom e  oppression  and to  a s s e r t  the ir  identities.
The analysis in th is  c h a p te r  will differ slightly from  th e  
analysis in earlier ch ap te rs .  In each  chap te r ,  th e  analysis has b een  
organized around th e  p en tad  -- th e  ac t ,  scene , ag en t,  agency, and 
purpose. This m e th o d  was em ployed in th e  analysis of Mitch 
Snyder’s te s t im o n y  in C hapter Three, th e  rhetoric of th e  adv o ca te .
It is n ecessa ry ,  occasionally, to  modify th e  organization to  b e t t e r  
a cco m m o d a te  th e  da ta . For example, to  make s e n se  of Judge  
Altimari’s opinion and th e  rhe toric  o f  th e  adversary  in C hapter 
Two, four p en tad s ,  ra th e r  than  one, were analyzed. A slightly
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d ifferen t organizational m e th o d  will be u sed  in th is  c h a p te r  as 
well. I found, as I analyzed th e  tes tim ony , th a t  th e  c o n te n t  of th e  
narra tives  did n o t  fall o u t  on clear pen tad ic  lines; ra ther,  e lem en ts  
of th e  p e n tad  ap p eared  to g e th e r ,  simultaneously. The ag en t,  for 
example, is always m en tioned  in connection  with th e  scene . The 
s c e n e  is always d iscu ssed  in te rm s  of its influence on th e  ag e n ts .  
The b e s t  way to  handle th is  difficulty, I concluded, is to  focus on 
ratios th em se lv es .  The s c e n e  and th e  s c e n e /a g e n t  ratios will be 
d iscussed  first. T h e rea f te r ,  t h e  a g e n t  and its ra tios  -- a g e n t / a c t ,  
a g e n t / s c e n e ,  and a g e n t /p u rp o s e  — will be examined. An analysis 
of th e  agency  will follow th a t .
4.1 The Scene and th e  S c en e /A g en t  Ratios
References to  th e  s c e n e  or s ituation make up th e  bulk of th e  
te s t im o n y  itself. All of th e  individuals who te s t i f ie d  ta lked  ab o u t  
th e  myriad w ays t h a t  being hom eless  and being in th is  s ituation  
influenced them . They also spoke abou t th e  ways th a t  th e  sc en e  
influenced their children, and a b o u t  th e  ways th a t  life in th e  
sh e lte rs  a f fe c te d  their  families. A third th e m e  th e  sp eak e rs  
ad d ressed  was th e  influence th e  s itua tion  had on o th e rs ,
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specifically, th e  sh e lte r  s ta f f  and  o th e r  hom eless  people. T hese  
th re e  ra tios  will each  be  d iscu ssed  in turn .
4.1.1 The sc en e  and its influence on th e  self
Several hom eless  individuals ta lked  a b o u t  how th e  scen e  
influenced th em  personally. Many people  w ere  ash am ed  of being in 
th is  situation: “...you think ab o u t  th e  e m b a rra s sm e n t  of having 
everything on th e  s t r e e t ,  of being under eviction and no t having th e  
clothing to  pu t on [your kids] to  g e t  th em  to  school...It is a very 
degrading th in g ” (Robertson, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 50 ) . Becoming hom eless was 
a difficult experience  th a t  few  people w an ted  to  believe could 
actually happen to  them . “Like I said, th e re  are a lot of hom eless  
people ou t here  who need  help and d o n ’t  g e t  it, and I know how th ey  
feel now b e c a u se  I am in th e  sam e  s ituation  th a t  th e y  are, which I 
never th o u g h t  I would b e ” (Wilkins, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 2 3 5 ) .  Becoming 
hom eless  was also an em otional experience . One wom an described  
it in this way: “...I was ju s t  totally  u p se t  b ec a u se  th is  had never 
happened to  m e before b ecau se  I w en t to  school, I’ve been  to  
college, my m o th er  is middle c la s s” (Narvaez, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 68 ) .
Along with th e  difficulty com prehend ing  th e  reality of th e  
situation , a n o th e r  com m on experience  w as personal pain: “ ...I cried
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enough, I w as d e p re sse d ,  s t r e s s  w as overwhelming a t  t im es  — I 
m ean w hat do you tell your children a f te r  you have four years  of 
college and end up in a welfare hotel. You tell your children to  go 
to  school so  th e y  can support  th em se lv es  so  you don’t  end  up in th e  
s ituation — bu t it happened  to  m e ” (Stanley, P., 1 9 8 8 ,  p. 22 ) . A 
hom eless  man explained th e  cha llenges  of life in th e  sh e lte r  
sy s tem : “...one d o e s n ’t  live in a sh e lte r  or SRO [single room 
occupancy hotel], ra ther, one  s tru g g le s  to  survive from day to  day.
I know, I’m one of th e  survivors of t h a t  sh e lte r  and SRO 
env ironm ent” (Marrero, 1 9 8 9 , .  p. 30 ) .  Life in th e  sh e lte r  s y s te m  
was dehumanizing: “...at th e  Martinique [Hotel] you felt like you 
w as in a ca g e  waiting to  crawl ou t,  I couldn’t  deal with i t” 
(MacKenzie, 19 8 9 , p. 73).
Maintaining o n e ’s s e lf -e s te e m  was th e re fo re  very  im portan t.  
N oted  one woman, “I might be hom eless  b u t I still have som e 
re sp e c t  for m yself...” (Pegues, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 136). Sustaining th a t  
r e s p e c t  for o n e ’s se lf  w as very difficult in th e  sh e l te r  
environm ent. The influence of th a t  environm ent b ecam e  much m ore 
clear when it was d iscu ssed  in relation to  children.
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4 .1 .2  The s c e n e  and its influence on children
P aren ts  fe lt th e  influence o f th e  s c e n e  on the ir  children 
acu te ly . Life in t h e  s h e l te r s  influenced children’s s e lf -e s te e m : “-- 
being in a sh e lte r  to  m e for a y ea r  and with th e  children th e  
conditions are really bad, you know and th e y  have very very low 
se lf  e s te e m  b e c a u s e  of th a t ,  you know in an env ironm ent like 
th a t . . . ” (P a te rson , 1 9 8 8 ,  p. 4 5 ) .  Children in th e  sh e lte r  sy s te m  
lacked opportun ities  th a t  m any people  ta k e  for g ran ted . Children 
suffered  b ec a u se  th ey  hadn’t  any place to  run or play. One paren t 
ad m itted  th a t :  “My children have su ffe red  b ec a u se  of it. My 
y o u n g e s t  tw o  are  I think overac tive  -- when th e y  g e t  ou t of th e  
room, th ey  go  berserk . B ecause th e re  is so  little place to  play, so  
little place to  run around, as soon  as th e y  have so m e  sp ace  to  run 
around in th e y  ta k e  full a d v a n ta g e  of it and  I call it bouncing off 
th e  walls b e c a u se  th e re  is so  m uch energy , th e y  are  so  a c t iv e ” 
(W ashington, 1 9 8 8 ,  pp. 2 4 -2 5 ) .
Perhaps harder to  b ea r  th an  th e  limited sp ace  o f th e  she lte r ,  
was th e  sham e of having to  live th e re  a t  all. One woman 
sum m arized  her experiences: “Three  and one-half y ea rs  ago  was th e  
longest and h a rd e s t  tim e of my life. I saw  my children go  through
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so  much s t r e s s  living in th re e  room s and th en  we ended  up in tw o  
rooms. A fter  a while, th ings w ere beginning to  happen. The 
children began  to  fight, th e y  began  to  a c t  out, th ey  began  to  no t 
w ant to  s tudy , th e y  didn’t  w an t to  go  to  school....They did no t w ant 
to  go to  school, th e y  w ere  asham ed , it was g e t t in g  hard e r”
(Stanley, P., 1 9 8 8 ,  p. 2 3 ) .  One paren t tried  to  explain to  th e  
c o m m it te e  th e  e m b a r ra s sm e n t  and  sh am e  her children felt: “And 
knowing th a t  my children, which w ere  t e e n s  a t  th e  tim e when I was 
in th e  sh e lte r  sy s te m , th e  e m b a rra s sm e n t  of knowing th a t  as soon 
as  I go [ they  w en t]  o u t this door so m eo n e  is [was] going to  
recognize m e [ them ] and know th a t  I am [ they  are] in a she lte r  
sy s te m  and t e a s e  m e [ them ], I [ they] may end up in a fight because  
th e re  is so  m any over crow ded children th e re  and have different 
a t t i tu d e s ,  so  many kinds o f people. T hose  th ings  are  happening 
every day” (Robertson, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 50).
This sh a m e  and e m b a r ra s sm e n t  m ade  it difficult for children 
to  go to  school. “ [My kids] m issed a lot of school. There was a 
period of t im e th a t  we s lep t  in th e  E.A.U. [Em ergency A ssis tance  
Unit] b ecau se  so m e  of th e  hotels  w ere so  bad to  s ta y  in. We have 
been  in six d ifferen t hotels . I sp e n t  1 5 days going from hotel to
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hotel until th e  social worker cam e  up with th e  Martinique Hotel...” 
(Stanley, P., 19 8 8 , p. 21 ) .
Illnesses and d isea se  w ere  a very  real th re a t :  “It is very easy  
to  g e t  sick in a sh e lte r  or SRO b e c a u se  m an ag em en t dum ps everyone 
in th e  sam e  dorm; th e  young with th e  old, th e  healthy with th e  sick, 
th e  th ief  with th e  h o n es t  m an” (Marrero, 19 8 9 , p. 30 ) . For this 
reason, som e people refused  to  e n te r  th e  sh e lte r  sy s tem , “ ...they do 
have sh e lte rs  and  with th e  kids being exposed  to  meningitis and my 
d au g h te r  is still sick, I am no t going to  ta k e  her from one Dew Drop 
Inn to  a n o th e r” (Pegues, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 137).
Children, like adults , w ere  su scep tib le  to  depress ion . “My 
y o u n g es t  d a u g h te r  has internalized her anger. She is ex trem ely  
d ep ressed . She w as very ash am ed  to  tell people w here she  lived so 
she  didn’t  make many friends a t  school” (W ashington, 19 8 8 , p. 25). 
One m other  revealed to  th e  co m m ittee  th a t  her son was 
hospitalized b e c a u se  th e  s itua tion  was so  bad: “...during th e  tim e a t  
th e  Martinique Hotel, my o ld es t  son  w as hospita lized a t  Bellevue 
for depression , b e c a u se  he could n o t  deal with th e  hotel s itu a t io n ” 
(MacKenzie, 1989 , p. 72).
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Conditions a t  th e  sh e lte rs  w ere poor. A you th  acknowledged 
th a t  crime w as a problem: “Living in th e  hotel for a while and I 
s ta r te d  like hanging ou t with o th e r  kids and th e y  w ere  like s tea ling  
and I didn’t  w an t to  do it, so  when I hang out with th em  I g o t bad 
and my m other  s e n t  m e away to  a group hom e for a while. And it 
w as bad th e re  too . It w as w orse to o  ou t th e r e ” (Stanley, L., 1988 , 
p. 24 ) . Crime and d isease  w ere no t th e  only problems, however. In 
th e  words of th e  youth: “Over th e re  a t  th e  Martinique th e y  sell 
drugs and everything. People g e t  killed; i t ’s  not a place for nobody 
to  be  in” (Stanley, L., 1 9 8 8 ,  p. 24 ) .  Conditions a t  so m e  sh e lte rs  
w ere  truly deplorable. One wom an re la ted  th e  following story : 
“Harlem [th e  Harlem Hotel] c re a te d  a lot of problem s with m e and 
my children. I have tw o  o th e r  d au g h te rs  th a t  th e re  was an
experience in th e  Harlem w here  th e y  had to  leave — th e y  w ere  in 
th e  e leva to r  and th e re  w as a m urder on th e  se v e n th  floor th e re  was 
a body in th e  e leva to r  with my tw o  daugh te rs .  At t h a t  tim e I had to
g e t  them  out of th e  hotel.. .” (Macklin, 1988 , p. 45 ) .
A fter hearing s to r ie s  like th is, one can u n d e rs tan d  why so m e 
people p referred  to  avoid th e  sh e lte r  s y s te m  a lto g e th e r .  “I d o n ’t  
think — I know th a t  I am no t going to  ta k e  th e m  [my children]
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around -  I have never been  in a shelter .  I d o n ’t  know w hat a 
sh e lte r  is. But from w hat I hear of it, in my opinion I d o n ’t  w ant 
th em  [my kids] going from place to  place like a h o b o ” (Pegues,
1982 , p. 136).
It is difficult t o  imagine how families surv ived  in such  
terrib le conditions. The ten s io n s  of th e  sh e lte r  env ironm ent m u st 
have taken  a toll on th e  families. Certainly maintaining a “norm al” 
family life was a challenge. The em otional difficulties are  perhaps  
th e  m o s t  clear in relation to  th e  children, b u t  in th e  final analysis, 
no one was u n affec ted  by th e  situation . Besides hom eless  p a ren ts  
and th e ir  children, th e  s itu a tio n  also influenced s h e l te r  w orkers 
and o th e r  hom eless  people.
4 .1 .3  The s c e n e  and its influence on o th e rs
Several h o m eless  individuals te s t i f ie d  t h a t  t h e  s t r e s s  of life 
in th e  sh e lte r  s y s te m  was difficult t o  bear. Large num bers  of 
hum an beings occupying small physical sp a c e s  p roduced  a sen sa tio n  
of crowding. One woman (Narvaez, 1 9 8 9 )  rep o rted  th a t  in a she lte r  
w here she  had s tay e d ,  th re e  families (hers  was one) had shared  one 
room. There w as no privacy in th e  sh e lte r  sy s tem . The crow ded 
conditions w ere  dehumanizing. When large num bers  of people in
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need  c o n g re g a te  in a small area, it is easy  to  view th e m  as a 
nam eless , face less  m ass, n o t  a s  so  many individuals. The 
dehumanizing env ironm ent o f  th e  sh e lte r  sy s te m  ap p eared  to  fo s te r  
negative  a t t i tu d e s  tow ard  th e  hom eless  am ong th e  sh e l te r  s taff .  
One wom an re c o u n te d  her difficulties locating em ploym ent, 
observing th a t  “...in th a t  p ro cess  [looking for a jo b  or an interview] 
you try  to  call th e  sh e lte r  and tell th em  ab o u t it. They did no t even 
care  abou t w hat happens to  you. And then  th e  s ta f f  th e re  th e y ’re 
really insensitive a lot of tim es, okay” (Narvaez, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 69 ) .
The s c e n e  also influenced o th e r  hom eless  people. “There are 
so  many people o u t  th e re  I saw  th a t  g o t d es tro y ed . . .” (Stanley, P., 
1988 , p. 22), lam ented  one woman, “...the sy s te m  is destroying th e  
people. They are breaking them  dow n” (Stanley, P., 1988 , p. 23).
The sy s te m  took  away peop le ’s hope, replacing it with despair.
Some people simply gave up. Robertson (1 9 8 9 )  explained th a t  “A 
lot of t im es th e  ones  on th e  g ra tes ,  th o se  are  th e  ones  th a t  have 
really been  th ro u g h  th e  s y s te m  and are ju s t  really t ired  of it, 
h itting their  head  ag a in s t  th e  wall, with no help, no social worker 
th e re  to  really pay a t te n t io n  to  them , to  know th a t  th e y  are  not
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ju s t  an o th e r  num ber on a piece of paper. That is th e  main reason 
th ey  are th e re ,  becau se  th e y  d o n ’t  have th a t  kind of help” (p. 49 ) .
There  are  very few re fe ren ces  in th e  te s t im o n y  to  th e  
im m ediate  scen e ,  th e  hearing room itself. And if t h e  im m ediate  
s c e n e  was m entioned , th e  re fe ren ce  was brief. This may reflect 
bo th  a lack o f knowledge of and a lack of a c c e s s  to  legitim ated 
form s of d iscourse . Most re fe ren ces  obliquely acknow ledged th e  
s ituation . T hese  re fe ren ces  w ere  typically m ade  a t  th e  beginning 
and end  of th e  tes t im ony . Opening remarks, like, “Mr., Chairman, 
my nam e is...” (Detorie, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 138 ),  “Good m orning,” (Johnson,
19 8 8 , p. 20 ) , “Hi,” (Narvaez, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 68 ) , and “Thank you, 
C ongressm an, for allowing m e to  be  here. Good m orning” (Marrero,
19 8 9 , p. 29 ) ,  briefly acknow ledged th e  scen e . Concluding 
com m ents , such as “Thank you ,” (Johnson, 1 9 8 8 ,  p. 20; Mason,
1982 , p. 136; Andrews, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 141 ),  “Thank you for listening,” 
(Wilkins, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 135), “I thank  you ,” (Pegues, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 137),
“Thank you Mr. Chairman,” (Detorie, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 1 4 0 ) ,  and “These  are 
som e of th e  th ings I have e n c o u n te red  in th e  last 7 m on ths  and 29 
days of being hom eless ,” (W est, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 1 3 4 )  also indirectly 
acknow ledged th e  s ituation.
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The focus in th e  te s t im o n y  is n o t on th e  hearing room bu t on 
th e  s t r e e t s  and how th e  s t r e e t s  influenced people. The focus, in 
Burkean te rm s ,  is a scen ic  one. Barbara Jo h n s to n e  ( 1 9 9 0 )  w rites 
th a t  “. ..s tories  can se rv e  to  c re a te  p laces” (p. 5). In th e s e  hearings, 
th e  hom eless  sp eak e rs  are  taking th e  audience ou ts ide  th e  hearing 
room, away from th is  familiar place, t o  a d ifferen t place, a 
d ifferen t s c e n e  -- th e  s t r e e t s .  This sh ift is a way of exerting  
control over th e  situation. The hom eless  do no t have much 
legitim ate pow er in th e  hearing room, bu t th e y  p o s se s s  ex p er t  
knowledge of the ir  lives o u ts id e  th e  hearing room. This m o v em en t 
is significant b e c a u se  it is w hat fo s te r s  unders tand ing . The d e g re e  
to  which th e  audience s e e s  th e  world th rough  th e  e y es  of th e  
hom eless  influences th e  d e g re e  to  which th e y  will work to  help 
th em . The sp e a k e rs  -- th ro u g h  their  te s t im o n y  — are  a t te m p tin g  
to  transfo rm  th e  audience and their a t t i tu d e s .  Thus th e  discussion 
o f th e  s c e n e  is a significant p a r t  of th e  te s t im o n y .
4 .2  The A gent and Its Ratios
References to  th e  a g e n t  largely m ake up th e  rem ainder of th e  
te s t im o n y . The a g e n t / a c t  ratio deals  with th e  a c t  of testify ing  
itself. The a g e n t / s c e n e  ra tios  explain how each  hom eless
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individual cam e to  be in th is  s itua tion . T hese  ra tios  tell th e  s to ry  
of how th e  a g e n ts  b ecam e  hom eless . Finally, th e  a g e n t /p u rp o se  
ratios explain why th e s e  individuals c h o se  to  ap p ear  befo re  th e  
s u b c o m m it te e  and te s t i fy .
4.2.1 The a g e n t / a c t  ratio
An appropria te  place to  begin th e  analysis of th e  a c t  of 
te s t ify in g  is with a d iscussion  of te s t im o n y  itself. “T e s t im o n y ,” 
w rites  Kroll-Smith ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  is a socially s i tu a te d  u se  o f sp e e c h  
involving norm s for its appropria te  exp ress ion” (p. 18). An 
aw areness  of w hat people need  to  know and need  t o  be able to  do to  
p roduce  te s t im o n y  will b e  helpful in developing an understand ing  of 
w h a t th e ir  te s t im o n y  u ltim ately  m eans .
In order t o  talk a b o u t  an experience and p roduce  tes t im ony  
a b o u t  t h a t  experience, an individual m u s t  u n d ers tan d  th e  
experience. Angueira ( 1 9 8 8 )  explains t h a t  to  produce tes tim ony , 
individuals m u s t  re fram e  and  r e c a s t  the ir  exper iences  in to  te rm s  
or ca teg o r ie s  t h a t  o th e rs  und ers tan d . Individuals m u st nam e their  
experience. According to  Anguiera (1 9 8 8 ) ,  te s t im o n y  
fundam entally  requ ires  intrinsic c o n ta c t  with o n e ’s p e rcep tion  of 
o n e ’s own reality. One of th e  reaso n s  th a t  th e  te s t im o n y  of th e
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hom eless  is so  moving and compelling is th a t  it co m m u n ica tes  
individual experience . Phenomenologically, c o n te n d s  Lingis (1 9 7 9 ) ,  
“It is o n e ’s whole ex is ten c e  t h a t  a r ticu la tes  and sp e a k s . . .” (p. 161).
Next, t h e  individual m u s t  r e c a s t  th is  experience  to  publicly 
com m unica te  it to  o th e rs .  This requires in trospection . Anguiera 
( 1 9 8 8 )  a rg u es  t h a t  individuals m u s t  critically exam ine the ir  
experiences  befo re  th e y  are  able to  share  them . She believes th a t  
only by perform ing an internal dialogue with th e ir  experience  -- in 
a s e n se ,  by talking t o  th e m se lv e s  -- can individuals e n te r  into 
dialogue with o th e rs .  This tran sfo rm a tio n  o f o n e ’s  individual 
experience  is w hat c r e a te s  “th e  optimal s itua tion  for gaining 
ac c e s s  to  a n o th e r ’s su b jec tiv i ty ” (Kroll-Smith, 1 9 8 0 ,  p. 2 4 ) .
Forging a connection  with th e  o th e r  is a p o te n t  political force  as 
well. Anguiera ( 1 9 8 8 )  th u s  views te s t im o n y  as a m ean s  of making 
public t h a t  which w as previously hidden. She cons ide rs  all 
te s t im o n y  political.
In coming forward t o  publicly sh a re  their  experience , th e  
hom eless  b eco m e  active a g e n ts  in th e  s trugg le  for social change.
The h om eless  individuals a re  a physical p re sen ce  who can n o t  be 
ignored. Their p re se n c e  lends credibility to  th e  position th a t
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hom eless  people need  gov ern m en t aid. As Fiske ( 1 9 9 1 )  remarks, 
th e  physical p re se n c e  of hom eless  people is “...one of th e  flesh and 
blood m eanings...” (p. 4 6 1 )  of governm en t policy. The hom eless  
before th e  su b c o m m it te e  are  th e re fo re  em bo d im en ts  of th e  
legislative p ro cess ;  th e y  symbolically r e p re s e n t  social p ro g ress .  
Their ac tio n s  have  po ten tia lly  significant c o n se q u e n c e s .
T estim ony  can b e  in te rp re te d  “as  sp e e c h  having significant 
c o n se q u e n c e s  for th e  social o rgan iza tion” (Kroll-Smith, 1 9 8 0 ,  p.
16).
With so  m uch a t  s tak e ,  it is in te re s ting  how rarely th e  a c t  is 
re ferred  to .  There  are  very  few  re fe ren ces  to  th e  a c t  of testify ing  
before  th e  su b co m m ittee .  Out of th e  s ix teen  people who testif ied , 
only tw o  people  explicitly re ferred  to  th e  ac t .  Marrero ( 1 9 8 9 )  
began  his te s t im o n y  by formally acknowledging th e  ac t ,  “I have 
com e here  to d ay  to  talk to  this  hearing to  te s t ify  no t so  much for 
m yself as for th o s e  who could no t be here  to  speak  for th e m se lv e s ” 
(p. 29 ) . R obertson ’s ( 1 9 8 9 )  acknow ledgm ent was m ore indirect.
She b egan  by saying, “W hat I would like to  say  is I really 
a p p rec ia te  th is  o p p o r tu n i ty ” (p. 4 9 ) ,  leaving th is  l is tener  to  fill in
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t h e  r e s t  -- for exam ple, “I really ap p re c ia te  th is  o p p ortun ity  to  
te s t i fy  be fo re  th is  c o m m it te e .”
Only one person  openly acknow ledged her re luc tance  to  
perform  th e  ac t .  Pegues  ( 1 9 8 2 )  m entioned  “I feel like I d idn’t  w ant 
to  com e down here today .. .” (p. 1 36).
More o ften , th e  re fe ren ces  to  th e  a c t  w ere  brief and indirect. 
Andrews ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,  for example, re ferred  to  th e  a c t  as  a way of 
introducing his rem arks. “Now I would like to  say .. .” and “I would 
also like to  say .. .” (p. 140 ).  Narvaez (1 9 8 9 ) ,  also em ployed this 
s tra te g y ,  “I w an t to  s t a t e  th a t . . . ” (p. 30 ) . Som etim es th e  
re fe ren ces  w ere  to  o n e ’s earlier te s t im o n y . “Like I sa id ...” was 
used  by Wilkins (1 9 8 2 ,  p. 1 35)  and Pegues  (1 9 8 2 ,  p. 1 3 7 )  a t  
d ifferent tim es. S om etim es  th e  re fe re n c e s  w ere  to  o th e r  p eo p le ’s 
te s t im o n y , as when MacKenzie ( 1 9 8 9 )  rem arked, “Well like she  
said...” (p. 73 ) . At t im es th e  re fe ren ces  to  th e  ac t  se rved  to  
s tre n g th e n  o n e ’s position. Andrews ( 1 9 8 2 )  u sed  this  techn ique  
when he s ta te d :  “The s t ro n g e s t  thing I think I can say .. .” (p. 140). 
Such re fe ren ces  could also w eaken o n e ’s position, as  when P.
Stanley ( 1 9 8 8 )  said, “I d o n ’t  know w hat e lse  to  tell you ...” (p. 23 ) .
Very few  peop le  re fe rred  to  their s to r ie s  explicitly or 
possessively , as  did Detorie ( 1 9 8 2 )  when he said, “I could tell you 
heartb reak ing  s to r ie s ” (p. 1 3 9 ) .  A nother unusual re fe ren ce  
occurred  in R o b e r tso n ’s ( 1 9 8 9 )  remarks: “W hat I always like to  
say .. .” (p. 5 0 )  and “I always try  to  say .. .” (p. 4 9 ) .  These  remarks 
w ere  unusual in t h a t  th e y  imply t h a t  th e  speak er  has experience 
speaking  publicly ab o u t  h o m elessn ess .  Likewise, D etorie’s ( 1 9 8 2 )  
s ta t e m e n t ,  “Let m e tell you, walking th e  s t r e e t s  is no picnic,” (p.
1 3 9 )  w as unusual, as  it s u g g e s te d  th e  speak er  was an au thority  on 
t h e  su b je c t .
T h a t few hom eless  sp e a k e rs  re fe rred  explicitly t o  th e  a c t  of 
tes t ify ing  s u g g e s t s  th e  individuals who a d d re s se d  th e  
su b c o m m it te e  had little experience  testify ing . They ap p ea red  to  be 
o u ts id e rs ,  unfamiliar with th e  political p ro cess .  The fa c t  t h a t  th e  
sp e a k e rs  did n o t  call a t te n t io n  to  th e  a c t  of telling their  s to r ie s  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  doing so  would d is tra c t  from th e  narrative. The 
s to r ie s  th u s  a p p ea r  s t ro n g e r  since  th e  sp eak e rs  avoided  calling 
a t te n t io n  to  th e  ac t .
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4 .2 .2  The a g e n t / s c e n e  ratios
W hat first s tr ikes  one upon s tudying  th e  a g e n t / s c e n e  ratios  
is how m any d ifferen t rea so n s  th e r e  are  for being hom eless . Mr. 
Marrero, a hom eless  man, perhaps  p u t  it b e s t  w hen he said: “I w an t 
to  s t a t e  t h a t  my becom ing hom eless  is no t re p re se n ta t iv e  of all 
hom eless  people ...m y s to ry  is unique in and of itself, ju s t  as  th e re  
are  s to r ie s  am ong you of s u c c e s s  and failure, trium ph and tragedy ; 
unique b ecau se  th ey  are ours, yours and mine” (Marrero, 1 9 8 9 ,  p.
30).
Many people b ecam e  hom eless  b ecau se  of ch an g es  in their 
financial s itua tion . Ms. MacKenzie ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  for exam ple, b ecam e  
hom eless  when her ren t increased  beyond  w hat sh e  could pay. “I 
b ecam e  hom eless  in March 1 9 8 7  and th a t  was b e c a u se  I w as in my 
a p a r tm e n t  for 10 years, a new landlord to o k  over and he w an ted  to  
raise th e  ren t.  And me, you know, being nervous, no t knowing 
w here to  tu rn  to ,  I g o t  sca re d  and ran. I didn’t  know ab o u t th e  Legal 
Aid or nothing a t  th e  t im e” (p. 7 2 ) .  Ms. S tanley’s (1 9 8 8 )  
h o m e le ssn e ss  w as re la ted  t o  insufficient income: “I b ecam e  
hom eless  in 1 9 8 5  and w hat I found during th a t  tim e was th a t  th e  
b ig g es t  re n t  welfare w as paying w as $ 3 8 5 . ...and w hat I found
h a rd es t  t h a t  w here  will I go t o  look for an a p a r tm e n t  [in New York 
City] for $ 3 8 5 ” (p. 20). “. ..the  reason  why I g o t  into th e  whole 
program was b ecau se  th e  place t h a t  I ren ted  for 9 years  w en t up 
four tim es  within 1 year b e c a u se  it changed  m an ag em en t 
com panies, and I was already on a limited b u d g e t  and I w as working 
par t  tim e, and I knew actually several m onths  befo re  I b ecam e  
hom eless  th a t  I w as going to  be hom eless, and I w en t to  so  many 
d ifferent agencies  trying to  g e t  help before  I b ec a m e  one of th o se  
s ta t i s t ic s ,  with no help a t  all, and I am still on waiting lists a t  
different p ro g ram s” (Robertson , 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 50).
A seco n d  reason  for h o m elessn ess  w as ch an g es  in o n e ’s 
family s ituation . Divorce could c o n tr ib u te  to  h o m elessn ess .  “I 
lived in New York all my life and I left b ec a u se  I g o t  married, and it 
didn’t  work o u t  so  I cam e back to  New York, lived with my pa ren ts  
bu t th e  housing was to o  many people, overcrowding my 
children...And we ju s t  couldn’t  g e t  along, so  I w en t ou t to  th e  
s t r e e t s  and s tu f f . . .” (Narvaez, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 68 ) .  Illness could also 
con tr ibu te .  “I can say  th a t  my h o m elessn ess  or being undomiciled 
or being in th e  s ituation  s ta r t e d  back in February 1 9 8 7  when my 
elderly fa th e r  who I had b een  caring for died. Up until then , I had
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b een  a full tim e s tu d e n t  a t  th e  local university in my hom etow n of 
Lawton, OK. I had dropped  o u t  th e  s e m e s te r  preceding his dea th  
b ecau se  th e  n a tu re  of his illness began  to  ta k e  a tu rn  for th e  w orst. 
My fa th e r  and I had decided  th a t  s ince his illness had g o t te n  so  bad 
and being th e  d au g h te r  t h a t  I was and th e  na tu re  of our 
relationship, we decided  no t to  sen d  him into a nursing hom e so  th e  
chore -- and it w as  a loving chore  -- to  care  for my fa th e r  we m ade 
th a t  he would m ove in with us and I would care  for him....and th a t  is 
how I ended  up in th e  hom eless  sy s tem , my en tire  family and I” 
(Johnson, 1988 , pp. 6-7).
Some sp eak e rs  p o r tray ed  th e m se lv es  as victims: “...I b ecam e 
one of th o s e  s ta t i s t ic s  with no help a t  all...” (R obertson , 1 9 8 9 ,  p.
50  ). Some blam ed their experience  on bad luck. “I was burned ou t 
of an ap a r tm e n t  2 years  ago  and I s ta y e d  with th e  Fox S tre e t  
Shelter for 2 y e a r s ” (Pa te rson , 1 9 8 8 ,  p. 4 5 ) .  O thers  blamed their 
h om elessness  on their own bad choices. “Before becom ing 
hom eless , I w as  involved with in travenous  drug abuse...Slowly I 
began  to  lose my friends, shortly  th e r e a f te r  I lost my a p a r tm e n t” 
(Marrero, 1989 , p. 29).
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Several sp e a k e rs  re fu sed  to  a c c e p t  personal responsibility 
for their hom elessness . Said one: “I am not here  by choice, I am 
here by force. When I say  force I m ean I was forced to  leave my 
hom e, forced  to  leave my family -- fo rced  to  be s e p a ra te d  from my 
family, ra ther. So it is a little d iffe ren t with m e ” (W est,  1 9 8 2 ,  p.
134).  Still o th e rs  p referred  to  blam e th e  g o vernm en t:  “First of all 
I am no t feeling sorry for m yself b u t  I am feeling e m b it te re d .  I am 
em b it te re d  tow ard  th e  s ituation  t h a t  th e  Governm ent has g o t  th e  
country  in. I have five children, and I have worked for 10 years  and 
due to  som eth ing  th a t  is beyond my control....I am not blaming 
myself, I am blaming som eone  e lse ” (Pegues, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 136).
The hom eless  sp eak e rs  g av e  many d ifferen t rea so n s  for their  
being hom eless . Cumulatively, th e s e  explanations m ade th e  
problem appear  larger and m ore complex. By making th e  problem 
m ore complex, th e  sp eak ers  may have effectively m ade  it m ore 
difficult for th e  audience to  blam e th e  victim. Thus, one could 
argue th a t  th e  hom eless  are  no t necessarily  responsib le  for th e  
s itua tion  in which th e y  find th em se lv es .
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4 .2 .3  The a g e n t /p u rp o se  ratio
Few of th e  individuals who te s t i f ie d  explicitly alluded to  
their  purpose. The following co m m en t,  m ade by a hom eless  person  
with AIDS, was so m ew h a t exceptional: “I have com e here  to d a y  to  
talk to  this hearing to  te s t i fy  no t so  much for m yself as  for th o se  
people who could no t be  here  to  sp eak  for th e m se lv e s ” (Marrero, 
1 9 89 , p. 2 9 ) .  More o ften , sp eak e rs  m en tioned  how difficult it was 
t o  talk publicly ab o u t  th e ir  experiences .  “It is hard  to  talk  ab o u t 
being h om eless” (W ashington, 19 8 8 , p. 24).
A few sp eak ers  tried  to  g e t  th e  audience to  u n d e rs tan d  th e  
complexity of th e  problem: “When you think ab o u t  transitional 
housing and th e  hotel sh e lte rs ,  it is tw o  to ta lly  d iffe ren t worlds. 
When you think abou t th e  single person  th a t  g o es  to  a shelter ,  th o se  
are tw o  different worlds. We n eed  t o  g e t  o u t  th e re  and find th e  
difference in th e m  and know th a t  th e r e  are  d iffe ren t p ro b lem s” 
(Robertson, 1989 , p. 50)
Only one sp eak e r  o ffe red  specific  solutions. “Well, I could go 
on and on. I know your tim e is sho rt .  I would like to  m ake som e 
su g g e s t io n s” (Detorie, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 1 39) .
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Although th e re  w ere  few explicit r e fe re n c e s  to  th e  a g e n t ’s 
purpose, severa l implicit r e fe re n c e s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  th e  sp eak e rs  
were trying to  accom plish certa in  goals in the ir  te s t im o n y . An 
im portan t goal was to  portray  th e  hom eless  positively. One way to  
accomplish th is  goal w as by reb u tt in g  com m only held s te r e o ty p e s  
of th e  hom eless . “The s t ro n g e s t  thing I think I can say  to  abolish 
th e  m yth th a t  all people who are  living on th e  s t r e e t  d o n ’t  w an t to  
work. I w an t to  work. I will ta k e  any kind of jo b ” (Andrews, 19 8 2 , 
p. 140). When Robertson ( 1 9 8 9 )  s ta te s ,  “...all hom eless  people are 
no t dope  add ic ts ,  alcoholics, people  with m ental p rob lem s.. .” (p.
4 9 ) ,  she  is trying to  overcom e th e  negative  im ages m any people 
have of th e  hom eless . Likewise, when Mr. Andrews ( 1 9 8 2 )  calls 
a t te n t io n  to  himself in his te s t im o n y , “I would also like to  say  I 
am no t an alcoholic, I am no t a drug addict, I have no criminal 
record, and I have a good a t t i tu d e ” (p. 140 ),  he is trying to  portray  
h im self  pos itive ly .
O ther speakers ,  such  as Mr. Detorie, ch o o se  to  adm it th a t  
so m e  hom eless  people do fit th e  s te re o ty p e ,  so m e  are alcoholic: “It 
is true , I a g re e  with th e  division co m m ander  o f th e  Salvation Army 
th a t  we have m aybe 4 0  or 50  p e rcen t  alcoholic. I know we have
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so m e  young people  who have com e in in th e  last year  or tw o  th a t  
have had hom e problems, or drugs, lost their  way. D isa s te rs” (p.
1 3 8 ) .  Mr. D eto rie’s acknow ledgem ent of this  reality, however, does  
no t underm ine his a t t e m p t  to  p o r tray  hom eless  positively. In fac t, 
his admission th a t  so m e  h om eless  people  fit th e  s te r e o ty p e  may 
have increased  his credibility — Mr. Detorie is nothing if no t 
hones t.  He th e n  couples t h a t  gain in e th o s  with a sy m p a th e t ic  
portrayal of th e  hom eless: “I know people g e t  em b a rra s se d  when 
th ey  s e e  [hom eless  people] ou t in th e  coffee  shops, th e  library, 
w herever, Greyhound, Trailways, b u t  believe me, th e s e  people  d o n ’t  
w ant to  be there .  They h a te  it m ore than  you h a te  looking a t  them , 
saying ‘Thank God it is no t  m e.’ They are  good people. They w ant to  
s to p  drinking. They really do. It is hard. We all know it is h a rd ” 
(Detorie, 1982 , p. 139).
The details  sp eak e rs  revealed  ab o u t  th e m se lv e s  m ade  th em  
more accessib le  to  th e  audience. When Wilkins ( 1 9 8 2 )  sha red  her 
s to ry , sh e  to o  w as trying to  overcom e th e  n eg a tiv es  a sso c ia ted  
with h o m e lessn ess .  The particular deta ils  of her own s to ry  are 
also quite  touching. “This is t h e  firs t t im e th a t  I have ever  been  
hom eless. I am hom eless  b ec a u se  of family problem s. I was ou t in
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th e  s t r e e t  no t knowing w here to  go and a friend told me abou t Mt. 
Carmel. This is a t  471 G S tre e t  N.W. I have been  s tay ing  th e re  for 
abou t a m onth and a half. I have been  seeking, you know, 
em ploym ent. I have cerebral palsy. I have had it all my life. I have 
had six operations. So I have been  going down to  th e  unem ploym ent 
office seeking work for th e  handicapped...l know th a t  their  backlog 
is so high b e c a u se  th e re  are so  many unemployed. So I tell th e  
unem ploym ent ag en cy  my limitations” (pp. 1 3 4 -1 3 5 ) .
A nother  im p o rtan t goal was to  p ro m o te  identification. 
Accomplishing th is  goal w as challenging. Could th e  audience, who 
had never b een  hom eless  th em se lv es ,  identify with people who 
had? Marrero ( 1 9 8 9 )  apparen tly  th o u g h t  not: “No m a t te r  w hat we 
say  we can never fully com m unica te  how we feel since none of you 
have lived as we h av e” (p. 29). O ther speakers  handled this 
difficulty m ore  delicately. Robertson  (1 9 8 9 ) ,  for exam ple, told th e  
com m ittee : “Even though  you are so  far rem oved from th e  situation, 
being part of Congress, you really do need  to  leave th o se  th ings 
behind and g o ” (p. 51).
O ther sp e a k e rs  a t t e m p te d  to  p ro m o te  identification by 
highlighting c h a ra c te r is t ic s  th e y  p o s se s se d  in com m on with th e
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audience. “There  are a lot of people who are like m e,” s ta t e d  
Andrews (1 9 8 2 ) ,  “I have seen  several men who have been  ju s t  as 
e d u c a te d  as  I w as and ju s t  as willing to  work who are still on th e  
s t r e e t ,  today. They are handicapped because  th e y  have no address . 
Well, th e y  have no hope, absolutely  none” ( p. 143). Wilkins (1 9 8 2 )  
po in ted  o u t  t h a t  many hom eless  people, like herself, are 
handicapped: “I know th e re  are so  many o th e r  hom eless  people ou t 
here  in th e  s t r e e t  th a t  a re  m ore handicapped than  I am .. .” (Wilkins, 
19 8 2 , p. 135 ).  By pointing ou t th a t  som e hom eless people were 
e d u c a te d ,  Andrews ( 1 9 8 2 )  m ade it difficult to  s te r e o ty p e  hom eless  
people  or blam e th em  for being in th is  s ituation. When Wilkins 
( 1 9 8 2 )  o bserved  th a t  m any hom eless  people are handicapped, she  
also coun te red  th e  ten d en cy  to  s te re o ty p e  and tu g g e d  th e  em otions 
of th e  lis teners .
All of th e  hom eless  individuals who te s t if ied  a t t e m p te d  to  
portray  th e  hom eless  in a positive light. The sp eak ers  em ployed a 
varie ty  of rhetorical tech n iq u es  t o  accom plish th is  goal. By 
revealing inform ation a b o u t  th e m se lv e s  (se lf-d isc losing), th e  
speakers  b ecam e more vulnerable, bu t in so  doing th ey  also m ade an 
im portan t connection  with th e  audience. As Moerman ( 1 9 8 8 )  no tes ,
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“ . . . fa c e - to -fa c e  in te rac tio n  is th e  c o n s t i tu t iv e  s u b s t r a te  o f social 
phenom ena. Everything t h a t  m a t t e r s  socially -  m eanings, class, 
roles, em otions, guilt, aggress ion , and so  forth  and so  on — is 
socially c o n s t ru c te d ” (p. 1).
4 .3  The Agency
The agency  is narrative. Through narrative th e  hom eless  take  
control of th e  situation . They shift t h e  scene. The focus is no t th e  
hearing room b u t th e  s t r e e t s  and how th e  s t r e e t s  influence people. 
The hom eless  sp en d  their tim e talking abou t th e  s c e n e  and th e  
s itua tion  of h o m e lessn ess .  Their narra tives  focus  on th e  influence 
of th e  scen e  on th e  agen t.
The narra tives  also con ta in  s u c c e s s  s to r ie s  explaining how 
som e hom eless  people w ere able to  g e t  ou t of th e  sy s tem . The 
s tro n g  conclusion of th e  s to ry ,  t h e s e  tes tim on ia ls  provided th e  
hom eless a m eans  of overcom ing blame, and a m e th o d  of 
illustrating th e y  are  w orthy  of help. “We are  co n s ta n tly  le tting 
people know who com e o u t  into th e  sh e lte r  program  w here I work 
at, here  is a n o th e r  person th a t  m ade  it t o  th e  o th e r  side and you can 
do it, t o o ” (Robertson, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 51). Through testim onials  
individuals personify  th e  o u tc o m e  of a s s is ta n c e ,  becom ing th e
exam ple justify ing th e  action. I cam e o u t of th e  sy s te m , for 
one. I am no t going to  be in it any more. I am no t g e tt in g  any type  
of a s s is ta n c e  a t  all anym ore” (Robertson, 19 8 9 , p. 51). The 
testim onial is a n e c e s sa ry  conclusion to  th e  narrative. “I d o n ’t  
know w hat e lse  to  tell y o u ,” s t a t e d  one individual, “It’s ju s t  t h a t  
I’ve lived it, I’ve been  on bo th  sides, I know w hat it is like to  be a 
working p a ren t  and su p p o rt  my family, I know w hat it is to  be on 
th e  welfare line, b u t  I survived it th rough  th e  grace  of God and only 
th rough  th e  g race  of God...” (Stanley, P., 19 8 8 , p. 23 ) . Individuals, 
who have symbolically surv ived  a d ram atic  en c o u n te r ,  u ltim ately 
e n a c t  su c c e ss .  This e n a c tm e n t  em pow ers  th e  individual and 
enlivens th e  d ram atic  encoun te r ;  t h e  s t r a te g y  of e n a c tm e n t  is 
largely responsib le  for th e  pow er of th e  narrative. “I am a form er 
hom eless  person . I work a full tim e job  now. I cam e  th rough  a 
training program  a t  a she lte r .  I was one of th e  lucky ones  to  have 
no t been  in th e  sh e lte r  sy s te m  as long as som e of th e  o th e rs  who 
have g o t te n  d iscouraged” (Robertson, 1989 , p. 4 9 ) .
The s u c c e s s  s to r ie s  fit into th e  larger pu rpose  of th e  
hearings, which is to  prove to  th e  legislature t h a t  h o m e lessn ess  is 
a problem, and th a t  hom eless  people d e se rv e  help. Rarely, however,
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is an explicit appeal m ade. The hom eless  are  prohibited from 
making forceful d em ands  b e c a u se  th e y  have no pow er or authority . 
Instead, th e y  rely on th e  qu ie t plea. The quiet plea appears  m o st 
o f ten  as an observa tion , and is m ake a lm ost indirectly, in ph rases  
like, “It is sad  th a t . . . ” and “....it is a sh am e  th a t . . . ” . One woman 
lam ented  th e  s ituation  w hen sh e  observed : “I c a n ’t  u n d ers tan d  how 
th is  country  can ta k e  billions of dollars and sen d  men to  th e  moon 
and c a n ’t  even  tak e  m o th e rs  and families and give th e m  affordable 
p erm anen t housing. It is a sh a m e ” (Stanley, P., 1 9 88 , p. 23 ) . Such 
obse rv a tio n s  o f te n  included appeals  to  American pride. For 
example, “It is sad  th a t  th e s e  th ings  are happening here  in America 
and this  is th e  richest and m o s t  powerful coun try  in th e  world, and 
we c a n ’t  even  help our own people. B ecause we are people who are 
in s t r e s s  or in need  a t  th e  tim e .. .” (Stanley, P., 1 9 8 8 ,  p. 23).
The m o s t  poignant plea con ta ined  in th e  te s t im o n y  w as a very 
simple one. “I find th a t  a house  is — when you have a hom e you 
beco m e  s tab le  and when you d o n ’t  i t’s  -- i t ’s like t h e r e ’s no place 
like home, I m ean  literally” (Narvaez, 1 9 8 9 ,  p. 7 4 ) .  Em bedded 
within th is  m e ssa g e  was a re q u e s t  to  be included in th e  
com m unity, and a plea for simple human recognition.
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4.4 Discussion
What d o es  ho m elessn ess  m ean to  people who are  hom eless? 
H om elessness  m eans  losing o n e ’s connec tions  to  th e  community. 
Some h om eless  individuals lost the ir  connec tions  to  family. To be 
hom eless  was to  be different, to  be marked as th e  o ther,  to  be 
alien, to  be s t ig m atized  (Robertson, 1989 ; Stanley, P., 1 9 8 8 ) .  
Hom eless people  felt e m b arra ssed ,  d e p re s se d  and d iscouraged  
b ecau se  th e y  w ere  t r e a t e d  d ifferen t from o thers .  They w ere looked 
down on or ignored. Som e people experienced  ho m eiessn ess  as a 
loss of their  individuality. O thers  fe lt th e y  even  lost their 
hum anity  while th e y  w ere  hom eless .
W hat h o m e le ssn e ss  m eans  to  hom eless  people  is d ifferent 
from w hat h o m elessn ess  m eans  to  th e  adversary  or th e  advoca te .
To Ju d g e  Altimari h o m e le ssn e ss  p o sed  a th re a t  to  th e  social fabric. 
Homeless people  w ere  dev ian t a g e n ts  who re p re se n te d  a hazard  to  
socie ty . To Snyder, h o m e lessn ess  w as a moral problem th a t  
required a policy rem edy. To th e  hom eless, hom elessness  m ean t 
being alone and co n s ta n tly  struggling. H om elessness  m eans  one is 
w ithout a hom e, and w ithout all th e  values hom e conno tes .  To be 
w ithout a hom e, a rgues  Somerville ( 1 9 9 2 ) ,  was to  be  w ithout
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“shelte r ,  hearth , heart ,  privacy, roo ts ,  abode  and (possibly) 
parad ise” (p. 5 3 2 ) .
The hom eless  individuals who a d d re sse d  Congress  m ade use 
of a variety  of rhetorical devices to  com m unica te  th e  meaning of 
h o m elessn ess .  The m o s t  significant rhetorical device w as th e  
s to ry .  The hom eless  sp e a k e rs  w ere  able to  t ra n sp o r t  th e  audience 
into their  world by shifting th e  scen e . Very few people m entioned  
th e  im m ediate  s itua tion  or their  pu rpose  for being th e re ,  b u t all 
th e  sp eak ers  d iscussed  th e  hardships th e y  experienced  on th e  
s t r e e t s  and in th e  sh e lte rs .  It is th e s e  acco u n ts  t h a t  m ake th e  
te s t im o n y  so  moving and compelling.
Judge  Altimari focused  p eo p le ’s a t te n t io n  on th e  subw ay and 
th e  th re a ts  p a s se n g e rs  faced  th e re .  His argum ent, couched  in legal 
language, is th e  m o s t  formal and leas t  accessib le  of th e  th re e .
Mitch Snyder focused  peo p le ’s a t te n t io n  on th e  d e a th s  th a t  
h o m e lessn ess  caused . He a rgues  passionate ly ; he is angrily self- 
righ teous . The te s t im o n y  given by hom eless  individuals, in 
c o n tra s t ,  is co m m u n ica ted  m ore informally, and con ta ins  less 
anger. Yet th is  te s t im o n y  also conveys th e  m o st em otional impact.
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Each rh e to r  u sed  a d ifferent agency  or m eans  to  accomplish 
their ends. Altimari’s ag en cy  w as th e  legal opinion and th e  pow er 
of th e  law. This agency  has th e  m o s t  institutional power. Snyder’s 
agency  w as Snyder him self — his visibility and n o to r ie ty  
co n tr ib u ted  to  his ability to  influence Congress  to  ac t .  This agency  
has a m ore limited authority . The hom eless  s p e a k e r ’s agency  was 
narrative. This agency  has th e  leas t  legitimacy. Looking a t  th e  
agency  from a n o th e r  p e rsp ec tiv e ,  however, s u g g e s ts  t h a t  narrative 
is th e  m o s t  powerful m eans  of establishing com m unity. Jo h n s to n e  
( 1 9 9 0 )  w rites  t h a t  our s e n s e  of com m unity  “is ro o te d  in narra tion” 
(p. 5). The hom eless  individuals speaking before  Congress  are 
partic ipa ting  in t h e  political p ro c e ss  and are  s im ultaneously  
creating  com m unity. The hom eless  are in th e  p ro cess  o f  asse r t ing  
their  identities  and their  self-hood, b e c a u se  “.. . the  person  com es  
into ex is ten c e  by partic ipating in th e  com m unity” (Kwant, 1 9 6 5 ,  p. 
243).
The rhe toric  of th e  hom eless  is truly unique, for th rough  it, 
th e  hom eless  work to  overcom e liminality. Turner ( 1 9 6 9 )  
d escribes  liminality as an am biguous s ta t e ,  a s t a t e  of flux, of 
being b e tw e e n  s t a t e s .  “Thus, liminality is f requently  likened to
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d ea th ,  to  being in th e  womb, to  invisibility, to  darkness , to  
bisexuality, to  th e  wilderness, and to  an eclipse o f th e  sun or 
m oon” (Turner, 1969 , p. 9 5 ) .  Through w hat Turner ( 1 9 6 9 )  describes  
as  th e  ritual p ro cess ,  liminal e n t i t ie s  can e n te r  “a relatively 
s tab le  s t a t e  once  m ore and, by virtue of th is ,” th e y  have “rights 
and obligations vis-a-vis o th e r s  of a clearly defined  ‘s t ru c tu ra l ’ 
ty p e . . .” (p. 9 5 ) .  I believe one can view th e  a c t  of testify ing  as a 
ritual p ro cess  which can enab le  th e  hom eless  to  e n te r  a relatively 
s ta b le  s ta te .  Community (in T urner’s te rm s ,  com munitas) can be 
c re a te d  th rough  th e  ritual p rocess .
Turner ( 1 9 6 9 )  o b se rv e s  th a t  “all r ites  of p a s sa g e  or 
‘tra n s i t io n ’ are marked by th re e  p hases:  separa tion , margin (or 
limen, signifying ‘th re sh o ld ’ in Latin), and ag g re g a t io n ” (p. 9 4 ) .  It 
is during th e  liminal period t h a t  th e  individual p a s s e s  from one 
s t a t e  to  ano ther.  One can argue t h a t  when hom eless  individuals 
add ress  th e  co m m ittee  th ey  go through  th e s e  th re e  phases. The 
period of se p a ra t io n  o ccu rs  w hen  h o m eless  individuals publicly 
adm it th e y  are  (or w ere) hom eless . This dec lara tion  effectively  
s e p a ra te s  th e  hom eless  person  from th e  m em bers  of th e  co m m ittee  
who are no t hom eless. This a c t  h e igh tens  th e  d is tance  b e tw een  th e
hom eless  person  and his or her audience, making th e  hom eless  
individual th e  o ther ,  and  alien. As th e  sp eak e rs  con tinue  their 
te s t im o n y  th e y  b eco m e  liminal, th e y  are  in b e tw e e n  worlds. The 
sp e a k e rs  are  vulnerable, allowing th e  audience to  s e e  the ir  
w eak n esses ,  le tt ing  th e  aud ience  look in on the ir  private  
experiences. The sp eak e r  is s im ultaneously  p re se n t  and ab se n t ,  
here  and no t here. The sp eak ers  are  talking ab o u t a life and 
exper iences  t h a t  w ere lived o u ts id e  o f th e  im m ediate  s ituation .
The sp eak e rs  th e m se lv e s  have very little connection  to  th e  hearing 
room itself, and are, in a s e n se ,  a b s e n t  from it. Simultaneously, 
th e  sp eak e rs  are  a vital p re sen ce ,  for th e y  are  bringing th is  o th e r  
world, and th e s e  alien experiences , to  life befo re  th is  audience.
The last phase , agg rega tion , occurs  a lm ost sim ultaneously. As 
hom eless  individuals lose th e m se lv e s ,  th e y  can fo rge  co n nec tions  
with th e  audience.
The focus  of this  c h a p te r  has b een  th e  rhetoric  of th e  
hom eless . The rhetoric  of th e  hom eless  is unique, for, th ro u g h  it, 
th e  hom eless  begin to  a s s e r t  the ir  identities  and a t t e m p t  to  
overcom e oppress ion . The cen tra l issue in th is  d isse r ta tio n  is 
w hat h o m e le ssn e ss  m eans  and how th a t  m eaning is rhetorically
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c o n s t i tu te d .  Several d iffe ren t,  and o f te n  con trad ic to ry ,  m eanings 
o f h o m e lessn ess  have e m e rg e d  from th is  analysis. H om elessness  
can be viewed as a social problem  requiring legal action, a social 
problem  requiring moral ac tion , and  as  a soc ia l/persona l problem 
requiring a hum anistic  re sponse .  Taken to g e th e r ,  w hat do th e se  
different m eanings m ean? Can th e s e  d ivergen t m eanings be 
reconciled? How can rhe toric  help one to  u n d e rs tan d  conflicting 
positions? T h ese  q u e s tio n s  will b e  d iscu ssed  in C hap ter  Five.
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In th e  previous chap te r ,  t h e  ques tion  of w hat ho m elessn ess  
m eans  to  people who are hom eless  w as examined. It is clear from 
th e  foregoing analyses th a t  h o m elessn ess  m eans  som eth ing  
different to  th e  hom eless  than  it does  to  th e  adversary  or th e  
advoca te .  What h om elessness  m eans is no t fixed nor s ta t ic .  
Malinowski ( 1 9 2 3 )  has ob se rv ed  th a t  language m eans  as it is used. 
H om elessness, too , m eans  as  it is used. To Ju d g e  Altimari 
h o m elessn ess  posed  a th re a t  to  th e  social fabric. To th e  advoca te ,  
h o m e lessn ess  w as a condition o f suffering th a t  so c ie ty  had a moral 
obligation to  end. To th e  hom eless, h om elessness  m ean t being 
alone and co n s tan tly  struggling. How can an exam ination o f th e s e  
divergent m eanings of hom eless  help one to  develop a new 
understand ing  of h o m elessn ess?  Perhaps th e  b e s t  way to  
accomplish this goal is to  re tu rn  to  th e  ques tions  t h a t  p rom pted  
th is  inquiry. T h ese  q u es tio n s  w ere  originally raised in Chapter One. 
They are: (1 )  Is sp eech  by th e  hom eless  d ifferent from sp eech  abou t 
th e  hom eless?  Are so m e  sp e a k e rs  viewed as  leg itim ate  while
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o th e rs  are  den ied  legitim acy? (2 )  W hat similarities do th e s e  
sp e e c h e s  sh a re?  Do th e  sp eakers  begin from th e  sam e  prem ises? 
Make th e  sam e  kinds of a rg u m en ts?  Reach th e  sam e  conclusions? 
(3) To w hat d eg ree  are th e  hom eless  p re sen t  or a b s e n t  from th e  
rhetoric  surrounding h o m e le ssn e ss?  And (4 )  how significant is 
their  p re se n c e  or ab sen ce?  W hat is lost and w hat is gained by 
le tting  o th e rs  sp eak  for us? I will exam ine each  of t h e s e  four 
q u es tio n s  in tu rn .
The firs t ques tion  asks  if s p e e c h  by th e  hom eless  is d ifferen t 
from sp e e c h  ab o u t  th e  hom eless. The answ er t o  th is  ques tion  is 
yes. The analysis has revealed  t h a t  hom eless  individuals speaking 
befo re  C ongress  are  bo th  partic ipating in th e  political p ro cess  and 
sim ultaneously  crea ting  com m unity . The rhetoric  of th e  hom eless  
is truly unique, for th rough  it, th e  hom eless  work to  overcom e 
liminality. By testify ing , th e  h om eless  a re  a t te m p t in g  to  a s s e r t  
their  identities  and es tab lish  the ir  self-hood. The rhe to ric  o f th e  
a d v o c a te  r e p re s e n te d  an a t t e m p t  to  influence th e  political p ro cess  
on behalf of th e  hom eless . A dvocates , by virtue of their positions, 
can make a rg u m en ts  th a t  th e  hom eless, b ecau se  th e y  are 
pow erless, canno t.  Ju d g e  Altimari, speaking for th e  court and for
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socie ty , used  rhetoric to  a rgue  t h a t  th e  rights of one group of 
people w ere superior to  th o s e  of a dev ian t minority.
A ques tion  re la ted  to  this first ques tion  is w h e th e r  som e 
sp eak ers  are  v iew ed as  leg it im ate  while o th e rs  are  denied 
legitimacy. This is certain ly  tru e ;  so m e  sp eak e rs  are  viewed as 
leg itim ate  while o th e r s  a re  den ied  legitimacy. The m ore im portan t 
and in te res ting  ques tion  waiting to  be answ ered  is why this is so. 
Legitimacy is re la ted  t o  a s p e a k e r ’s credibility. S tew art ,  Smith 
and Denton ( 1 9 8 9 )  obse rv e  th a t  one ty p e  of legitimacy derives from 
au thority , trad ition , and th e  law. This ty p e  of legitim acy en ti t le s  
one to  influence in a given area. The second  ty p e  of legitimacy 
derives from o n e ’s abilities. The individual who resp o n d s  
effectively  to  th e  s ituation , and th e  person  who m akes  an 
ar ticu la te  a rg u m en t,  a re  people  w ho have gained legitimacy th rough  
their  ac tions  and abilities. Their legitimacy is earned . Ju d g e  
Altimari is an exam ple of a person  with th e  first ty p e  of 
legitimacy; his right to  influence derives from th e  law and his 
position. Mitch Snyder p o s s e s s e s  th e  seco n d  ty p e  of legitimacy. He 
has earned  th e  right to  influence in th e  area  of ho m elessn ess  
th rough  his activ ities  and experiences . But w hat o f th e  hom eless?
149
The hom eless  do n o t p o s se s s  th e  first ty p e  of legitimacy, 
derived from tradition, au tho rity  or th e  law. Nor do th e  hom eless  
p o s s e s s  special abilities which en t i t le  th e m  t o  influence in a given 
area; th e y  do no t have th e  seco n d  ty p e  of legitimacy. What is 
missing from th is  descrip tion  is a d iscussion  o f th e  s i te  as  a 
m eans  of conferring legitimacy. The hom eless  are  given th e  right 
to  sp eak  and be  heard  in a particular location, th e  Congressional 
hearing room. In th e  hearing room th e  hom eless  are  invited to  
sha re  the ir  experiences  and im pressions with th e  audience. The 
recep tion  th e  hom eless  rece ive  in t h e  hearing room  leg itim ates  
them ; here  th e y  are  taken  seriously by th e  audience. This positive 
recep tion  m akes  it possible for th e  hom eless  to  overcom e  their 
liminality. In th is  location, th e  h om eless  are  a ffo rded  a certa in  
am ount of co u r te sy  and resp ec t .  Such is no t th e  ca se  when th e  
hom eless  a t t e m p t  to  com m unica te  with o th e rs  on th e  s t r e e t s .
“The place w here a sp e e c h  is given d ic ta te s  th e  kinds of 
th ings th a t  can be said and th e  w ays th ey  can be  sa id” (King, 19 9 2 , 
p. 5). The city s t r e e t s  as location influence hum an in teraction.
Soja ( 1 9 8 9 )  observes :  “In Foucauldian te rm s ,  cities are  th e  
co n v e rg en t  s i te s  of (social) sp ace ,  knowledge, and power, th e
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h ead q u a r te rs  of socie ta l m o d es  of regu la tion” (p. 2 3 5 ) .  The s t r e e t s  
are  public places. Public s p a c e  is sh a red  with o th e rs .  Public s p a c e  
is socially regu la ted ; ce r ta in  behaviors  a re  allowed and certa in  
behaviors  a re  forbidden in public (Martin, 1 9 8 2 ) .  More specifically, 
public p laces  influence com m unication . For exam ple, Edward Hall 
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  individuals m aintain a g r e a te r  physical d is tan ce  
b e tw e e n  th e m se lv e s  and o th e rs  in public in te rac tions  th an  in 
private  o n es  (Littlejohn, 1 9 8 9 ) .  This d is tan ce  s e rv e s  a p ro te c t iv e  
function, for it limits o n e ’s in terac tion  with o th e rs ,  “it can be 
used  to  insulate or sc reen  people from each o th e r” (Hall, 19 6 6 , p. 
12 3 ) .  Public d is tan ce  is a cloaking device which provides 
individuals with anonym ity . D istance is powerful b e c a u s e  it 
d isco u rag es  com m unica tion , it le ts  individuals avoid 
responsibility. D istance allows people  to  avoid co n n ec tin g  with 
o th e rs .
LaRusso ( 1 9 7 7 )  a rg u es  t h a t  “th e  human organism is a f fec ted  
by th e  physical env ironm ent and th e  im ages derived from th a t  
env ironm ent” (p. 121). He co n ten d s  th a t  th e  im ages derived from 
th e  physical env ironm ent influence hum an behavior. In o th e r  
words, an individual’s pe rcep tion  of s p a c e  influences t h a t  p e rso n ’s
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behavior in t h a t  sp ace .  Being in public influences o n e ’s a t t i tu d e s .
It c r e a te s  a particu lar kind of vision, in which individuals s e e  
th ings  in certa in  ways. This is i llustra ted  by a m o th e r ’s 
recollection of an en co u n te r  with a hom eless  man: “My son asked, 
‘Mommy, why is t h a t  man lying on th e  sidew alk?’...1 d idn’t  really 
notice him. To me, he was part o f  the landscape ...” (italics added) 
(Manning, 1 9 9 2 ,  p. 6D). This explanation of ev e n ts ,  th is  vision of 
th e  world, is b a se d  on a geograph ic  descrip tion, which e ra se s  and 
n e g a te s  th e  hom eless , making th e m  invisible.
Kim Hopper ( 1 9 9 1 )  o b se rv e s  th a t :  “Like ‘th e  h e a th ’ in 
S h ak esp eare ’s tim e, ‘th e  s t r e e t ’ in our own tim e has com e to  
signify a kind of c lose reposito ry  of th ings  evil and alien...” (p.
1 2 9 ) .  Thus th e  a c t  of speaking in this s i te  renders  th e  speaker 
illegitimate, dev ian t and alien. The place in which th e  sp eech  
occurs  is significant. Hom eless people  who com m unica te  on th e  
s t r e e t s  violate public ex p ec ta t io n s .  The a c t  of speaking m akes th e  
in tended  audience uncom fortab le . Explains Hastings (1 9 9 2 ) :
“People are d e sp e ra te .  They w an t hom eless  people to  be ou t of 
sight and ou t of mind...” (p. IOC). White (1 9 9 2 )  sp ecu la te s  th a t  
h o m e lessn ess  d is tu rb s  A m ericans b e c a u s e  it s u g g e s t s  t h a t  “th e
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American dream  is failing” (p. 19). Labeling th e  s t r e e t s  an 
illegitimate public forum allows th e  public to  p ro te c t  i tse lf  and t o  
ignore th e  hom eless .
The se c o n d  qu es tio n  asked  w hat similarities th e s e  s p e e c h e s  
shared. Did th e  sp eak ers  begin from th e  sam e  prem ises?  Make th e  
s am e  kinds o f a rg u m en ts?  Reach th e  sam e  conclusions? The 
s p e e c h e s  sh a red  several similarities. Each rh e to r  m ade  use  of th e  
rhetorical dev ice  of identification. Ju d g e  Altimari en co u rag ed  th e  
audience to  identify with th e  c o m m u te rs  who regularly rode th e  
subw ay and their  concerns. Mitch Snyder so u g h t  to  achieve 
identification by identifying th e  hom eless  as  hardworking 
Americans, people  who p o s se s se d  th e  sam e  ch arac te r is t ic s  as th e  
audience. The hom eless  th e m se lv es  a t t e m p te d  t o  produce 
identification  by sharing t h e  de ta ils  of th e ir  individual s itua tions ,  
th u s  making th em se lv es  m ore accessib le  to  th e  audience. They also 
poin ted  o u t  th e  a t t r ib u te s  th e y  shared  with th e  audience.
One could argue th a t  all of th e  speakers  began from th e  
prem ise th a t  h o m elessn ess  w as a problem. However, each  rhe to r  
defined th e  problem  differently  and o ffered  a d iffe ren t solution. It 
follows, no t surprisingly, t h a t  th e  sp e a k e rs  em ployed  d ifferen t
ty p e s  of a rgum en ts .  Ju d g e  Altimari focused  on th e  subw ay and th e  
th re a ts  p a s se n g e rs  faced  th e re .  His a rgum ent, couched  in legal 
language, is th e  m o s t  formal and lea s t  accessib le  of th e  th ree .
Mitch Snyder focused  on th e  d e a th s  t h a t  h om elessness  caused . He 
argued  passionate ly ; he w as angrily se lf-r igh teous . S nyder’s anger  
may have m ade his a rg u m en t less accessib le  to  his in tended  
audience. The te s t im o n y  given by h om eless  individuals, in 
c o n tra s t ,  w as  co m m u n ica ted  m ore  informally, and co n ta in ed  less 
anger. Yet this  te s t im o n y  also conveyed  th e  m o st  em otional 
impact. This is b e c au se ,  in addition t o  using d ifferen t a rg u m en ts ,  
each rhe to r  also em ployed a d ifferent agency  or m eans to  
accomplish the ir  ends. Altimari’s ag en cy  was th e  legal opinion and 
th e  pow er of th e  law. This agency  has th e  m o s t  institutional 
power. Snyder’s agency  w as  Snyder himself -- his visibility and 
no to rie ty  co n tr ib u ted  to  his ability to  influence C ongress  to  act.  
This agency  has m ore limited au thority . Write Baum and Burnes
(1993):
More than  even th e  hom eless  th em se lv es ,  Mitch Snyder m ade 
h o m elessn ess  a m ajor political issue of th e  1 9 8 0 s  and s e t  
th e  to n e  for th e  political d e b a te .  Robert Hayes, counsel to  
th e  National Coalition for th e  H om eless ...c red ited  Synder with
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crea ting  ‘a lm ost single-handedly  a m o v e m e n t’ for th e  
hom eless  (p. 114).
The hom eless  sp e a k e r ’s agency  was narrative. This agency  has th e
leas t institu tional au thority . Looking a t  th e  agency  from an o th e r
p e rsp ec tiv e ,  how ever, s u g g e s t s  t h a t  narrative is th e  m o s t  powerful
m eans  of estab lish ing  com m unity. Narrative conveys  th e  s t ro n g e s t
em otional im pact and e s ta b lish e s  th e  s t r o n g e s t  connection
b e tw een  sp eak er  and audience. Jo h n s to n e  ( 1 9 9 0 )  w rites th a t  our
s e n se  of com m unity  “is ro o te d  in narration” (p. 5).
The sp e a k e rs  also rea c h e d  d ifferen t conclusions. Altimari
concluded th a t  prohibiting begging  in th e  subw ay w as th e  only way
to  eliminate th e  danger  th e  hom eless  posed  to  p assen g e rs .  Snyder
urged th e  c o m m it te e  he a d d re sse d  t o  make sp ace  available so  th a t
d e a th s  could be  p rev en ted . The hom eless  m ade quiet pleas for
g re a te r  a t te n t io n  to  th e  problem.
The third question  asked  to  w hat d e g ree  th e  hom eless  were
p re se n t  or a b s e n t  from th e  rhetoric surrounding h om elessness .  The
hom eless  w ere  th e  leas t p re se n t  in Ju d g e  Altimari’s opinion. He
focused  on th e  ac t.  The hom eless  were som ew hat p re se n t  and
so m e w h a t a b s e n t  from Snyder’s  te s t im o n y . Snyder so m e tim es
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spoke for th e  hom eless  and  so m e tim e s  for himself. Not surprising, 
th e  hom eless  w ere  th e  m o s t  p re se n t  in the ir  own tes tim ony .
The fourth  ques tion  asks how significant th e  p re se n c e  or 
ab sen ce  of th e  hom eless  from th e  political p ro cess  is. As has been 
shown in th e  foregoing analyses, p re se n c e  and ab se n c e  
significantly  influence political rhe to ric .  In J u d g e  Altimari’s 
opinion th e  p re se n c e  of th e  hom eless  in th e  subw ay is used  to  
justify  a regulation m andating  their a b sen ce .  The Ju d g e  defines 
th e  a g e n t  by th e  a c t  — b eg g a rs  beg  — and defines th e  a c t  as 
inherently hazardous. It is b e c a u se  th e  hom eless  are such  a s tro n g  
p resence  th a t  th ey  are th rea ten ing . The a d v o ca te  Mitch Snyder 
u ses  th e  p re sen ce  of th e  hom eless  in th e  hearing room, in 
W ashington, D.C., and acro ss  th e  nation, to  illustrate th e  m agnitude 
of th e  problem. Snyder a rg u es  th a t  th e  hom eless  are  everywhere; 
their p resen ce  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  problem is enorm ous. Enormous 
problem s require Congressional action . Finally, by coming forward 
publicly to  sha re  the ir  experience , th e  hom eless  th e m se lv e s  
becam e a vital p resen ce  and active em bodim ent of th e  o u tco m e  of 
a ss is tan c e .  The a c t  of te s tify ing  helps th e  hom eless  a s s e r t  their 
individual iden tities . All th re e  rh e to rs  u sed  p re se n c e  in their
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a rg u m en ts .  The p re se n c e  of th e  hom eless  was used  rhetorically to  
justify  laws making th e m  a b s e n t ,  t o  urge action  on their  behalf, 
and as proof th a t  action can be  effective.
A b sen ce  is a lso  a powerful rhetorical tool. Ju d g e  Altimari 
rhetorically m akes th e  hom eless  go away, by defining th e  a g e n t  by 
th e  ac t ,  th e n  focusing on th e  ac t .  Altimari rarely re fe rs  to  th e  
ag e n t  a t  all, and when he d o es  so, he uses  th e  te rm  b eg g ar  ra ther  
than  th e  te rm  hom eless  person. Snyder, who uses  p resen ce  so  
effectively, also d iscu sses  a b sen ce .  If th e  public d o e s n ’t  s e e  th e  
hom eless  th e y  d o n ’t  have to  worry ab o u t them . The a b sen ce  of th e  
hom eless  can be used  to  deny  responsibility. Snyder ( 1 9 8 2 )  
acknow ledges th a t  “The people ...are  no t seeing th e  hum anity of th e  
[hom eless]  people  suffering in the ir  c i t [ ie s ]” (p. 21 ) .  The hom eless  
people who te s t i f ie d  be fo re  th e  co m m it te e  co u n te re d  th e  public 
ten d en cy  to  look th e  o ther  way and deny th e  problem. They becam e, 
during their  te s t im o n y , a p re se n c e  th a t  could no t be ignored.
The las t  ques tion  asks w hat is lost and w hat is gained by 
le tting  o th e rs  sp eak  for us? It is im portan t to  acknow ledge th a t  
som eth ing  is lost and so m eth in g  is gained by le tting o th e rs  speak  
for us. The ad v o c a te  may reach  a wider audience and may exert
157
influence th a t  individuals may not. A d v o ca tes  may also d e t r a c t  
from th e  individuals th e y  re p re se n t  -- th ey  may be  notorious 
th em se lv es ,  or th e y  may alienate  their  po ten tia l audience. Mitch 
Snyder, som e would argue, had th e  distinction of doing bo th . “Over 
th e  years, many cam e to  view Snyder as bo th  a hero and th e  
fo rem o st leader of th e  activ ist hom eless  m ovem en t.  O thers  cam e 
to  regard  him as  a m entally  d is tu rb ed  m iddle-class individual who 
needed  psychiatric t r e a tm e n t” (Baum & Burnes, 1 9 9 3 ,  p. 2 0 8 ) .
The m o s t  significant loss is th e  loss of o n e ’s own voice.
When o the rs  speak  for us, to  so m e  e x ten t ,  th ey  rob us o f our 
personhood. The m e ssa g e  rings less tru e  b ecau se  it is to  a d eg ree  
rem oved  from th e  individual who experienced  it.
In sum , all a c to r s  in social d ram as walk a fine line.
A dvocates  are a t  risk of becom ing consum ed  by th e  m ovem en t or 
co rrup ted  by their  positions. A dversaries  who respond  to o  harshly 
risk alienating th e  public. The hom eless  may never g e t  a c c e s s  to  
th e  political a p p a ra tu s  w ithout rep re sen ta t io n  by an ad v o ca te .  The 
key to  s u c c e ss  is to  control, as much as possible, th e  au d ien ce’s 
percep tions. The m eans t o  this  end is rhetoric.
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Of w hat significance, th en ,  is th e  rhetoric  of h o m e lessn ess?  
Can th e s e  d ivergen t positions be reconciled? In C hapter  One I 
a rgued  th a t  th e  d ifferen t rhe to rics  of h o m e lessn ess  — th e  rhetoric  
of th e  adversary , th e  rhetoric  of th e  ad v o ca te ,  and th e  rhetoric  of 
th e  hom eless  th em se lv es  — c re a te  a “t e x t ” of hom elessness .  
Reconciling th e s e  d ivergen t positions  implies blending th e  
p e rsp ec tiv es  to  produce a new understanding . I re jec t  t h e  idea t h a t  
th e s e  positions can be blended. The value of a rhetorical approach  
is th a t  it allows one to  u n d ers tan d  th e  p ro c e sse s  th a t  produce 
th e s e  d ifferen t p e rsp ec t iv es .  The m o s t  im portan t p ro cess  is 
r e p re s s io n .
When a social m ovem en t is su p p ressed , by law or by cus tom , 
th e  m ovem en t is s tre n g th e n e d .  As th e  m o v em en t s tru g g les  against 
t h e  dom inant order, its su p p o r t  solidifies; th e  m em b ers  unite 
aga ins t a com m on enem y. The civil rights m o v em en t is an example 
of a social m ovem en t which b ec a m e  s tro n g e r  in re sp o n se  to  
oppression. In a like manner, th e  m ovem en t to  end h om elessness  
b ecam e  s tro n g e r  in re sp o n se  to  oppression. I believe th a t  th e  
rhetoric  on behalf of th e  hom eless  was a t  its m o st powerful when 
opposition to  aiding th e  hom eless  was a t  its peak. Cornel W est
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( 1 9 9 4 )  charac te r izes  th e  d ecad e  o f th e  1 9 8 0 s  as  a period of 
“re t re n c h m e n t ,” in which th e  public focused  on accum ulating  
wealth and ignored th e  d isadvan taged . President Ronald Reagan, 
who argued  th a t  m o s t  of th e  hom eless  lived on th e  s t r e e t s  by 
choice (Wright, 1989 ; Hopper, 1990 ; Davis, 1 9 9 0 ) ,  b ecam e  a symbol 
of public a t t i tu d e s  tow ard  th e  hom eless . Reagan w as so  closely 
identified with th e  an ti-h o m eless  position t h a t  Mitch Snyder 
( 1 9 8 2 )  blam ed him personally for th e  plight of th e  hom eless: “The 
P res iden t h as  b een  incredibly adro it a t  c rea ting  th r e e  ring c ircuses  
and focusing a t te n t io n  everyw here  e x cep t  w here  it n eed s  to  g o ” (p.
1 7). The callous and uncaring a t t i tu d e  of th e  Reagan 
adm inistration  gave  a d v o c a te s  som eth ing  to  rally around; it 
s t r e n g th e n e d  th e  faith of th e  troops .
The rhe to ric  exam ined in th is  d is se r ta t io n  is significant 
b ecau se  it was p roduced during a tu rbu len t period o f s trugg le . In 
1 9 8 2  re p re se n ta t iv e s  of th e  Reagan adm inistration denied th e  
problem entirely, claiming th a t  no one lived on th e  s t r e e t s  (Hopper 
& Hamburg, 1 9 8 6 ) .  A year  later, Reagan advisor Edwin Meese called 
soup  kitchens a “free  lunch,” arguing th a t  such  p rogram s se rved  
people who w ere no t in need. A dvocates  s trugg led  agains t th e s e
a t t i tu d e s .  Rhetoric arises  o u t of s trugg le .  Foscarinis ( 1 9 9 1 )  
c o n te n d s  th a t ,  “As a resu lt  o f  ex traord inary  e ffo rt  and p re s su re ” 
on th e  par t  of a d v o c a te s ,  t h e  “political c lim ate surrounding 
h o m e le ssn e ss” eventually  chan g ed  (p. 1 2 3 4 ) .  Myriad policies and 
program s have been  developed  to  aid th e  hom eless, th e  first and 
m o s t  significant of which was th e  1 9 8 7  S tew ar t  B. McKinney 
Homeless A ssis tance  Act. Baum and Burnes ( 1 9 9 3 )  c red it Snyder 
and his activism for so m e  of th e s e  ch anges ,  acknowledging th a t  
“There is no doub t th a t  Snyder and th e  a d v o c a te s  he inspired 
su c c e e d e d  in pu tting  th e  suffering of hom eless  people  into th e  
national sp o tl ig h t” (p. 11 7).
Of w hat significance is th is  rhe toric  to d ay ?  In 1 9 9 4 ,  th e  
plight of th e  hom eless  is old news. Policies and program s to  aid 
th e  hom eless  have achieved varying levels of su c c e ss .  Mathews 
( 1 9 9 2 )  a rgues  t h a t  em erg en cy -sh e lte r  p rogram s “may have 
ag g rav a ted  ra th e r  th an  e a s e d  th e  long te rm  problem ” by increasing 
dependency  (p. 2 9 ) .  He obse rv es  th a t  “Officials have had th e  b e s t  
re su lts  turn ing  s h e lte r s  in to  transitional housing, w here  hea lth  and 
job  problems can be ad d ressed .. .” (p. 29). H om elessness has not
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disappeared; it has no t b een  solved. Homeless ad v o c a te  Mitch 
Snyder gave  up th e  cause ; in July of 1 9 9 0  he co m m itted  suicide.
Today, th e  public app ears  to  be  less sy m p a th e t ic  to  th e  
hom eless. The tide  has tu rned . Smolowe (1 9 9 3 )  o b se rv es  th a t  “The 
sym pathy  of th e  19 8 0 s  t h a t  gave way to  com passion fatigue by th e  
turn  of th e  d e c a d e  is now an open expression of loathing for th e  
h o m e less” (p. 2 8 ) .  Som e cities are  passing  legislation making 
begging a crime and prohibiting h om eless  people from s itt ing  on 
th e  public s t r e e t s  (S an ta  Barbara is talking... 1 990 ; Hastings, 1 992 ; 
Egan, 1 9 9 3 ) .  “A tlanta , Chicago, Dallas, New York City, San 
Francisco, S e a t t le  and W ashington, DC, are  am ong th e  m ajor cities 
th a t  have a t t e m p te d  to  en fo rce  so m e  form of an ti-begging  or an ti­
camping ord inances...” (Hastings, 1 9 9 2 ,  p. IOC). Some observers  
are  calling th is  a backlash agains t th e  hom eless  (Smolowe, 1 9 9 3 ) .  
Timothy Egan (1 9 9 3 ) ,  writing for th e  New York Times, r e p o r ts  th a t  
“Political lead ers . . .say  th e ir  new p o s tu re  re f lec ts  n o t ju s t  th e  
a t t i tu d e  of a public fed up with agg ress ive  s t r e e t  people bu t also 
th e  way new thinking on th e  h o m e le ssn e ss  problem is finding its 
way into public policy” (p. 26L).
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Why has th e  public a t t i tu d e  undergone such a change?  What 
has c o n tr ib u ted  to  th e  “new thinking” ab o u t h o m e lessn ess?
Several f a c to rs  have c o n tr ib u te d  to  th is  tran sfo rm atio n . First, it 
ap p ears  t h a t  th e  num ber of hom eless  people is no t rising. Several 
cities  re p o r te d  in 1 9 9 2  th a t  the ir  sh e l te r  populations w ere  
stabilizing or declining (M athew s, 1 9 9 2 ) .  Second, officials believe 
t h a t  a d e q u a te  social se rv ices  now exist to  provide food and sh e l te r  
for th o se  in n eed  (Egan, 1 9 9 3 ) .  Taken to g e th e r  th e s e  tw o t re n d s  
have cau sed  so m e  people to  sp ecu la te  th a t  th e  problem w as being 
inflated (M athew s, 1 9 9 2 ) .  More significantly, th e s e  tw o  t re n d s  
su p p o rt  th e  belief th a t  “m o s t  of th e  hom eless  are no t working 
people down on their luck and in need  of a meal b u t ra th e r  drug 
ab u se rs  or alcoholics or are  mentally  ill” (Egan, 1 9 9 3 ,  p. 26L).
Such a conclusion is s u p p o r te d  by officials a t  s h e l te r s  who have 
found th a t  “Many po ten tia l  sh e l te r  re s id en ts  s ta y  away...when to ld  
th a t  th ey  m u s t  undergo  drug t r e a tm e n t  and o th e r  form s of 
rehabilita tion” (Mathews, 1 9 9 2 ,  p. 29 ) . Support also co m es  from 
th e  experience  of Portland, Oregon, which in s t i tu ted  a program  
encouraging  p ed es tr ian s  to  give panhandlers  vouchers  th a t  could be 
exchanged  for food and sh e lte r  ins tead  of giving th em  money. They
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found th a t  very few of th e s e  vouchers  were being red eem ed  (Egan, 
1993).
The public’s pe rcep tion  of th e  hom eless  population has 
changed . In th e  1 9 8 0 s  th e  hom eless  population was romanticized. 
The hom eless  w ere  p o r tray ed  as  victims of a callous and uncaring 
governm ent. In th e  19 9 0 s  th e  hom eless  are  dem onized. They are 
s een  as deviant and dangerous. Smolowe ( 1 9 9 3 )  s t a t e s  th a t  th e  
d e b a te  has b een  radically re fram ed  “into te rm s  th a t  re je c t  a 
sy m p a th e tic  view of th e  h o m e less” (p. 29).
This change  in public s e n t im e n t  tow ard  th e  hom eless  also 
reflects  a change  in rhetoric. Baum and Burnes ( 1 9 9 3 )  con tend  
th a t  “th e  very word ‘h o m e le s sn e s s ’ is a m isnom er coined by 
ac tiv is ts  to  p e rsu ad e  th e  public t h a t  s t r e e t  people  are  ju s t  regular 
folks with housing p ro b lem s” (in Smolowe, 19 9 3 , pp. 2 9 -3 0 ) .  The 
au thors  argue t h a t  th e  American public has been  deceived  by 
ac t iv is ts  into believing th a t  th e  hom eless  w ere  people  simply down 
on their luck when in fac t  “up to  8 5  p e rc e n t  of all hom eless  adults  
su ffe r  from chronic alcoholism, drug addition, m en ta l illness, or 
som e combination of th e  th re e . . .” (Baum & Burnes, 19 9 3 , p. 3).
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Campbell and Reeves ( 1 9 8 9 )  offer som e su p p o rt  for this  
con ten tion . They n o te  t h a t  a “sem a n tic  sh ift” occurred  in 
American journalism  in th e  mid 1 9 8 0 s .  Prior to  th a t  tim e, “The 
New York Times Index provided no ‘hom eless  p e rso n s ’ category , 
listing in s te a d  s c a t te r e d  artic les  under ‘v ag ran cy ’ or ‘housing’...In 
1 9 8 3 ,  th e  language dramatically changed  as  hom eless  persons  
displaced vagrancy  as a c lassification” (p. 2 1 ) .  Campbell and 
Reeves ( 1 9 8 9 )  ob se rv e  th a t  being w ithout a hom e implies a lack of 
individual contro l or choice, su g g e s t in g  hom eless  people  are  th e  
victims of fo rces  beyond their  control, no t drifters  who ch o o se  to  
live on th e  s t r e e t s .
Paradoxically, this  c h an g e  in public a t t i tu d e  could be  exactly  
w hat th e  m o v em en t on behalf of th e  hom eless  n eed s  -- w hat 
Bowers and Ochs ( 1 9 7 1 )  te rm  a “flag issue” (p. 27 ) , a com m on 
enem y, a fo rce  which will rhetorically bring people  to g e th e r .
N otes  Foscarinis (1 9 9 1 ) ,  “A new agenda  m ust be defined, and a new 
cam paign m oun ted . The political landscape has changed  since th e  
original cam paign  [for th e  McKinney Act] was initiated in 1985 . 
Certainly th e  rhetoric has ch an g ed ” (p. 1234).
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This re sea rch  d e m o n s t r a te s  t h a t  rhe toric  influences public 
a t t i tu d e s  and ultim ately influences social change . O bserves  
Foscarinis ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  “. . .rhetoric  has  eno rm ous  symbolic 
significance...” (p. 1 2 3 4 ) .  W hat people say abou t ho m elessn ess  
m a t te rs ,  for language  c r e a te s  reality. “Through rhetoric , w e s ize  
up s itua tions  and nam e th e ir  s t ru c tu re  and o u ts tan d in g  ingredients . 
How we describe  a s itua tion  ind icates  how we are  perceiving it and 
th e  choices we s e e  available to  u s ” (Foss, 1989 , p. 3 3 6 ) .  The 
ju d g e s  who w rite  judicial opinions directly  influence public policy. 
The ad v o c a te s  who argue on behalf of o th e rs  can influence th e  
public and policy makers. They give th e  media a fram e and 
c h a ra c te rs  for its dram as (Campbell & Reeves, 1 9 8 9 ) .  “While 
c o m m en ta to rs . . .o f ten  seem  to  s u g g e s t  th a t  all th e y  are doing is 
describing an independen t en tity , w hat th ey  s e e m  to  b e  doing is 
creating  o n e ” (Beresford, 1 9 7 9 ,  p. 14 1 ) .  Very o f ten  th e  voice th a t  
m a t te r s  th e  leas t is th e  one belonging to  th e  person  ab o u t whom all 
th e  fuss is being made, th e  voice on th e  margin.
This s tu d y  e x ten d s  th e  work of Fiske ( 1 9 9 1 )  and Campbell 
( 1 9 8 8 )  by examining w hat h o m elessn ess  m eans  to  different rh e to rs  
in d ifferent s ituations. It au g m e n ts  th e  work of Power ( 1 9 9 1 )  and
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Campbell and Reeves ( 1 9 8 9 )  by discussing th e  Burkean co n c e p ts  of 
identification and division, and en la rges  th e  s c o p e  o f their  
discussion to  include in te re s te d  social a c to rs .  This d is se r ta t io n  
builds upon Lisosky's ( 1 9 9 2 )  discussion of hom eless  children and 
Lawrence and Hocking's ( 1 9 9 0 )  o b serva tions  ab o u t  a t t i tu d e s  tow ard  
th e  hom eless. My research  e x ten d s  th e  work o f Robinson e t  al. 
( 1 9 9 2 )  on persuasive  ta c t ic s  em ployed by hom eless  individuals by 
examining w h e th e r  so c ie ty  leg itim ates  so m e  form s o f sp eech .
This s tu d y  is an a t t e m p t  to  a r ticu la te  t h e  multiple voices 
which make up th e  te x t  o f  hom elessness .  By focusing on th e  
hom eless , a marginal g roup, th is  s tu d y  d e p a r ts  from  traditional 
rhetorical s tu d ie s .  Yet it also em bodies  trad ition , by examining th e  
official t e x t  of th e  dom inant group. Combining th e s e  p e rsp ec tiv es ,  
bo th  th e  new and th e  old, has p roduced  a fuller understand ing  of th e  
rhetoric  of h o m e lessn ess .
Perhaps th e  m o s t  im p o rtan t contribution  th is  s tu d y  m akes  is 
t h a t  it a r t icu la te s  th e  significance of th e  p re se n c e  or a b se n c e  of 
th e  hom eless  in th e  p ro c e sse s  of policy form ation and social 
change . A seco n d  significant implication of th is  d is se r ta t io n  is 
th a t  it o ffers a new way of looking a t  m ed ia ted  com m unication.
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Instead  of focusing on tech n o lo g y  as m ediator, th is  discussion has 
c e n te re d  on how com m unication is m ed ia ted  by o th e r  people. This 
research  has answ ered  th e  ques tion , w hat is gained or lost when 
o th e rs  speak  for you? This im p o rtan t  ques tion  has received  little 
a t te n t io n  from scholars.
Further s tu d y  o f th e  rhetoric  of h o m e lessn ess  is w arran ted . 
Several q u es tio n s  can be  raised as  a resu lt  of th is  analysis; th e s e  
ques tions  should b e  exam ined in fu tu re  research .
One area  in need  o f fu rth e r  research  is th e  rhetoric  of th e  
hom eless. Examining th e  published s p e e c h e s  of hom eless  
individuals is im portan t,  b u t  it should be accom pan ied  by research  
in th e  naturalis tic  tradition. Barbara Jo h n s to n e  ( 1 9 9 0 )  o b se rv es  
th a t  “A person  is a t  hom e in a place when th e  place evokes  s to ries ,  
and, conversely, s to r ies  can se rv e  t o  c re a te  places. In an im portan t 
s en se ,  a com m unity  of sp eak ers  is a group of people  who share  
previous s to r ie s . . .” (p. 5). Future s tu d ies  of sp eech  by th e  hom eless  
could explore th e  relationship of narra tive  and place. A no ther  area 
of inquiry m ight be to  s tu d y  hom eless  sp eech  to  d iscover if and 
how narra tive  helps hom eless  individuals develop a com m unity .
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The relationship of com m unity  and cu ltu re  could be fu rther  
developed  from an e th n o g rap h y  of com m unication perspec tive .  This 
kind of cultural s tu d y  could p roduce  a m ore deta iled  p ic tu re  of 
hom elessness .  E thnography of com m unication draw s from th e  
trad it ions  of sociology, p e rfo rm an ce  s tu d ies ,  an thropology , 
linguistics and philosophy. Such an approach  com bines  “various 
th re a d s  o f in te re s t  and  th e o re t ic a l  o r ie n ta t io n ,” (Saville-Troike, 
19 8 9 , p. 1) which should produce new understand ings  of 
com m unicative  behav iors  and  th e ir  roles in social life.
Additional work should be  done  on portrayals  o f th e  hom eless  
in th e  popular media. Popular cu ltu re  re p re se n ts  one way th a t  
people make s e n se  of th e  world. The popular im ages of 
h o m e lessn ess  reflect,  t o  a d eg ree ,  co n tem p o ra ry  unders tand ing  of 
th is  issue. Such work would a u g m en t analyses  of th e  depiction of 
hom eless  people  in th e  ne tw ork  news. Early portrayals  o f  th e  
hom eless  (such  as  a television program  in which Lucille Ball was a 
bag lady) have been  sym pathe tic .  More recently , th e  hom eless  have 
been  dep ic ted  as alien and th e  o ther. T hese  media im ages may 
reflec t th e  difficulties m any people  have in making s e n s e  of 
h o m e le ssn e s s .
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The Congressional hearings th e m se lv e s  are  a rich sou rce  of 
d a ta  w orthy  of additional investigation . Future re sea rch  m ight 
exam ine th e  functions  o f te s t im o n y  itself. The relationship of 
advocacy  and legislation would also be  w orthy  of fu rth e r  
investigation. Such an en te rp r ise  could be  applied to  t h e  legal 
a rena  as  well; th e  need  for legal advocacy  for th e  hom eless  appears  
to  be  growing. A dv o ca tes  may sh ift the ir  em phasis  from 
legislative action  to  legal action on behalf of th e  hom eless . There 
is much m ore to  be discovered  in regard  to  th e  rhetoric of 
h o m elessn ess  and th e  u se  o f rhetoric , d is tance  and sp a c e  to  
legitimize so m e  people  while d isenfranchising o th e rs .  It is my 
hope, th a t  by conducting  research  of th is  type , a d e g ree  of 
understanding  ab o u t such behavior will be produced.
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